Sandworm Team is a destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. Sandworm Team's most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017's NotPetya attacks. Sandworm Team has been active since at least 2009.
Associated Group Descriptions
|Quedagh||Based on similarities between TTPs, malware, and targeting, Sandworm Team and Quedagh appear to refer to the same group.  |
|Enterprise||T1087||.002||Account Discovery: Domain Account|
|.003||Account Discovery: Email Account|
|Enterprise||T1071||.001||Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols|
|Enterprise||T1059||.005||Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic|
|Enterprise||T1555||.003||Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers|
|Enterprise||T1132||.001||Data Encoding: Standard Encoding|
|Enterprise||T1140||Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information||
Sandworm Team's VBS backdoor can decode Base64-encoded data and save it to the %TEMP% folder. The group also decrypted received information using the Triple DES algorithm and decompresses it using GZip.
|Enterprise||T1561||.002||Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe|
|Enterprise||T1041||Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
|Enterprise||T1203||Exploitation for Client Execution|
|Enterprise||T1133||External Remote Services||
Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network. Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that software company's users.
|Enterprise||T1070||.004||Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion|
|Enterprise||T1105||Ingress Tool Transfer|
|Enterprise||T1056||.001||Input Capture: Keylogging|
|Enterprise||T1036||.005||Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location|
|Enterprise||T1027||Obfuscated Files or Information|
|Enterprise||T1003||.001||OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory|
|Enterprise||T1566||.001||Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment|
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.
|Enterprise||T1219||Remote Access Software|
|Enterprise||T1018||Remote System Discovery|
|Enterprise||T1218||.011||Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32|
|Enterprise||T1195||.002||Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain|
|Enterprise||T1082||System Information Discovery|
|Enterprise||T1016||System Network Configuration Discovery|
|Enterprise||T1204||.002||User Execution: Malicious File|
|Enterprise||T1102||.002||Web Service: Bidirectional Communication||
Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.
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- Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
- CrowdStrike. (2019, January). 2019 Global Threat Report. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.