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Permission Groups Discovery

ID Name
T1069.001 Local Groups
T1069.002 Domain Groups
T1069.003 Cloud Groups

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.

Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.[1]

ID: T1069
Sub-techniques:  T1069.001, T1069.002, T1069.003
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Tactic: Discovery
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Platforms: Containers, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks; Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC); Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
Version: 2.6
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 15 October 2024
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Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0022 APT3

APT3 has a tool that can enumerate the permissions associated with Windows groups.[2]
G0096 APT41

APT41 used net group commands to enumerate various Windows user groups and permissions.[3]
S0335 Carbon

Carbon uses the net group command.[4]
G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has enumerated all users and roles from a victim's main treasury system.[5]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID has the ability to identify Workgroup membership.[6]
S0233 MURKYTOP

MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about groups.[7]
S0445 ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter gathered the local privileges for the infected host.[8]
S0623 Siloscape

Siloscape checks for Kubernetes node permissions.[9]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the Get-ManagementRoleAssignment PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate Exchange management role assignments through an Exchange Management Shell.[10]
G0092 TA505

TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups.[11] TA505 has also run net group /domain.[12]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.[13]
G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for group and user discovery.[14]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content

Monitor for logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by cloud services.
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
DS0036 Group Group Enumeration

Monitor for an extracted list of ACLs of available groups and/or their associated settings.
Group Metadata

Monitor for contextual data about a group which describes group and activity around it.
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

References

  1. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  2. Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  3. Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
  4. GovCERT. (2016, May 23). Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG. Retrieved November 7, 2018.
  5. Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  6. Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
  7. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  1. Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
  2. Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
  3. Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
  4. Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  5. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  6. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
  7. CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.