Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

ID: T1041
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Exfiltration
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Contributors: William Cain
Version: 2.2
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 07 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2.[1]

G1030 Agrius

Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers.[2]

S1025 Amadey

Amadey has sent victim data to its C2 servers.[3]

S0584 AppleJeus

AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.[4]

S0622 AppleSeed

AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.[5]

G0022 APT3

APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel.[6]

G0050 APT32

APT32's backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server.[7]

G0087 APT39

APT39 has exfiltrated stolen victim data through C2 communications.[8]

S0373 Astaroth

Astaroth exfiltrates collected information from its r1.log file to the external C2 server. [9]

S0438 Attor

Attor has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.[10]

S1029 AuTo Stealer

AuTo Stealer can exfiltrate data over actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP or TCP.[11]

S0031 BACKSPACE

Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server.[12]

S1081 BADHATCH

BADHATCH can exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.[13][14]

S0234 Bandook

Bandook can upload files from a victim's machine over the C2 channel.[15]

S0239 Bankshot

Bankshot exfiltrates data over its C2 channel.[16]

S0268 Bisonal

Bisonal has added the exfiltrated data to the URL over the C2 channel.[17]

S0520 BLINDINGCAN

BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.[18][19]

S0657 BLUELIGHT

BLUELIGHT has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[20]

S0651 BoxCaon

BoxCaon uploads files and data from a compromised host over the existing C2 channel.[21]

S1039 Bumblebee

Bumblebee can send collected data in JSON format to C2.[22]

C0017 C0017

During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.[23]

S0077 CallMe

CallMe exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.[24]

S0351 Cannon

Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels.[25]

S0484 Carberp

Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.[26][27]

S0572 Caterpillar WebShell

Caterpillar WebShell can upload files over the C2 channel.[28]

S0674 CharmPower

CharmPower can exfiltrate gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST.[29]

G0114 Chimera

Chimera has used Cobalt Strike C2 beacons for data exfiltration.[30]

S1149 CHIMNEYSWEEP

CHIMNEYSWEEP can upload collected files to the command-and-control server.[31]

S0667 Chrommme

Chrommme can exfiltrate collected data via C2.[32]

G0142 Confucius

Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.[33]

S1024 CreepySnail

CreepySnail can connect to C2 for data exfiltration.[34]

S0115 Crimson

Crimson can exfiltrate stolen information over its C2.[35]

S0538 Crutch

Crutch can exfiltrate data over the primary C2 channel (Dropbox HTTP API).[36]

S1153 Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer can send information about the targeted system to C2 including captured passwords, OS build, hostname, and username.[37]

G1012 CURIUM

CURIUM has used IMAP and SMTPS for exfiltration via tools such as IMAPLoader.[38]

S0687 Cyclops Blink

Cyclops Blink has the ability to upload exfiltrated files to a C2 server.[39]

S1111 DarkGate

DarkGate uses existing command and control channels to retrieve captured cryptocurrency wallet credentials.[40]

S1021 DnsSystem

DnsSystem can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 server.[41]

S0600 Doki

Doki has used Ngrok to establish C2 and exfiltrate data.[42]

S0502 Drovorub

Drovorub can exfiltrate files over C2 infrastructure.[43]

S1159 DUSTTRAP

DUSTTRAP can exfiltrate collected data over C2 channels.[44]

S0062 DustySky

DustySky has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.[45]

S0024 Dyre

Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.[46]

S0377 Ebury

Ebury exfiltrates a list of outbound and inbound SSH sessions using OpenSSH's known_host files and wtmp records. Ebury can exfiltrate SSH credentials through custom DNS queries or use the command Xcat to send the process's ssh session's credentials to the C2 server.[47][48]

S0367 Emotet

Emotet has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[49][50]

S0363 Empire

Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel.[51][52]

S0568 EVILNUM

EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.[53]

S0696 Flagpro

Flagpro has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.[54]

S0381 FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy has sent data collected from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[55]

S0661 FoggyWeb

FoggyWeb can remotely exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server.[56]

C0001 Frankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2.[52]

S1044 FunnyDream

FunnyDream can execute commands, including gathering user information, and send the results to C2.[57]

G0093 GALLIUM

GALLIUM used Web shells and HTRAN for C2 and to exfiltrate data.[58]

G0047 Gamaredon Group

A Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server.[59]

S0493 GoldenSpy

GoldenSpy has exfiltrated host environment information to an external C2 domain via port 9006.[60]

S0588 GoldMax

GoldMax can exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel.[61][62]

S0477 Goopy

Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.[63]

S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can send data it retrieves to the C2 server.[64]

S0632 GrimAgent

GrimAgent has sent data related to a compromise host over its C2 channel.[65]

S0391 HAWKBALL

HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.[66]

G0126 Higaisa

Higaisa exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[67]

C0038 HomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used HTTP to transfer data from compromised Exchange servers.[68]

S0376 HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data.[69]

S0431 HotCroissant

HotCroissant has the ability to download files from the infected host to the command and control (C2) server.[70]

S1022 IceApple

IceApple's Multi File Exfiltrator module can exfiltrate multiple files from a compromised host as an HTTP response over C2.[71]

S0434 Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor has uploaded a file containing debugger logs, network information and system information to the C2.[72]

S0604 Industroyer

Industroyer sends information about hardware profiles and previously-received commands back to the C2 server in a POST-request.[73]

S1132 IPsec Helper

IPsec Helper exfiltrates specific files through its command and control framework.[74]

G0004 Ke3chang

Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.[75]

S0487 Kessel

Kessel has exfiltrated information gathered from the infected system to the C2 server.[76]

S1020 Kevin

Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.[77]

S0526 KGH_SPY

KGH_SPY can exfiltrate collected information from the host to the C2 server.[78]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[79][80]

S0356 KONNI

KONNI has sent data and files to its C2 server.[81][82][83]

S1075 KOPILUWAK

KOPILUWAK has exfiltrated collected data to its C2 via POST requests.[84]

S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus can exfiltrate encrypted system information to the C2 server.[85][86]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.[87][88][89]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[90]

S0395 LightNeuron

LightNeuron exfiltrates data over its email C2 channel.[91]

S0680 LitePower

LitePower can send collected data, including screenshots, over its C2 channel.[92]

S0447 Lokibot

Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.[93]

G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.[94]

S1142 LunarMail

LunarMail can use email image attachments with embedded data for receiving C2 commands and data exfiltration.[95]

S0409 Machete

Machete's collected data is exfiltrated over the same channel used for C2.[96]

S1016 MacMa

MacMa exfiltrates data from a supplied path over its C2 channel.[97]

S1060 Mafalda

Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.[98]

S1156 Manjusaka

Manjusaka data exfiltration takes place over HTTP channels.[99]

S0652 MarkiRAT

MarkiRAT can exfiltrate locally stored data via its C2.[100]

S0459 MechaFlounder

MechaFlounder has the ability to send the compromised user's account name and hostname within a URL to C2.[101]

S1059 metaMain

metaMain can upload collected files and data to its C2 server.[102]

S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo can send the data it collects to the C2 server.[103]

S0084 Mis-Type

Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.[104]

S0083 Misdat

Misdat has uploaded files and data to its C2 servers.[104]

S1122 Mispadu

Mispadu can sends the collected financial data to the C2 server.[105][106]

S0079 MobileOrder

MobileOrder exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.[24]

S1026 Mongall

Mongall can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 server.[107]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.[108]

S0034 NETEAGLE

NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.[12]

S1090 NightClub

NightClub can use SMTP and DNS for file exfiltration and C2.[109]

S0385 njRAT

njRAT has used HTTP to receive stolen information from the infected machine.[110]

S0340 Octopus

Octopus has uploaded stolen files and data from a victim's machine over its C2 channel.[111]

S0439 Okrum

Data exfiltration is done by Okrum using the already opened channel with the C2 server.[112]

S0264 OopsIE

OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.[113]

C0022 Operation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.[114]

C0006 Operation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers.[115]

C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data.[116]

S1017 OutSteel

OutSteel can upload files from a compromised host over its C2 channel.[117]

S1050 PcShare

PcShare can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[57]

S0587 Penquin

Penquin can execute the command code do_upload to send files to C2.[118]

S1145 Pikabot

During the initial Pikabot command and control check-in, Pikabot will transmit collected system information encrypted using RC4.[119]

S1031 PingPull

PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.[120]

S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.[121]

S0441 PowerShower

PowerShower has used a PowerShell document stealer module to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB that were modified during the past two days.[122]

S0238 Proxysvc

Proxysvc performs data exfiltration over the control server channel using a custom protocol.[123]

S0078 Psylo

Psylo exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.[24]

S0147 Pteranodon

Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.[59]

S0192 Pupy

Pupy can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.[124]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can send stolen information to C2 nodes including passwords, accounts, and emails.[125]

S1148 Raccoon Stealer

Raccoon Stealer uses existing HTTP-based command and control channels for exfiltration.[126][127][128]

S0495 RDAT

RDAT can exfiltrate data gathered from the infected system via the established Exchange Web Services API C2 channel.[129]

S0375 Remexi

Remexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.[130]

S0496 REvil

REvil can exfiltrate host and malware information to C2 servers.[131]

S0448 Rising Sun

Rising Sun can send data gathered from the infected machine via HTTP POST request to the C2.[132]

S0240 ROKRAT

ROKRAT can send collected files back over same C2 channel.[133]

S1078 RotaJakiro

RotaJakiro sends device and other collected data back to the C2 using the established C2 channels over TCP. [134]

S0085 S-Type

S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[104]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.[135]

S0461 SDBbot

SDBbot has sent collected data from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[55]

S1019 Shark

Shark has the ability to upload files from the compromised host over a DNS or HTTP C2 channel.[136]

S1089 SharpDisco

SharpDisco can load a plugin to exfiltrate stolen files to SMB shares also used in C2.[109]

S0445 ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter sent generated reports to the C2 via HTTP POST requests.[137]

S0610 SideTwist

SideTwist has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[138]

S0692 SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can transfer files from an infected host to the C2 server.[139]

S0633 Sliver

Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the download command.[140]

S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA

SLOTHFULMEDIA has sent system information to a C2 server via HTTP and HTTPS POST requests.[141]

S0649 SMOKEDHAM

SMOKEDHAM has exfiltrated data to its C2 server.[142]

S0615 SombRAT

SombRAT has uploaded collected data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[143]

S0543 Spark

Spark has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.[144]

S1030 Squirrelwaffle

Squirrelwaffle has exfiltrated victim data using HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.[145]

S1037 STARWHALE

STARWHALE can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 servers.[146]

G0038 Stealth Falcon

After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.[147]

S1034 StrifeWater

StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[148]

S0491 StrongPity

StrongPity can exfiltrate collected documents through C2 channels.[149][150]

S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet sends compromised victim information via HTTP.[151]

S1042 SUGARDUMP

SUGARDUMP has sent stolen credentials and other data to its C2 server.[152]

S1064 SVCReady

SVCReady can send collected data in JSON format to its C2 server.[153]

S0663 SysUpdate

SysUpdate has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[154]

S0467 TajMahal

TajMahal has the ability to send collected files over its C2.[155]

S0595 ThiefQuest

ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the /Users/ folder to the command and control server via unencrypted HTTP. Network packets contain a string with two pieces of information: a file path and the contents of the file in a base64 encoded string.[156][157]

S0671 Tomiris

Tomiris can upload files matching a hardcoded set of extensions, such as .doc, .docx, .pdf, and .rar, to its C2 server.[158]

S0678 Torisma

Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.[159]

S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot can send information about the compromised host and upload data to a hardcoded C2 server.[160][161]

S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif has used HTTP POSTs to exfil gathered information.[162][163][164]

S0476 Valak

Valak has the ability to exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.[165][166][167]

S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.[168]

G1035 Winter Vivern

Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.[169]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has exfiltrated domain credentials and network enumeration information over command and control (C2) channels.[170][171]

S1065 Woody RAT

Woody RAT can exfiltrate files from an infected machine to its C2 server.[172]

S0658 XCSSET

XCSSET exfiltrates data stolen from a system over its C2 channel.[173]

S0251 Zebrocy

Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.[174][175]

G0128 ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated files via the Dropbox API C2.[176]

S0086 ZLib

ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[104]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1057 Data Loss Prevention

Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being sent over unencrypted protocols.

M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [177]

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel.

DS0022 File File Access

Monitor for suspicious files (i.e. .pdf, .docx, .jpg, etc.) viewed in isolation that may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel.

DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts.

Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on TCP network connection creation.

Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).

Network Traffic Flow

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.

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