Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.
Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.[1] Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.[2]
Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.[3]
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 compromised McAfee ePO to move laterally by distributing malware as a software deployment task.[4] |
| C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.[5] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.[6] |
| G0091 | Silence |
Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.[7] |
| G0028 | Threat Group-1314 |
Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.[8] |
| S0041 | Wiper |
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.[9] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1015 | Active Directory Configuration |
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of group policy. |
| M1033 | Limit Software Installation |
Restrict the use of third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of multi-factor authentication. |
| M1030 | Network Segmentation |
Ensure proper system isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls. |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. |
| M1029 | Remote Data Storage |
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled. |
| M1051 | Update Software |
Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure there are regular reviews of accounts provisioned to these systems to verify continued business need, and ensure there is governance to trace de-provisioning of access that is no longer required. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of account privilege separation. |
| M1017 | User Training |
Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0015 | Application Log | Application Log Content |
Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage.Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Analytic 1 - Look for irregular deployment activity, systems not typically used for deployment suddenly pushing software, abnormal account login activity
|
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor for newly executed processes that does not correlate to known good software. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. Note: This query detects the creation of suspicious processes initiated by system or administrative accounts (such as SYSTEM, Admin, or SCCM) that are not typical for those users, and filters the process creation based on unusual patterns. Processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or python executed in this context without an expected parent process or correlation to authorized events should be flagged for investigation. Analytic 1 - Look for unusual software deployment processes, unexpected binaries or scripts, non-standard execution trees
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