Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).[1][2] Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.[3] |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.[4] |
| G1036 | Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim organizations through email and social media interaction.[5] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.[6] |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance pre-compromise to gain information about the targeted organization.[7] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. |
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.