| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
| T1021.003 | Distributed Component Object Model |
| T1021.004 | SSH |
| T1021.005 | VNC |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management |
| T1021.007 | Cloud Services |
| T1021.008 | Direct Cloud VM Connections |
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[1] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[2] WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.[3]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1063 | Brute Ratel C4 |
Brute Ratel C4 can use WinRM for pivoting.[4] |
| G0114 | Chimera | |
| S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can use |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has leveraged |
| C0048 | Operation MidnightEclipse |
During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used WinRM to move laterally in targeted networks.[9] |
| S0692 | SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY tracks |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WinRM via PowerShell to execute commands and payloads on remote hosts.[11] |
| G1053 | Storm-0501 |
Storm-0501 has utilized the post-exploitation tool known as Evil-WinRM that uses PowerShell over Windows Remote Management (WinRM) for remote code execution.[12] |
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution.[13] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has used Window Remote Management to move laterally through a victim network.[14] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Disable the WinRM service. |
| M1030 | Network Segmentation |
If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure and follow WinRM best practices on use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[15] |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM accounts and permissions. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0477 | Behavioral Detection of WinRM-Based Remote Access | AN1313 |
Adversaries using WinRM to remotely execute commands, launch child processes, or access WMI. The detection chain includes service use, network activity, remote session logon, and process creation within a short temporal window. |