| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1583.001 | Domains |
| T1583.002 | DNS Server |
| T1583.003 | Virtual Private Server |
| T1583.004 | Server |
| T1583.005 | Botnet |
| T1583.006 | Web Services |
| T1583.007 | Serverless |
| T1583.008 | Malvertising |
Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in Drive-by Compromise, enabling Phishing operations, or facilitating Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party Server or renting a Virtual Private Server, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.[1][2]
Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.[3]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1012 | CURIUM |
CURIUM has created dedicated servers for command and control and exfiltration purposes.[4] |
| G1006 | Earth Lusca |
Earth Lusca has acquired multiple servers for some of their operations, using each server for a different role.[5] |
| G0093 | GALLIUM |
GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM.[6] |
| G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.[7] |
| G1020 | Mustard Tempest |
Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months.[8] |
| C0002 | Night Dragon |
During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2.[9] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.[10] |
| C0006 | Operation Honeybee |
For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server.[11] |
| C0014 | Operation Wocao |
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation.[12] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.[13] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0035 | Internet Scan | Response Content |
Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.[14][15][16] |
| Response Metadata |
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |