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System Shutdown/Reboot

Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via Network Device CLI (e.g. reload).[1][2]

Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.

Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as Disk Structure Wipe or Inhibit System Recovery, to hasten the intended effects on system availability.[3][4]

ID: T1529
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
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Tactic: Impact
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Platforms: Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
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Impact Type: Availability
Contributors: Austin Clark, @c2defense; Hubert Mank
Version: 1.3
Created: 04 October 2019
Last Modified: 22 March 2023
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1125 AcidRain

AcidRain reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete.[5]
S1133 Apostle

Apostle reboots the victim machine following wiping and related activity.[6]
G0067 APT37

APT37 has used malware that will issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR.[7]
G0082 APT38

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR.[8]
S1053 AvosLocker

AvosLocker’s Linux variant has terminated ESXi virtual machines.[9]
S1136 BFG Agonizer

BFG Agonizer uses elevated privileges to call NtRaiseHardError to induce a "blue screen of death" on infected systems, causing a system crash. Once shut down, the system is no longer bootable.[10]
S1149 CHIMNEYSWEEP

CHIMNEYSWEEP can reboot or shutdown the targeted system or logoff the current user.[11]
S1033 DCSrv

DCSrv has a function to sleep for two hours before rebooting the system.[12]
S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown.[13][14]
S0607 KillDisk

KillDisk attempts to reboot the machine by terminating specific processes.[15]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus has the ability to restart compromised hosts.[16]
G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.[17]
S0372 LockerGoga

LockerGoga has been observed shutting down infected systems.[18]
S0582 LookBack

LookBack can shutdown and reboot the victim machine.[19]
S0449 Maze

Maze has issued a shutdown command on a victim machine that, upon reboot, will run the ransomware within a VM.[20]
S1135 MultiLayer Wiper

MultiLayer Wiper reboots the infected system following wiping and related tasks to prevent system recovery.[10]
S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya will reboot the system one hour after infection.[3][21]
S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer will shut down the compromised system after it is done modifying system configuration settings.[4][21]
S0140 Shamoon

Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed.[22][23]

S0689 WhisperGate

WhisperGate can shutdown a compromised host through execution of ExitWindowsEx with the EXW_SHUTDOWN flag.[24]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. For network devices, monitor executed commands in AAA logs, especially those run by unexpected or unauthorized users.
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems.
DS0013 Sensor Health Host Status

Monitor for logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the health of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions from logging applications) that may suggest the shutting down or rebooting of the system. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.

References

  1. Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
  2. CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
  3. Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
  4. Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  5. Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen, SentinelOne. (2022, March 31). AcidRain | A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
  6. Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  7. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
  8. FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
  9. Trend Micro Research. (2022, April 4). Ransomware Spotlight AvosLocker. Retrieved January 11, 2023.
  10. Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  11. Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  12. Checkpoint Research. (2021, November 15). Uncovering MosesStaff techniques: Ideology over Money. Retrieved August 11, 2022.
  1. Guerrero-Saade, J. (2022, February 23). HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  2. Dani, M. (2022, March 1). Ukrainian Targets Hit by HermeticWiper, New Datawiper Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  3. Gilbert Sison, Rheniel Ramos, Jay Yaneza, Alfredo Oliveira. (2018, January 15). KillDisk Variant Hits Latin American Financial Groups. Retrieved January 12, 2021.
  4. Stepanic, D. and Bousseaden, S. (2024, May 15). Spring Cleaning with LATRODECTUS: A Potential Replacement for ICEDID. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  5. US-CERT. (2018, March 09). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536.11.WHITE. Retrieved June 13, 2018.
  6. Greenberg, A. (2019, March 25). A Guide to LockerGoga, the Ransomware Crippling Industrial Firms. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
  7. Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
  8. Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  9. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  10. Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  11. Mundo, A., Roccia, T., Saavedra-Morales, J., Beek, C.. (2018, December 14). Shamoon Returns to Wipe Systems in Middle East, Europe . Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  12. Biasini, N. et al.. (2022, January 21). Ukraine Campaign Delivers Defacement and Wipers, in Continued Escalation. Retrieved March 14, 2022.