ID | Name |
---|---|
T1608.001 | Upload Malware |
T1608.002 | Upload Tool |
T1608.003 | Install Digital Certificate |
T1608.004 | Drive-by Target |
T1608.005 | Link Target |
T1608.006 | SEO Poisoning |
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.[1][2]
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive for use during targeting.[1] |
G1002 | BITTER | |
C0010 | C0010 |
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.[4] |
C0011 | C0011 |
For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group.[5] |
C0021 | C0021 |
For C0021, the threat actors uploaded malware to websites under their control.[6][7] |
G1006 | Earth Lusca |
Earth Lusca has staged malware and malicious files on compromised web servers, GitHub, and Google Drive.[8] |
G1011 | EXOTIC LILY |
EXOTIC LILY has uploaded malicious payloads to file-sharing services including TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer, and OneDrive.[9] |
G0046 | FIN7 |
FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3.[10] |
G0047 | Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group has registered domains to stage payloads.[11][12] |
G1001 | HEXANE |
HEXANE has staged malware on fraudulent websites set up to impersonate targeted organizations.[13] |
G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has used compromised and acquired infrastructure to host and deliver malware including Blogspot to host beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants.[14][15] |
G0140 | LazyScripter |
LazyScripter has hosted open-source remote access Trojans used in its operations in GitHub.[16] |
G1014 | LuminousMoth |
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[17] |
G1036 | Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet staged malicious capabilities online for follow-on download by victims or malware.[18] |
G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has hosted malicious payloads on DropBox including PlugX.[19] |
G1020 | Mustard Tempest |
Mustard Tempest has hosted payloads on acquired second-stage servers for periods of either days, weeks, or months.[20] |
C0002 | Night Dragon |
During Night Dragon, threat actors uploaded commonly available hacker tools to compromised web servers.[21] |
C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.[22][23][24][25] |
C0013 | Operation Sharpshooter |
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors staged malicious files on Dropbox and other websites.[26] |
C0005 | Operation Spalax |
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors staged malware and malicious files in legitimate hosting services such as OneDrive or MediaFire.[27] |
G1031 | Saint Bear |
Saint Bear has used the Discord content delivery network for hosting malicious content referenced in links and emails.[28] |
G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers in forums to enable initial access to executing user.[29] |
G1008 | SideCopy |
SideCopy has used compromised domains to host its malicious payloads.[30] |
G1033 | Star Blizzard |
Star Blizzard has uploaded malicious payloads to cloud storage sites.[31] |
G1018 | TA2541 |
TA2541 has uploaded malware to various platforms including Google Drive, Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.[32][33] |
G0092 | TA505 | |
G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.[35] |
G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[36] |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0035 | Internet Scan | Response Content |
If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as User Execution or Ingress Tool Transfer . |