1. Home
  2. Groups
  3. Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

ID: G0034
ⓘ
Associated Groups: ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING, BlackEnergy (Group), Quedagh, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUM, Seashell Blizzard, FROZENBARENTS, APT44
Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence; Hakan KARABACAK
Version: 4.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 12 September 2024
Version Permalink

Associated Group Descriptions

Name Description
ELECTRUM

[8][2]
Telebots

[6][1][2]
IRON VIKING

[9][1][2]
BlackEnergy (Group)

[6][2]
Quedagh

[3] [10][2]
Voodoo Bear

[4][1][2]
IRIDIUM

[11]
Seashell Blizzard

[12]
FROZENBARENTS

[13]
APT44

[14]

Campaigns

ID Name First Seen Last Seen References Techniques
C0028 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack December 2015 [15] January 2016 [15]

[16] [1]

 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Block Command Message, Block Reporting Message, Block Serial COM, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Commonly Used Port, Connection Proxy, Create Account: Domain Account, Denial of Control, Denial of Service, Device Restart/Shutdown, External Remote Services, External Remote Services, Graphical User Interface, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Lateral Tool Transfer, Lateral Tool Transfer, Loss of Availability, Loss of Control, Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Manipulation of Control, Modify Registry, Network Sniffing, Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment, Process Injection, Remote Services, Remote System Discovery, Remote System Discovery, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Firmware, Unauthorized Command Message, User Execution: Malicious File, Valid Accounts, Valid Accounts
C0025 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack December 2016 [17][18] December 2016 [17][18]

[1][19]

 Account Manipulation, Brute Force, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Command-Line Interface, Compromise Host Software Binary, Create Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging, Lateral Tool Transfer, Lateral Tool Transfer, Masquerading: Masquerade File Type, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Masquerading: Masquerade Account Name, Masquerading, Obfuscated Files or Information, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote Services, Remote System Discovery, Scripting, Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures, Valid Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation
C0034 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack June 2022 [20] October 2022 [20]

[20][21]

Autorun Image, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command-Line Interface, Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service, Data Destruction, Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification, Lateral Tool Transfer, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Protocol Tunneling, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Scripting, Server Software Component: Web Shell, System Binary Proxy Execution, Unauthorized Command Message
Enterprise Layer
download view
Mobile Layer
download view
ICS Layer
download view

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1087 .002 Account Discovery: Domain Account

Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about usernames listed in AD.[22]

.003 Account Discovery: Email Account

Sandworm Team used malware to enumerate email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application.[23]

Enterprise T1098 Account Manipulation

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the sp_addlinkedsrvlogin command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network.[18]
Enterprise T1583 Acquire Infrastructure

Sandworm Team used various third-party email campaign management services to deliver phishing emails.[13]
.001 Domains

Sandworm Team has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages, while also hosting these items on legitimate, compromised network infrastructure.[1][24]
.004 Server

Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.[1]
Enterprise T1595 .002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning.[1]
Enterprise T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool connects to the designated C2 server via HTTP.[22]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests. [15]
Enterprise T1110 Brute Force

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts.[18]
Enterprise T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Sandworm Team has used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.[1][18]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.[18]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy.[20]
.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL.[18]
.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

Sandworm Team has created VBScripts to run an SSH server.[25][22][26][18]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a VBA script called vba_macro.exe. This macro dropped FONTCACHE.DAT, the primary BlackEnergy implant; rundll32.exe, for executing the malware; NTUSER.log, an empty file; and desktop.ini, the default file used to determine folder displays on Windows machines. [15]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server.[18]
Enterprise T1586 .001 Compromise Accounts: Social Media Accounts

Sandworm Team creates credential capture webpages to compromise existing, legitimate social media accounts.[24]
Enterprise T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.[17]
Enterprise T1584 .004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server

Sandworm Team compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns.[27][13]
.005 Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet

Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.[28]
Enterprise T1136 .002 Create Account: Domain Account

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created privileged domain accounts to be used for further exploitation and lateral movement. [15]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, "admin" and "система" (System). The accounts were then assigned to a domain matching local operation and were delegated new privileges.[18]
Enterprise T1543 .002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team configured Systemd to maintain persistence of GOGETTER, specifying the WantedBy=multi-user.target configuration to run GOGETTER when the system begins accepting user logins.[20]
.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary. [29]
Enterprise T1555 .003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Sandworm Team's CredRaptor tool can collect saved passwords from various internet browsers.[22]
Enterprise T1485 Data Destruction

Sandworm Team has used CaddyWiper, SDelete, and the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on victim systems. [30][26][20] Additionally, Sandworm Team has used the JUNKMAIL tool to overwrite files with null bytes.[14]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions.[20]
Enterprise T1132 .001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.[22]

Enterprise T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Sandworm Team has used Prestige ransomware to encrypt data at targeted organizations in transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland.[11]
Enterprise T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Sandworm Team exfiltrates data of interest from enterprise databases using Adminer.[13]
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

Sandworm Team has exfiltrated internal documents, files, and other data from compromised hosts.[1]
Enterprise T1491 .002 Defacement: External Defacement

Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.[1][2]
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Sandworm Team's VBS backdoor can decode Base64-encoded data and save it to the %TEMP% folder. The group also decrypted received information using the Triple DES algorithm and decompresses it using GZip.[22][23]
Enterprise T1587 .001 Develop Capabilities: Malware

Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer.[1]
Enterprise T1561 .002 Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe

Sandworm Team has used the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to corrupt the infected system's master boot record.[30][26]
Enterprise T1484 .001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy and execute malware.[20]
Enterprise T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service

Sandworm Team temporarily disrupted service to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector websites after compromising a Georgian web hosting provider in 2019.[1]
Enterprise T1585 .001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts

Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.[1]
.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts

Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.[1]
Enterprise T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.[22]

Enterprise T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Sandworm Team exploits public-facing applications for initial access and to acquire infrastructure, such as exploitation of the EXIM mail transfer agent in Linux systems.[27][13]
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Sandworm Team has exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft PowerPoint via OLE objects (CVE-2014-4114) and Microsoft Word via crafted TIFF images (CVE-2013-3906).[31][32][33]
Enterprise T1133 External Remote Services

Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network. Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that software company's users.[25][26][34][14]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems. [15]
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Sandworm Team has enumerated files on a compromised host.[1][18]
Enterprise T1592 .002 Gather Victim Host Information: Software

Sandworm Team has researched software code to enable supply-chain operations, most notably for the 2017 NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team also collected a list of computers using specific software as part of its targeting efforts.[1]
Enterprise T1589 .002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses

Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.[1]
.003 Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names

Sandworm Team's research of potential victim organizations included the identification and collection of employee information.[1]
Enterprise T1590 .001 Gather Victim Network Information: Domain Properties

Sandworm Team conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack.[1]
Enterprise T1591 .002 Gather Victim Org Information: Business Relationships

In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics, Sandworm Team conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site.[1]
Enterprise T1562 .001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security. [15]
.002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems.[18]
Enterprise T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

Sandworm Team has used backdoors that can delete files used in an attack from an infected system.[22][23][20]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after FONTCACHE.DAT, rundll32.exe, and the associated .lnk file is delivered. [15]
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Sandworm Team has pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.[22][1]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data. [15]
Enterprise T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Sandworm Team uses Prestige to delete the backup catalog from the target system using: C:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet and to delete volume shadow copies using: C:\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. [11]

Enterprise T1056 .001 Input Capture: Keylogging

Sandworm Team has used a keylogger to capture keystrokes by using the SetWindowsHookEx function.[22]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin. [15][35]
Enterprise T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Sandworm Team has used move to transfer files to a network share and has copied payloads--such as Prestige ransomware--to an Active Directory Domain Controller and distributed via the Default Domain Group Policy Object.[18][11] Additionally, Sandworm Team has transferred an ISO file into the OT network to gain initial access.[20]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the corporate network and between the ICS and corporate network. [15]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used move to transfer files to a network share.[18]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object (GPO) to copy CaddyWiper's executable msserver.exe from a staging server to a local hard drive before deployment.[20]
Enterprise T1036 Masquerading

Sandworm Team masqueraded malicious installers as Windows update packages to evade defense and entice users to execute binaries.[13]
.004 Masquerade Task or Service

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services.[20]
.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location

Sandworm Team has avoided detection by naming a malicious binary explorer.exe.[22][1]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.[29]
.008 Masquerade File Type

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as .txt files.[18]
.010 Masquerade Account Name

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, "admin" and "система" (System).[18]
Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. [15].
Enterprise T1106 Native API

Sandworm Team uses Prestige to disable and restore file system redirection by using the following functions: Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection() and Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection().[11]
Enterprise T1040 Network Sniffing

Sandworm Team has used intercepter-NG to sniff passwords in network traffic.[22]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy’s network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid’s industrial control systems. [36]
Enterprise T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel.[20]
Enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port

Sandworm Team has used port 6789 to accept connections on the group's SSH server.[25]
Enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Sandworm Team has used Base64 encoding within malware variants.[31]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used heavily obfuscated code with Industroyer in its Windows Notepad backdoor.[17]
.002 Software Packing

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.[18]
.010 Command Obfuscation

Sandworm Team has used ROT13 encoding, AES encryption and compression with the zlib library for their Python-based backdoor.[22]
Enterprise T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

Sandworm Team has acquired open-source tools for their operations, including Invoke-PSImage, which was used to establish an encrypted channel from a compromised host to Sandworm Team's C2 server in preparation for the 2018 Winter Olympics attack, as well as Impacket and RemoteExec, which were used in their 2022 Prestige operations.[1][11] Additionally, Sandworm Team has used Empire, Cobalt Strike and PoshC2.[14]
.006 Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities

In 2017, Sandworm Team conducted technical research related to vulnerabilities associated with websites used by the Korean Sport and Olympic Committee, a Korean power company, and a Korean airport.[1]
Enterprise T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Sandworm Team has used its plainpwd tool, a modified version of Mimikatz, and comsvcs.dll to dump Windows credentials from system memory.[22][26][11]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials.[18]
.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

Sandworm Team has used ntdsutil.exe to back up the Active Directory database, likely for credential access.[11]
Enterprise T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office and ZIP file attachments via spearphishing emails.[31][30][22][1][37][14]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team obtained their initial foothold into many IT systems using Microsoft Office attachments delivered through phishing emails. [35]
.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.[1]
Enterprise T1598 .003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link

Sandworm Team has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials.[1]
Enterprise T1055 Process Injection

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2. [15]
Enterprise T1572 Protocol Tunneling

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the GOGETTER tunneler software to establish a "Yamux" TLS-based C2 channel with an external server(s).[20]
Enterprise T1090 Proxy

Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.[22]

Enterprise T1219 Remote Access Software

Sandworm Team has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers.[30][11]
Enterprise T1021 .002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Sandworm Team has copied payloads to the ADMIN$ share of remote systems and run net use to connect to network shares.[18][11]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized net use to connect to network shares.[18]
Enterprise T1018 Remote System Discovery

Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[22][18]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets. [36]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[18]
Enterprise T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines.[14]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.[20]
Enterprise T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains

Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an "EDRPOU" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spearphishing emails.[1]
Enterprise T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites

Sandworm Team has conducted research against potential victim websites as part of its operational planning.[1]
Enterprise T1505 .001 Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures.[18]
.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell

Sandworm Team has used webshells including P.A.S. Webshell to maintain access to victim networks.[34]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the Neo-REGEORG webshell on an internet-facing server.[20]
Enterprise T1489 Service Stop

Sandworm Team attempts to stop the MSSQL Windows service to ensure successful encryption of locked files.[11]

Enterprise T1072 Software Deployment Tools

Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.[11]
Enterprise T1608 .001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers in forums to enable initial access to executing user.[14]
Enterprise T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

Sandworm Team used information stealer malware to collect browser session cookies.[13]
Enterprise T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers on forums to achieve initial, untargetetd access in victim environments.[14]

.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.[38][26][1]
Enterprise T1218 .011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using rundll32.exe.[23]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using rundll32.exe. [15]
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

Sandworm Team used a backdoor to enumerate information about the infected system's operating system.[23][1]

Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

Sandworm Team had gathered user, IP address, and server data related to RDP sessions on a compromised host. It has also accessed network diagram files useful for understanding how a host's network was configured.[1][18]

Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

Sandworm Team has collected the username from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise T1199 Trusted Relationship

Sandworm Team has used dedicated network connections from one victim organization to gain unauthorized access to a separate organization.[1] Additionally, Sandworm Team has accessed Internet service providers and telecommunication entities that provide mobile connectivity.[14]

Enterprise T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link

Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.[1]
.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on spearphishing attachments and enabling malicious macros embedded within files.[22][1]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them. [35]
Enterprise T1078 Valid Accounts

Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.[30]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts on the corporate network to escalate privileges, move laterally, and establish persistence within the corporate network. [35]
.002 Domain Accounts

Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.[1][11]
Enterprise T1102 .002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.[22][26]
Enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

Sandworm Team has used Impacket’s WMIexec module for remote code execution and VBScript to run WMI queries.[18][11]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys. [18]
Mobile T1660 Phishing

Sandworm Team used SMS-based phishing to target victims with malicious links.[13]
Mobile T1409 Stored Application Data

Sandworm Team can collect encrypted Telegram and Signal communications.[14]
ICS T0895 Autorun Image

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used existing hypervisor access to map an ISO image named a.iso to a virtual machine running a SCADA server. The SCADA server’s operating system was configured to autorun CD-ROM images, and as a result, a malicious VBS script on the ISO image was automatically executed.[20]
ICS T0803 Block Command Message

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team blocked command messages by using malicious firmware to render serial-to-ethernet converters inoperable. [35]
ICS T0804 Block Reporting Message

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team blocked reporting messages by using malicious firmware to render serial-to-ethernet converters inoperable. [35]
ICS T0805 Block Serial COM

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team overwrote the serial-to-ethernet converter firmware, rendering the devices not operational. This meant that communication to the downstream serial devices was either not possible or more difficult. [15]
ICS T0807 Command-Line Interface

Sandworm Team uses the MS-SQL server xp_cmdshell command, and PowerShell to execute commands. [39]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team supplied the name of the payload DLL to Industroyer via a command line parameter.[17]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged the SCIL-API on the MicroSCADA platform to execute commands through the scilc.exe binary.[20]
ICS T0885 Commonly Used Port

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used port 443 to communicate with their C2 servers. [15]
ICS T0884 Connection Proxy

Sandworm Team establishes an internal proxy prior to the installation of backdoors within the network. [40]

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team established an internal proxy prior to the installation of backdoors within the network. [15]
ICS T0813 Denial of Control

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, KillDisk rendered devices that were necessary for remote recovery unusable, including at least one RTU. Additionally, Sandworm Team overwrote the firmware for serial-to-ethernet converters, denying operators control of the downstream devices. [15][35]
ICS T0814 Denial of Service

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, power company phone line operators were hit with a denial of service attack so that they couldn’t field customers’ calls about outages. Operators were also denied service to their downstream devices when their serial-to-ethernet converters had their firmware overwritten, which bricked the devices. [35]
ICS T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team scheduled the uninterruptable power supplies (UPS) to shutdown data and telephone servers via the UPS management interface. [35][15]
ICS T0819 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. [41] [42]
ICS T0822 External Remote Services

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used Valid Accounts taken from the Windows Domain Controller to access the control system Virtual Private Network (VPN) used by grid operators. [15]
ICS T0823 Graphical User Interface

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized HMI GUIs in the SCADA environment to open breakers. [35]
ICS T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the ICS network. [15]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a VBS script to facilitate lateral tool transfer. The VBS script was used to copy ICS-specific payloads with the following command: cscript C:\Backinfo\ufn.vbs C:\Backinfo\101.dll C:\Delta\101.dll[18]
ICS T0826 Loss of Availability

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team opened the breakers at the infected sites, shutting the power off for thousands of businesses and households for around 6 hours. [35][15]
ICS T0827 Loss of Control

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, operators were shut out of their equipment either through the denial of peripheral use or the degradation of equipment. Operators were therefore unable to recover from the incident through their traditional means. Much of the power was restored manually. [35]
ICS T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, power breakers were opened which caused the operating companies to be unable to deliver power, and left thousands of businesses and households without power for around 6 hours. [35][15]
ICS T0831 Manipulation of Control

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team opened live breakers via remote commands to the HMI, causing blackouts. [35]
ICS T0849 Masquerading

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team transferred executable files as .txt and then renamed them to .exe, likely to avoid detection through extension tracking.[18]
ICS T0886 Remote Services

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an IT helpdesk software to move the mouse on ICS control devices to maliciously release electricity breakers. [16]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used MS-SQL access to a pivot machine, allowing code execution throughout the ICS network.[18]
ICS T0846 Remote System Discovery

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered operational assets once on the OT network. [36] [15]
ICS T0853 Scripting

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized VBS and batch scripts for file movement and as wrappers for PowerShell execution.[18]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilizes a Visual Basic script lun.vbs to execute n.bat which then executed the MicroSCADA scilc.exe command.[20]
ICS T0894 System Binary Proxy Execution

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team executed a MicroSCADA application binary scilc.exe to send a predefined list of SCADA instructions specified in a file defined by the adversary, s1.txt. The executed command C:\sc\prog\exec\scilc.exe -do pack\scil\s1.txt leverages the SCADA software to send unauthorized command messages to remote substations.[20]
ICS T0857 System Firmware

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team overwrote the serial-to-ethernet gateways with custom firmware to make systems either disabled, shutdown, and/or unrecoverable. [35]
ICS T0855 Unauthorized Command Message

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team issued unauthorized commands to substation breaks after gaining control of operator workstations and accessing a distribution management system (DMS) application. [35]

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the MicroSCADA SCIL-API to specify a set of SCADA instructions, including the sending of unauthorized commands to substation devices.[20]
ICS T0859 Valid Accounts

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems. Sandworm Team used the credentials of valid accounts to interact with client applications and access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. [35][15]

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems.[18]

Software

ID Name References Techniques
S1125 AcidRain Sandworm Team is linked to AcidRain deployment during the ViaSat KA-SAT incident in 2022.[43][44] Data Destruction, Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe, File and Directory Discovery, System Shutdown/Reboot
S0606 Bad Rabbit [9] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Brute Force: Password Spraying, Data Encrypted for Impact, Drive-by Compromise, Drive-by Compromise, Exploitation of Remote Services, Exploitation of Remote Services, Firmware Corruption, Lateral Tool Transfer, Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Network Share Discovery, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Process Discovery, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Services: Service Execution, User Execution: Malicious File, User Execution
S0089 BlackEnergy [3][10][1][2][9] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data Destruction, Fallback Channels, File and Directory Discovery, Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weakness, Indicator Removal, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Input Capture: Keylogging, Network Service Discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Screen Capture, Spearphishing Attachment, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files, Valid Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0693 CaddyWiper [20] Data Destruction, Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe, File and Directory Discovery, File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification, Native API, Process Discovery, System Information Discovery
S0555 CHEMISTGAMES [45] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, Data from Local System, Download New Code at Runtime, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Location Tracking, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information, Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, System Information Discovery
S0154 Cobalt Strike Sandworm Team has used multiple publicly available tools during operations, such as Cobalt Strike.[14] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing, Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft, Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token, Account Discovery: Domain Account, Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols, BITS Jobs, Browser Session Hijacking, Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Data Obfuscation: Protocol or Service Impersonation, Data Transfer Size Limits, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Process Argument Spoofing, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Native API, Network Service Discovery, Network Share Discovery, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools, Obfuscated Files or Information, Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Process Injection: Process Hollowing, Process Injection, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Domain Fronting, Proxy: Internal Proxy, Query Registry, Reflective Code Loading, Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services: SSH, Remote Services: Windows Remote Management, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model, Remote System Discovery, Scheduled Transfer, Screen Capture, Software Discovery, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts, Valid Accounts: Local Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0687 Cyclops Blink [46][47] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts, Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Inter-Process Communication, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Non-Standard Port, Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware, Process Discovery, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery
S0363 Empire Sandworm Team has used multiple publicly available tools during operations, such as Empire.[14] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Access Token Manipulation, Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, Account Discovery: Domain Account, Account Discovery: Local Account, Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Archive Collected Data, Automated Collection, Automated Exfiltration, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification, Browser Information Discovery, Clipboard Data, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Create Account: Local Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification, Domain Trust Discovery, Email Collection: Local Email Collection, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository, Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation of Remote Services, File and Directory Discovery, Group Policy Discovery, Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path, Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking, Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable, Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Input Capture: Credential API Hooking, Native API, Network Service Discovery, Network Share Discovery, Network Sniffing, Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Process Discovery, Process Injection, Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model, Remote Services: SSH, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Screen Capture, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Video Capture, Web Service: Bidirectional Communication, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0401 Exaramel for Linux [48][34] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, Create or Modify System Process, Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Fallback Channels, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, Scheduled Task/Job: Cron, System Owner/User Discovery
S0343 Exaramel for Windows [48] Archive Collected Data, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Modify Registry, Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage
S0342 GreyEnergy [9] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Service Discovery
S0357 Impacket [11] Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, Network Sniffing, OS Credential Dumping: NTDS, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Ccache Files, System Services: Service Execution, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0604 Industroyer [18][29][17][49][14] Activate Firmware Update Mode, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Automated Collection, Block Command Message, Block Reporting Message, Block Serial COM, Brute Force I/O, Command-Line Interface, Compromise Host Software Binary, Connection Proxy, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Destruction, Data Destruction, Denial of Control, Denial of Service, Denial of View, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Device Restart/Shutdown, Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Loss of Control, Loss of Protection, Loss of View, Manipulation of Control, Manipulation of View, Monitor Process State, Network Connection Enumeration, Network Service Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, Query Registry, Remote System Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Remote System Information Discovery, Service Stop, Service Stop, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Unauthorized Command Message, Valid Accounts
S1072 Industroyer2 [50][14] Automated Collection, Brute Force I/O, Modify Parameter, Monitor Process State, Process Discovery, Remote System Information Discovery, Service Stop, Unauthorized Command Message
S0231 Invoke-PSImage [1] Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography, Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads
S0607 KillDisk [1][9] Access Token Manipulation, Data Destruction, Data Destruction, Data Encrypted for Impact, Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Indicator Removal on Host, Loss of View, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Service Stop, Service Stop, Shared Modules, System Information Discovery, System Shutdown/Reboot
S0002 Mimikatz [18] Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Account Manipulation, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager, OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Rogue Domain Controller, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
S0039 Net [18] Account Discovery: Domain Account, Account Discovery: Local Account, Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups, Create Account: Local Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal, Network Share Discovery, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery
S0368 NotPetya [6][1][2][9][47][14] Data Encrypted for Impact, Exploitation of Remote Services, Exploitation of Remote Services, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Lateral Tool Transfer, Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Masquerading, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Services: Service Execution, System Shutdown/Reboot, Valid Accounts: Local Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0365 Olympic Destroyer [51][9][1][2][47][14] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data Destruction, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Inhibit System Recovery, Lateral Tool Transfer, Network Share Discovery, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, Service Stop, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Shutdown/Reboot, Windows Management Instrumentation
S0598 P.A.S. Webshell [34] Account Discovery: Local Account, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Brute Force: Password Guessing, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Data from Information Repositories, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, File and Directory Discovery, File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Network Service Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information, Server Software Component: Web Shell, Software Discovery
S0378 PoshC2 Sandworm Team has used multiple publicly available tools during operations, such as PoshC2.[14] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, Access Token Manipulation, Account Discovery: Local Account, Account Discovery: Domain Account, Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility, Automated Collection, Brute Force, Credentials from Password Stores, Domain Trust Discovery, Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation of Remote Services, File and Directory Discovery, Input Capture: Keylogging, Network Service Discovery, Network Sniffing, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Process Injection, Proxy, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Windows Management Instrumentation
S1058 Prestige [11][14] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Data Encrypted for Impact, Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification, File and Directory Discovery, Inhibit System Recovery, Modify Registry, Native API, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Service Stop
S0029 PsExec [18] Create Account: Domain Account, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Lateral Tool Transfer, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, System Services: Service Execution
S0195 SDelete Sandworm Team has used SDelete for wartime operations in 2022-2023.[14] Data Destruction, Indicator Removal: File Deletion
S1010 VPNFilter VPNFilter is associated with Sandworm Team operations based on reporting on VPNFilter replacement software, Cyclops Blink.[46] Adversary-in-the-Middle, Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe, Network Sniffing

References

  1. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  2. UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.
  3. Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
  4. Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
  5. Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  6. NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  7. Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.
  8. Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  9. Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  10. F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  11. MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New “Prestige” ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
  12. Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
  13. Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia’s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
  14. Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
  15. Booz Allen Hamilton When The Lights Went Out Retrieved. 2019/10/22
  16. Andy Greenberg. (2017, June 28). How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar. Retrieved September 27, 2023.
  17. Anton Cherepanov. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  18. Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  19. Joe Slowik 2019, August 15 CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a Protection-Focused Attack Retrieved. 2019/10/22
  20. Ken Proska, John Wolfram, Jared Wilson, Dan Black, Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker, Tyler Mclellan, Chris Sistrunk. (2023, November 9). Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  21. Dragos, Inc.. (2023, December 11). ELECTRUM Targeted Ukrainian Electric Entity Using Custom Tools and CaddyWiper Malware, October 2022. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  22. Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  23. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, July 4). Analysis of TeleBots’ cunning backdoor . Retrieved June 11, 2020.
  24. Joseph Slowik, DomainTools. (2021, March 3). Centreon to Exim and Back: On the Trail of Sandworm. Retrieved April 6, 2024.
  25. Cherepanov, A.. (2016, January 3). BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry . Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  26. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
  1. National Security Agency. (2020, March 28). Sandworm Actors Exploiting Vulnerability In EXIM Mail Transfer Agent. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
  2. NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
  3. Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  4. US-CERT. (2016, February 25). ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  5. Ward, S.. (2014, October 14). iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  6. Wu, W. (2014, October 14). An Analysis of Windows Zero-day Vulnerability ‘CVE-2014-4114’ aka “Sandworm”. Retrieved June 18, 2020.
  7. Li, H. (2013, November 5). McAfee Labs Detects Zero-Day Exploit Targeting Microsoft Office. Retrieved June 18, 2020.
  8. ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
  9. Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.
  10. Charles McLellan. (2016, March 4). How hackers attacked Ukraine's power grid: Implications for Industrial IoT security. Retrieved September 27, 2023.
  11. Morgan, K. (2023, October 18). Government-backed actors exploiting WinRAR vulnerability. Retrieved July 19, 2024.
  12. Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
  13. Dragos 2018, October 12 Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE Retrieved. 2019/10/14
  14. Dragos Inc. 2017, June 13 Industroyer - Dragos - 201706: Analysis of the Threat to Electic Grid Operations Retrieved. 2017/09/18
  15. ICS-CERT 2014, December 10 ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E) Retrieved. 2019/10/11
  16. ICS CERT 2018, September 06 Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess RPC Vulnerability (Update B) Retrieved. 2019/12/05
  17. A.J. Vincens, CyberScoop. (2024, March 18). Researchers spot updated version of malware that hit Viasat. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
  18. Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen, SentinelOne. (2022, March 31). AcidRain | A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe. Retrieved March 25, 2024.
  19. B. Leonard, N. Mehta. (2019, November 21). The Secret Life of Sandworms. Retrieved December 31, 2020.
  20. NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
  21. Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
  22. Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
  23. Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  24. ESET. (2022, April 12). Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
  25. CrowdStrike. (2019, January). 2019 Global Threat Report. Retrieved June 10, 2020.