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Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification

ID Name
T1484.001 Group Policy Modification
T1484.002 Trust Modification

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path \<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.[1][2]

Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.

Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution, and more.[2][3][4][5][6] Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.[3]

For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.[3][4] In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.[7]

ID: T1484.001
Sub-technique of:  T1484
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
Contributors: Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom; Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
Version: 1.1
Created: 28 December 2020
Last Modified: 24 October 2025
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0034 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy and execute malware.[8]
G0096 APT41

APT41 used scheduled tasks created via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy ransomware.[9]
G1021 Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used Group Policy to deploy batch scripts for ransomware deployment.[10]
S0554 Egregor

Egregor can modify the GPO to evade detection.[11] [12]
S0363 Empire

Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.[13]
S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to deploy through an infected system's default domain policy.[14]
G0119 Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.[15][16]
S1199 LockBit 2.0

LockBit 2.0 can modify Group Policy to disable Windows Defender and to automatically infect devices in Windows domains.[17][18]
S1202 LockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can enable options for propogation through Group Policy Objects.[19]
S0688 Meteor

Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.[20]
S1058 Prestige

Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.[21]
S1242 Qilin

Qilin has pushed a scheduled task via a Group Policy Object for payload execution.[22][23]
C0058 SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, modified group policy to enable ransomware distribution.[24]
G1053 Storm-0501

Storm-0501 distributed Group Policy Objects to tamper with security products.[25]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit

Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later).[26]
M1018 User Account Management

Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[3][27][28]

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0305 Detection of Group Policy Modifications via AD Object Changes and File Activity AN0854

Adversary modifies GPO containers or files under SYSVOL using LDAP, ADSI, PowerShell (e.g., New-GPOImmediateTask) or GUI tools. This includes directory object changes (e.g., gPCFileSysPath), delegation assignments (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege), and SYSVOL file writes (ScheduledTasks.xml, GptTmpl.inf).

References

  1. srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  2. Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  3. Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  4. Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  5. Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  6. Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  7. Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  8. Ken Proska, John Wolfram, Jared Wilson, Dan Black, Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker, Tyler Mclellan, Chris Sistrunk. (2023, November 9). Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  9. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  10. Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
  11. Rochberger, L. (2020, November 26). Cybereason vs. Egregor Ransomware. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  12. Bichet, J. (2020, November 12). Egregor – Prolock: Fraternal Twins ?. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  13. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  14. ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022.
  1. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  2. Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.
  3. FBI. (2022, February 4). Indicators of Compromise Associated with LockBit 2.0 Ransomware. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  4. Elsad, A. et al. (2022, June 9). LockBit 2.0: How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  5. FBI et al. (2023, March 16). #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  6. Check Point Research Team. (2021, August 14). Indra - Hackers Behind Recent Attacks on Iran. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
  7. MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New “Prestige” ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
  8. Magdy, S. et al. (2022, August 25). New Golang Ransomware Agenda Customizes Attacks. Retrieved September 26, 2025.
  9. Thomas, W. (2024, June 12). Tracking Adversaries: The Qilin RaaS. Retrieved September 26, 2025.
  10. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, July 22). Disrupting active exploitation of on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 15, 2025.
  11. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, September 26). Storm-0501: Ransomware attacks expanding to hybrid cloud environments. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
  12. Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  13. Microsoft. (2008, September 11). Fun with WMI Filters in Group Policy. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  14. Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Filtering the Scope of a GPO. Retrieved March 13, 2019.