ID | Name |
---|---|
T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol |
T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
T1021.003 | Distributed Component Object Model |
T1021.004 | SSH |
T1021.005 | VNC |
T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management |
T1021.007 | Cloud Services |
T1021.008 | Direct Cloud VM Connections |
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).[1]
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.[2]
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.[3] Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.[4] |
G0006 | APT1 |
The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.[5] |
G0022 | APT3 |
APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.[6] APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.[7] |
G0087 | APT39 |
APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.[8][9] |
G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 used RDP for lateral movement.[10][11] APT41 used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.[12] |
G1023 | APT5 |
APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.[13] |
G0143 | Aquatic Panda |
Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.[14] |
G0001 | Axiom | |
G0108 | Blue Mockingbird |
Blue Mockingbird has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.[16] |
C0015 | C0015 |
During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.[17] |
C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.[18] |
C0032 | C0032 |
During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.[19] |
S0030 | Carbanak |
Carbanak enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.[20] |
G0114 | Chimera | |
G0080 | Cobalt Group |
Cobalt Group has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.[22] |
S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.[23][24] |
C0029 | Cutting Edge |
During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.[25] |
S0334 | DarkComet |
DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.[26] |
G0035 | Dragonfly | |
G0051 | FIN10 |
FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.[28] |
G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.[29] |
G0037 | FIN6 | |
G0046 | FIN7 |
FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.[32] |
G0061 | FIN8 | |
G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.[34][35] |
G1001 | HEXANE |
HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.[36] |
C0038 | HomeLand Justice |
During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.[37][38] |
S0434 | Imminent Monitor |
Imminent Monitor has a module for performing remote desktop access.[39] |
G1032 | INC Ransom |
INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.[40][41][42][43] |
G0119 | Indrik Spider |
Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.[44] |
S0283 | jRAT | |
G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.[46] |
S0250 | Koadic |
Koadic can enable remote desktop on the victim's machine.[47] |
G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.[48][49] |
G0065 | Leviathan |
Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.[50] |
G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.[51][52] |
G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.[53][54] |
S0385 | njRAT |
njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.[55] |
G0049 | OilRig |
OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.[56][57][11] |
G0040 | Patchwork | |
S0192 | Pupy |
Pupy can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.[59] |
S0583 | Pysa | |
S0262 | QuasarRAT |
QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.[61][62] |
S0379 | Revenge RAT |
Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.[63] |
S0461 | SDBbot |
SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.[64] |
S0382 | ServHelper |
ServHelper has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.[65] |
G0091 | Silence | |
C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.[67] |
G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.[68] |
S0670 | WarzoneRAT |
WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.[69] |
G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.[70][71][72][73] |
S0350 | zwShell | |
S0412 | ZxShell |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1047 | Audit |
Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups. |
M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary. |
M1035 | Limit Access to Resource Over Network |
Use remote desktop gateways. |
M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Use multi-factor authentication for remote logins.[76] |
M1030 | Network Segmentation |
Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network. |
M1028 | Operating System Configuration |
Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server.[77] |
M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. |
M1018 | User Account Management |
Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. |
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0028 | Logon Session | Logon Session Creation |
Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitoring logon and logoff events for hosts on the network is very important for situational awareness. This information can be used as an indicator of unusual activity as well as to corroborate activity seen elsewhere. Could be applied to a number of different types of monitoring depending on what information is desired. Some use cases include monitoring for all remote connections and building login timelines for users. Logon events are Windows Event Code 4624 for Windows Vista and above, 518 for pre-Vista. Logoff events are 4634 for Windows Vista and above, 538 for pre-Vista. Note: This analytic looks for user logon events and filters out the top 30 account names to reduce the occurrence of noisy service accounts and the like. It is meant as a starting point for situational awareness around such events. This is liable to be quite noisy and will need tweaking, especially in terms of the number of top users filtered out. Analytic 1
|
Logon Session Metadata |
Monitor authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns. A remote desktop logon, through RDP, may be typical of a system administrator or IT support, but only from select workstations. Monitoring remote desktop logons and comparing to known/approved originating systems can detect lateral movement of an adversary. Analytic 1
|
||
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Connection Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections (typically over port 3389) that may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Analytic 1 - Abnormal RDP Network Connections
|
Network Traffic Flow |
Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows that may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), built in to Microsoft operating systems, allows a user to remotely log in to the desktop of another host. It allows for interactive access of the running windows, and forwards key presses, mouse clicks, etc. Network administrators, power users, and end-users may use RDP for day-to-day operations. From an adversary’s perspective, RDP provides a means to laterally move to a new host. Determining which RDP connections correspond to adversary activity can be a difficult problem in highly dynamic environments, but will be useful in identifying the scope of a compromise.Remote Desktop can be detected in several ways
Analytic 1 - Suspicious RDP
|
||
DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor for newly executed processes (such as Analytic 1 - Unusual processes associated with RDP sessions
|