| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1585.001 | Social Media Accounts |
| T1585.002 | Email Accounts |
| T1585.003 | Cloud Accounts |
Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing.[1] Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.[2]
Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).[1]
To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.[3]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0006 | APT1 |
APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.[1] |
| G1012 | CURIUM |
CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader.[4] |
| G1011 | EXOTIC LILY |
EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.[5] |
| C0007 | FunnyDream |
For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.[6] |
| G1001 | HEXANE |
HEXANE has established email accounts for use in domain registration including for ProtonMail addresses.[7] |
| G0119 | Indrik Spider |
Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details.[8] |
| G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.[9][10][11] |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.[12] |
| G0065 | Leviathan |
Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.[13] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.[14][15] |
| G1036 | Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet has created email accounts to interact with victims, including for phishing purposes.[16] |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.[17] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.[18] |
| C0016 | Operation Dust Storm |
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.[19] |
| C0006 | Operation Honeybee |
During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.[20] |
| C0014 | Operation Wocao |
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.[21] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.[22] |
| G0122 | Silent Librarian |
Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.[23] |
| G1033 | Star Blizzard |
Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.[24][25][26] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has leveraged ProtonMail email addresses in ransom notes when delivering Ryuk ransomware.[27] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).