| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1001.001 | Junk Data |
| T1001.002 | Steganography |
| T1001.003 | Protocol or Service Impersonation |
Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.
Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity.
Adversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.[1][2]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0245 | BADCALL | |
| S0239 | Bankshot |
Bankshot generates a false TLS handshake using a public certificate to disguise C2 network communications.[4] |
| S1226 | BOOKWORM |
BOOKWORM has modified HTTP POST requests to resemble legitimate communications.[5] |
| C0017 | C0017 |
During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.[6] |
| S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can leverage the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual data in either an HTTP header, URI parameter, the transaction body, or appending it to the URI.[7] |
| S0076 | FakeM |
FakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.[8] |
| S0181 | FALLCHILL |
FALLCHILL uses fake Transport Layer Security (TLS) to communicate with its C2 server.[9] |
| S1120 | FRAMESTING |
FRAMESTING uses a cookie named |
| S0246 | HARDRAIN |
HARDRAIN uses FakeTLS to communicate with its C2 server.[11] |
| G0126 | Higaisa | |
| S0260 | InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can mimic HTTP protocol with custom HTTP "verbs" HIDE, ZVVP, and NOP.[13][14] |
| S0387 | KeyBoy |
KeyBoy uses custom SSL libraries to impersonate SSL in C2 traffic.[15] |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.[16][17][18][19] |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has utilized TLS record headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. Mustang Panda has used FakeTLS to communicate with its C2 servers.[20] |
| S1100 | Ninja |
Ninja has the ability to mimic legitimate services with customized HTTP URL paths and headers to hide malicious traffic.[21] |
| S0439 | Okrum |
Okrum leverages the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual messages in the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers of the HTTP requests.[1] |
| S1228 | PUBLOAD |
PUBLOAD has modified HTTP POST requests to resemble legitimate communications.[22][5] PUBLOAD used FakeTLS headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. PUBLOAD has utilized FakeTLS headers with the bytes 17 03 03.[23] |
| S1227 | StarProxy |
StarProxy has utilized TLS record headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. StarProxy used FakeTLS to communicate with its C2 server.[20] |
| S0559 | SUNBURST |
SUNBURST masqueraded its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol.[24] |
| S0586 | TAINTEDSCRIBE |
TAINTEDSCRIBE has used FakeTLS for session authentication.[25] |
| S1239 | TONESHELL |
TONESHELL used FakeTLS headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic.[23][20] TONESHELL variants have utilized FakeTLS headers with the bytes |
| S0022 | Uroburos |
Uroburos can use custom communication methodologies that ride over common protocols including TCP, UDP, HTTP, SMTP, and DNS in order to blend with normal network traffic. [26] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0470 | Detecting Protocol or Service Impersonation via Anomalous TLS, HTTP Header, and Port Mismatch Correlation | AN1294 |
Untrusted processes creating outbound TLS/HTTPS connections with malformed certificates or header fields, often mismatched with target service behavior. Detects protocol impersonation attempts via traffic metadata analysis and host process lineage. |
| AN1295 |
Detection of binaries spawning encrypted sessions using OpenSSL or curl to external services with mismatched ports/protocols. Identifies behavior where internal services simulate trusted cloud service traffic patterns. |
||
| AN1296 |
Unsigned or suspicious applications initiating network traffic claiming to be browser, mail, or cloud clients. Detects impersonation via TLS fingerprint and User-Agent string deviation. |
||
| AN1297 |
ESXi hosts initiating connections from non-standard daemons mimicking HTTP/HTTPS or SNMP traffic, but with irregular payload formats or expired/unsigned TLS certificates. |