1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Phishing
  5. Spearphishing Link

Phishing: Spearphishing Link

ID Name
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.

Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").[1] URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an "@" symbol: for example, hxxp://google.com@1157586937.[2]

Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to Steal Application Access Tokens.[3] These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. [4]

Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through "consent phishing" into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .[3][4]

Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as "device code phishing," an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.[5][6][7]

ID: T1566.002
Sub-technique of:  T1566
ⓘ
Tactic: Initial Access
ⓘ
Platforms: Identity Provider, Linux, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Contributors: Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services); Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps; Mark Wee; Menachem Goldstein; Philip Winther; Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC); Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
Version: 2.7
Created: 02 March 2020
Last Modified: 15 October 2024
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0677 AADInternals

AADInternals can send "consent phishing" emails containing malicious links designed to steal users’ access tokens.[8]
S0584 AppleJeus

AppleJeus has been distributed via spearphishing link.[9]
G0006 APT1

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.[10]
G0016 APT29

APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.[11][12][13]
G0022 APT3

APT3 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[14]
G0050 APT32

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[15][16][17][18][19]
G0064 APT33

APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files.[20][21]
G0087 APT39

APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious links to initially compromise victims.[22][23]
S0534 Bazar

Bazar has been spread via emails with embedded malicious links.[24][25][26]
G0098 BlackTech

BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with links to cloud services to deliver malware.[27]
S1039 Bumblebee

Bumblebee has been spread through e-mail campaigns with malicious links.[28][29]
C0011 C0011

During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent emails containing a malicious link to student targets in India.[30]
C0021 C0021

During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks.[31][32]
G0080 Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.[33][34]
G0142 Confucius

Confucius has sent malicious links to victims through email campaigns.[35]
S1111 DarkGate

DarkGate is distributed in phishing emails containing links to distribute malicious VBS or MSI files.[36] DarkGate uses applications such as Microsoft Teams for distributing links to payloads.[36]
G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails to potential targets that contained a malicious link.[37]
G0066 Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing a link to malicious content hosted on an uncommon Web server.[38][39]
S0367 Emotet

Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing links. [40][41][42][43][44][45][46][46][47]
G0120 Evilnum

Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a zip file hosted on Google Drive.[48]
G1011 EXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has relied on victims to open malicious links in e-mails for execution.[49]
G0085 FIN4

FIN4 has used spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts) containing malicious links.[50][51]
G0046 FIN7

FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links.[52]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.[53]
S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro has been spread via malicious links embedded in e-mails.[54][55]
S0561 GuLoader

GuLoader has been spread in phishing campaigns using malicious web links.[56]
S0499 Hancitor

Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.[57]
S0528 Javali

Javali has been delivered via malicious links embedded in e-mails.[58]
S0585 Kerrdown

Kerrdown has been distributed via e-mails containing a malicious link.[19]
G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a document that contained malicious macros or took the victim to an actor-controlled domain.[59][60][61]
S0669 KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.[62]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus has been distributed to victims through emails containing malicious links.[63][64]
G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.[65]
G0140 LazyScripter

LazyScripter has used spam emails that contain a link that redirects the victim to download a malicious document.[62]
G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with links, often using a fraudulent lookalike domain and stolen branding.[66][67]
G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious Dropbox download link.[68]
G0095 Machete

Machete has sent phishing emails that contain a link to an external server with ZIP and RAR archives.[69][70]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download Pupy.[71][72][73][74]
S0530 Melcoz

Melcoz has been spread through malicious links embedded in e-mails.[58]
S1122 Mispadu

Mispadu has been spread via malicious links embedded in emails.[75]
G0103 Mofang

Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious links included.[76]
G0021 Molerats

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.[77]
G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.[78][79][80]
G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has delivered malicious links to their intended targets.[81]
G1020 Mustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has sent victims emails containing links to compromised websites.[82]
S0198 NETWIRE

NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious links.[56]
C0002 Night Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing links to compromised websites where malware was downloaded.[83]
G0049 OilRig

OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.[84]
C0022 Operation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.[85][86]
C0016 Operation Dust Storm

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious link.[87]
C0005 Operation Spalax

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails to victims that contained a malicious link.[88]
S1017 OutSteel

OutSteel has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.[89]
G0040 Patchwork

Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[90][91][92]
C0036 Pikabot Distribution February 2024

Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized emails with hyperlinks leading to malicious ZIP archive files containing scripts to download and install Pikabot.[93]
S0453 Pony

Pony has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.[94]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot has spread through emails with malicious links.[95][96][97][98][99][100][101]
G1039 RedCurl

RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious links to gain initial access.[102][103]
S1018 Saint Bot

Saint Bot has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.[89]
G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.[104]
G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links often crafted for specific targets.[105][106]
S1086 Snip3

Snip3 has been delivered to victims through e-mail links to malicious files.[107]
S1124 SocGholish

SocGholish has been spread via emails containing malicious links.[82]
S0646 SpicyOmelette

SpicyOmelette has been distributed via emails containing a malicious link that appears to be a PDF document.[34]
S1030 Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has been distributed through phishing emails containing a malicious URL.[108]
G1018 TA2541

TA2541 has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious links to deliver malware. [109][107]
G0092 TA505

TA505 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[110][111][112][113]
G1037 TA577

TA577 has sent emails containing links to malicious JavaScript files.[63]
G0134 Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.[114][115]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot has been delivered via malicious links in phishing e-mails.[116]
G0010 Turla

Turla attempted to trick targets into clicking on a link featuring a seemingly legitimate domain from Adobe.com to download their malware and gain initial access.[117]
S0476 Valak

Valak has been delivered via malicious links in e-mail.[118]
G0112 Windshift

Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[119]
G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services.[120][121]
G0128 ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links in e-mails to deliver malware.[122][123][124]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit

Audit applications and their permissions to ensure access to data and resources are limited based upon necessity and principle of least privilege.
M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content

Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.
M1054 Software Configuration

Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.[125][126].

Furthermore, policies may enforce / install browser extensions that protect against IDN and homograph attacks.
M1018 User Account Management

Azure AD Administrators apply limitations upon the ability for users to grant consent to unfamiliar or unverified third-party applications.

M1017 User Training

Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links which includes phishing for consent with OAuth 2.0. Additionally, users may perform visual checks of the domains they visit; however, homographs in ASCII and in IDN domains and URL schema obfuscation may render manual checks difficult. Use email warning banners to alert users when emails contain links from external senders, prompting them to exercise caution and reducing the likelihood of falling victim to spearphishing attacks. Phishing training and other cybersecurity training may raise awareness to check URLs before visiting the sites.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content

Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.[125][126] URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links and identifying obfuscated URLs) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites.[2] Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.

Furthermore, monitor browser logs for homographs in ASCII and in internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites).
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).

Furthermore, monitor network traffic for cloned sites as well as homographs via the use of internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites).

Network Traffic Flow

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.

References

  1. CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
  2. Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.
  3. Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
  4. Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June 14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021.
  5. SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2021, June 3). OAuth’S Device Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
  6. Jenko Hwong. (2021, August 10). New Phishing Attacks Exploiting OAuth Authorization Flows (Part 1). Retrieved March 19, 2024.
  7. Optiv. (2021, August 17). Microsoft 365 OAuth Device Code Flow and Phishing. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
  8. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
  9. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  10. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  11. Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  12. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.
  13. Secureworks CTU. (2021, May 28). USAID-Themed Phishing Campaign Leverages U.S. Elections Lure. Retrieved February 24, 2022.
  14. Eng, E., Caselden, D.. (2015, June 23). Operation Clandestine Wolf – Adobe Flash Zero-Day in APT3 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  15. Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  16. Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  17. Henderson, S., et al. (2020, April 22). Vietnamese Threat Actors APT32 Targeting Wuhan Government and Chinese Ministry of Emergency Management in Latest Example of COVID-19 Related Espionage. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
  18. Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
  19. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  20. O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  21. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  22. Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
  23. FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.
  24. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020.
  25. Sadique, M. and Singh, A. (2020, September 29). Spear Phishing Campaign Delivers Buer and Bazar Malware. Retrieved November 19, 2020.
  26. Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.
  27. Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
  28. Merriman, K. and Trouerbach, P. (2022, April 28). This isn't Optimus Prime's Bumblebee but it's Still Transforming. Retrieved August 22, 2022.
  29. Cybereason. (2022, August 17). Bumblebee Loader – The High Road to Enterprise Domain Control. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  30. N. Baisini. (2022, July 13). Transparent Tribe begins targeting education sector in latest campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
  31. Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
  32. Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
  33. Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.
  34. CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
  35. Lunghi, D. (2021, August 17). Confucius Uses Pegasus Spyware-related Lures to Target Pakistani Military. Retrieved December 26, 2021.
  36. Ernesto Fernández Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  37. Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
  38. O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  39. Clayton, M.. (2012, September 14). Stealing US business secrets: Experts ID two huge cyber 'gangs' in China. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  40. Salvio, J.. (2014, June 27). New Banking Malware Uses Network Sniffing for Data Theft. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  41. Shulmin, A. . (2015, April 9). The Banking Trojan Emotet: Detailed Analysis. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  42. CIS. (2017, April 28). Emotet Changes TTPs and Arrives in United States. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  43. Smith, A.. (2017, December 22). Protect your network from Emotet Trojan with Malwarebytes Endpoint Security. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  44. Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  45. US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  46. Brumaghin, E.. (2019, January 15). Emotet re-emerges after the holidays. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  47. Özarslan, S. (2018, December 21). The Christmas Card you never wanted - A new wave of Emotet is back to wreak havoc. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  48. Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  49. Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  50. Vengerik, B. et al.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved December 17, 2018.
  51. Vengerik, B. & Dennesen, K.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved January 15, 2019.
  52. Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
  53. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
  54. Abramov, D. (2020, April 13). Grandoreiro Malware Now Targeting Banks in Spain. Retrieved November 12, 2020.
  55. ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.
  56. Duncan, B. (2020, April 3). GuLoader: Malspam Campaign Installing NetWire RAT. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  57. Tom Spring. (2017, January 11). Spammers Revive Hancitor Downloader Campaigns. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
  58. GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.
  59. Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
  60. ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
  61. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
  62. Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021.
  63. Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.
  1. Abrams, L. (2024, April 30). New Latrodectus malware attacks use Microsoft, Cloudflare themes. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  2. Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
  3. Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  4. CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.
  5. Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
  6. The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
  7. ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
  8. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, February 15). Iranian PupyRAT Bites Middle Eastern Organizations. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
  9. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021.
  10. Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021.
  11. MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity – MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023.
  12. SCILabs. (2021, December 23). Cyber Threat Profile Malteiro. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  13. Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
  14. GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.
  15. Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.
  16. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  17. Miller, J. et al. (2024, March 21). Security Brief: TA450 Uses Embedded Links in PDF Attachments in Latest Campaign. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  18. Roccia, T., Seret, T., Fokker, J. (2021, March 16). Technical Analysis of Operation Dianxun. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  19. Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
  20. McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  21. Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
  22. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  23. Breitenbacher, D and Osis, K. (2020, June 17). OPERATION IN(TER)CEPTION: Targeted Attacks Against European Aerospace and Military Companies. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  24. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
  25. M. Porolli. (2021, January 21). Operation Spalax: Targeted malware attacks in Colombia. Retrieved September 16, 2022.
  26. Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
  27. Hamada, J.. (2016, July 25). Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  28. Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
  29. Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
  30. Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
  31. hasherezade. (2016, April 11). No money, but Pony! From a mail to a trojan horse. Retrieved May 21, 2020.
  32. Mendoza, E. et al. (2020, May 25). Qakbot Resurges, Spreads through VBS Files. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  33. Sette, N. et al. (2020, June 4). Qakbot Malware Now Exfiltrating Emails for Sophisticated Thread Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  34. Trend Micro. (2020, December 17). QAKBOT: A decade-old malware still with new tricks. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  35. Morrow, D. (2021, April 15). The rise of QakBot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  36. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  37. Group IB. (2020, September). LOCK LIKE A PRO. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  38. Kenefick, I. et al. (2022, October 12). Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
  39. Group-IB. (2020, August). RedCurl: The Pentest You Didn’t Know About. Retrieved August 9, 2024.
  40. Group-IB. (2021, November). RedCurl: The Awakening. Retrieved August 14, 2024.
  41. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  42. Hegel, T. (2021, January 13). A Global Perspective of the SideWinder APT. Retrieved January 27, 2021.
  43. Cyble. (2020, September 26). SideWinder APT Targets with futuristic Tactics and Techniques. Retrieved January 29, 2021.
  44. Jornet, A. (2021, December 23). Snip3, an investigation into malware. Retrieved September 19, 2023.
  45. Kumar, A., Stone-Gross, Brett. (2021, September 28). Squirrelwaffle: New Loader Delivering Cobalt Strike. Retrieved August 9, 2022.
  46. Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
  47. Proofpoint Staff. (2017, September 27). Threat Actor Profile: TA505, From Dridex to GlobeImposter. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  48. Schwarz, D. and Proofpoint Staff. (2019, January 9). ServHelper and FlawedGrace - New malware introduced by TA505. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  49. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  50. Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  51. Malhotra, A. (2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
  52. Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
  53. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
  54. ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
  55. Reaves, J. and Platt, J. (2020, June). Valak Malware and the Connection to Gozi Loader ConfCrew. Retrieved August 31, 2020.
  56. Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
  57. DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  58. The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
  59. Burt, T. (2020, September 10). New cyberattacks targeting U.S. elections. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
  60. Huntley, S. (2020, October 16). How We're Tackling Evolving Online Threats. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
  61. Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
  62. Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  63. Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.