Rogue Domain Controller

Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. [1] Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.

Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. [2]

This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). [1] The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. [1]

ID: T1207
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Platforms: Windows
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Version: 2.2
Created: 18 April 2018
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0002 Mimikatz

Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCShadow module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.[3][2]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0276 Detection Strategy for Rogue Domain Controller (DCShadow) Registration and Replication Abuse AN0770

Detection of rogue Domain Controller registration and Active Directory replication abuse by correlating: (1) creation/modification of nTDSDSA and server objects in the Configuration partition, (2) unexpected usage of Directory Replication Service SPNs (GC/ or E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2), (3) replication RPC calls (DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, GetNCChanges) originating from non-DC hosts, and (4) Kerberos authentication by non-DC machines using DRS-related SPNs. These events in combination, especially from hosts outside the Domain Controllers OU, may indicate DCShadow or rogue DC activity.

References