ID | Name |
---|---|
T1074.001 | Local Data Staging |
T1074.002 | Remote Data Staging |
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.[1]
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0045 | ADVSTORESHELL |
ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.[2] |
G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius has used the folder, |
S0622 | AppleSeed |
AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[4] |
G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.[5] |
G0022 | APT3 |
APT3 has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.[6] |
G0087 | APT39 |
APT39 has utilized tools to aggregate data prior to exfiltration.[7] |
C0040 | APT41 DUST |
APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration.[8] |
G1023 | APT5 |
APT5 has staged data on compromised systems prior to exfiltration often in |
S0373 | Astaroth |
Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration. [10] |
S0438 | Attor |
Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.[11] |
S1029 | AuTo Stealer |
AuTo Stealer can store collected data from an infected host to a file named |
G0135 | BackdoorDiplomacy |
BackdoorDiplomacy has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.[13] |
S0128 | BADNEWS |
BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's |
S0337 | BadPatch |
BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.[16] |
S0651 | BoxCaon |
BoxCaon has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.[17] |
C0015 | C0015 |
During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file |
C0017 | C0017 |
During C0017, APT41 copied the local |
C0032 | C0032 |
During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.[20] |
S0274 | Calisto |
Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[21][22] |
S0335 | Carbon |
Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.[23] |
S0261 | Catchamas |
Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.[24] |
S1043 | ccf32 |
ccf32 can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.[25] |
G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts.[26] |
S1149 | CHIMNEYSWEEP |
CHIMNEYSWEEP can store captured screenshots to disk including to a covert store named |
S0667 | Chrommme |
Chrommme can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.[28] |
S0538 | Crutch |
Crutch has staged stolen files in the |
S1153 | Cuckoo Stealer |
Cuckoo Stealer has staged collected application data from Safari, Notes, and Keychain to |
S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman can stage local data in the Windows Registry.[1] |
G0035 | Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.[31] |
S0567 | Dtrack |
Dtrack can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.[32][33] |
S0038 | Duqu |
Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[34] |
S0062 | DustySky |
DustySky created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.[35] |
S0024 | Dyre |
Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.[36] |
S0593 | ECCENTRICBANDWAGON |
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the |
S0081 | Elise |
Elise creates a file in |
S0343 | Exaramel for Windows |
Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[39] |
G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has utilized the following temporary folders on compromised Windows and Linux systems for their operations prior to exfiltration: |
G0053 | FIN5 |
FIN5 scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.[42] |
S0036 | FLASHFLOOD |
FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[43] |
S0503 | FrameworkPOS |
FrameworkPOS can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows.[44] |
S1044 | FunnyDream |
FunnyDream can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.[25] |
G0093 | GALLIUM |
GALLIUM compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.[45] |
S0249 | Gold Dragon |
Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.[46] |
S0170 | Helminth |
Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[47] |
G0119 | Indrik Spider |
Indrik Spider has stored collected data in a .tmp file.[48] |
S0260 | InvisiMole |
InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.[49][50] |
S0265 | Kazuar |
Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[51] |
S0526 | KGH_SPY |
KGH_SPY can save collected system information to a file named "info" before exfiltration.[52] |
G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under |
S1075 | KOPILUWAK |
KOPILUWAK has piped the results from executed C2 commands to |
G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[56][57] |
G0065 | Leviathan |
Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.[58][59] |
S0395 | LightNeuron |
LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as |
S1101 | LoFiSe |
LoFiSe can save files to be evaluated for further exfiltration in the |
S1142 | LunarMail |
LunarMail can create a directory in |
S0409 | Machete |
Machete stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.[63][64] |
S1016 | MacMa |
MacMa has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.[65] |
S1060 | Mafalda |
Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.[66] |
S0652 | MarkiRAT |
MarkiRAT can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.[67] |
G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.[68] |
S0443 | MESSAGETAP |
MESSAGETAP stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.[69] |
S1059 | metaMain |
metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.[66][70] |
S1015 | Milan |
Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters |
S0084 | Mis-Type |
Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files |
S0149 | MoonWind |
MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.[73] |
G0069 | MuddyWater |
MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's |
G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in |
S0247 | NavRAT |
NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.[77] |
S0198 | NETWIRE |
NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the |
S1090 | NightClub |
NightClub has copied captured files and keystrokes to the |
S0353 | NOKKI |
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in |
S0644 | ObliqueRAT |
ObliqueRAT can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.[81] |
S0340 | Octopus |
Octopus has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.[82][83] |
S0264 | OopsIE |
OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[84] |
C0006 | Operation Honeybee |
During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format |
C0014 | Operation Wocao |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.[86] |
S1109 | PACEMAKER |
PACEMAKER has written extracted data to |
G0040 | Patchwork |
Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.[15] |
S0012 | PoisonIvy | |
S1012 | PowerLess |
PowerLess can stage stolen browser data in |
S0113 | Prikormka |
Prikormka creates a directory, |
S0147 | Pteranodon |
Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under |
S0196 | PUNCHBUGGY |
PUNCHBUGGY has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.[92] |
S0197 | PUNCHTRACK |
PUNCHTRACK aggregates collected data in a tmp file.[93] |
S0650 | QakBot |
QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.[94] |
S0629 | RainyDay |
RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to |
S0458 | Ramsay |
Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in |
S0169 | RawPOS |
Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".[98] |
S0090 | Rover | |
G0121 | Sidewinder |
Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.[100] |
S1110 | SLIGHTPULSE |
SLIGHTPULSE has piped the output from executed commands to |
S1104 | SLOWPULSE |
SLOWPULSE can write logged ACE credentials to |
S1124 | SocGholish |
SocGholish can send output from |
S0615 | SombRAT |
SombRAT can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.[102] |
S0035 | SPACESHIP |
SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.[43] |
S1037 | STARWHALE |
STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called |
S1042 | SUGARDUMP |
SUGARDUMP has stored collected data under |
G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.[105] |
G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.[106] |
S0094 | Trojan.Karagany |
Trojan.Karagany can create directories to store plugin output and stage data for exfiltration.[107][108] |
S0647 | Turian |
Turian can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.[13] |
S0386 | Ursnif |
Ursnif has used tmp files to stage gathered information.[109] |
S0136 | USBStealer |
USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[110][111] |
S1154 | VersaMem |
VersaMem staged captured credentials locally at |
G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has saved stolen files including the |
G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has staged ZIP files in local directories such as, |
S0251 | Zebrocy |
Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.[116] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. |
DS0022 | File | File Access |
Monitor processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. |
File Creation |
Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. |
||
DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Modification |
Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |