Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.[1]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius used the Plink tool for tunneling and connections to remote machines, renaming it |
| G1007 | Aoqin Dragon |
Aoqin Dragon has used fake icons including antivirus and external drives to disguise malicious payloads.[3] |
| S0622 | AppleSeed | |
| G0007 | APT28 | |
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.[6] |
| C0046 | ArcaneDoor |
ArcaneDoor involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances.[7] |
| S1246 | BeaverTail |
BeaverTail has masqueraded as MiroTalk installation packages: "MiroTalk.dmg" for macOS and "MiroTalk.msi" for Windows, and has included login GUIs with MiroTalk themes.[8] |
| S0268 | Bisonal |
Bisonal dropped a decoy payload with a .jpg extension that contained a malicious Visual Basic script.[9] |
| S0635 | BoomBox |
BoomBox has the ability to mask malicious data strings as PDF files.[10] |
| G0060 | BRONZE BUTLER |
BRONZE BUTLER has masked executables with document file icons including Word and Adobe PDF.[11] |
| C0015 | C0015 |
During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file |
| C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.[13] |
| G1052 | Contagious Interview |
Contagious Interview has delivered BeaverTail malware masquerading as legitimate software or applications.[14][15][16][17][8] Contagious Interview has also delivered malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software drivers.[18] |
| S0497 | Dacls |
The Dacls Mach-O binary has been disguised as a .nib file.[19] |
| S1111 | DarkGate |
DarkGate can masquerade as pirated media content for initial delivery to victims.[20] |
| S1066 | DarkTortilla |
DarkTortilla's payload has been renamed |
| S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman has used an icon mimicking a text file to mask a malicious executable.[22] |
| G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as |
| S0634 | EnvyScout |
EnvyScout has used folder icons for malicious files to lure victims into opening them.[10] |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has masqueraded staged data by using the Windows certutil utility to generate fake Base64 encoded certificates with the input file.[24][25] |
| S0696 | Flagpro |
Flagpro can download malicious files with a .tmp extension and append them with .exe prior to execution.[26] |
| S0661 | FoggyWeb |
FoggyWeb can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.[27] |
| C0035 | KV Botnet Activity |
KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to |
| G0140 | LazyScripter |
LazyScripter has used several different security software icons to disguise executables.[29] |
| G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass has used esentutl to change file extensions to their true type that were masquerading as .txt files.[30] |
| S1015 | Milan |
Milan has used an executable named |
| S0637 | NativeZone |
NativeZone has, upon execution, displayed a message box that appears to be related to a Ukrainian electronic document management system.[32] |
| G0133 | Nomadic Octopus |
Nomadic Octopus attempted to make Octopus appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.[33] |
| S0368 | NotPetya | |
| G0049 | OilRig |
OilRig has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.[35] |
| C0016 | Operation Dust Storm |
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.[36] |
| C0006 | Operation Honeybee |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.[37] |
| G0068 | PLATINUM | |
| S0453 | Pony |
Pony has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy.[39] |
| S1046 | PowGoop |
PowGoop has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat).[40] |
| S0565 | Raindrop |
Raindrop was built to include a modified version of 7-Zip source code (including associated export names) and Far Manager source code.[41][42] |
| S0458 | Ramsay | |
| S0662 | RCSession |
RCSession has used a file named English.rtf to appear benign on victim hosts.[44][45] |
| S1240 | RedLine Stealer |
RedLine Stealer malware has masqueraded as legitimate software such as "PDF Converter Software" which has been distributed through poisoned search engine results often resembling legitimate software lures with the combination of typo squatted domains.[46] |
| S0148 | RTM |
RTM has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.[47] |
| S0446 | Ryuk |
Ryuk can create .dll files that actually contain a Rich Text File format document.[48] |
| S1018 | Saint Bot |
Saint Bot has renamed malicious binaries as |
| C0059 | Salesforce Data Exfiltration |
During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.[51] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team masqueraded malicious installers as Windows update packages to evade defense and entice users to execute binaries.[52] |
| S0615 | SombRAT |
SombRAT can use a legitimate process name to hide itself.[53] |
| G1046 | Storm-1811 |
Storm-1811 has prompted users to download and execute batch scripts that masquerade as legitimate update files during initial access and social engineering operations.[54] |
| S1183 | StrelaStealer |
StrelaStealer PE executable payloads have used uncommon but legitimate extensions such as |
| G0127 | TA551 | |
| G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.[57] |
| S0682 | TrailBlazer |
TrailBlazer has used filenames that match the name of the compromised system in attempt to avoid detection.[58] |
| S0266 | TrickBot |
The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.[59] |
| S1164 | UPSTYLE |
UPSTYLE has masqueraded filenames using examples such as |
| S0689 | WhisperGate |
WhisperGate has been disguised as a JPG extension to avoid detection as a malicious PE file.[61] |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables.[62] Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers.[63] |
| S0466 | WindTail |
WindTail has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask payloads.[62] |
| G1035 | Winter Vivern |
Winter Vivern created specially-crafted documents mimicking legitimate government or similar documents during phishing campaigns.[64] |
| S0658 | XCSSET |
XCSSET installs malicious application bundles that mimic native macOS apps, such as Safari, by using the legitimate app’s icon and customizing the |
| G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has spoofed legitimate applications in phishing lures and changed file extensions to conceal installation of malware.[67][68] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1049 | Antivirus/Antimalware |
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. |
| M1047 | Audit |
Audit user accounts to ensure that each one has a defined purpose. |
| M1040 | Behavior Prevention on Endpoint |
Implement security controls on the endpoint, such as a Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS), to identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious files (such as those with mismatching file signatures). |
| M1045 | Code Signing |
Require signed binaries. |
| M1038 | Execution Prevention |
Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common operating system utilities that are needed. |
| M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Consider defining and enforcing a naming convention for user accounts to more easily spot generic account names that do not fit the typical schema. |
| M1017 | User Training |
Train users not to open email attachments or click unknown links (URLs). Such training fosters more secure habits within your organization and will limit many of the risks. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0127 | Behavioral Detection of Masquerading Across Platforms via Metadata and Execution Discrepancy | AN0355 |
Adversary renames LOLBINs or deploys binaries with spoofed file names, internal PE metadata, or misleading icons to appear legitimate. File creation is followed by execution or service registration inconsistent with known usage. |
| AN0356 |
Adversary drops renamed binaries in uncommon directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) or uses special characters in names (e.g., trailing space, Unicode RLO). Execution or cronjob registration follows shortly after file drop. |
||
| AN0357 |
Adversary creates disguised launch daemons or apps with misleading names and bundle metadata (e.g., Info.plist values inconsistent with binary path or icon). Launch is correlated with user logon or persistence setup. |
||
| AN0358 |
Adversary uses renamed container images, injects files into containers with misleading names or metadata (e.g., renamed system binaries), and executes them during startup or scheduled jobs. |
||
| AN0359 |
Adversary places scripts or binaries with misleading names in /etc/rc.local.d or /var/spool/cron, or registers services with legitimate-sounding names not present in default ESXi builds. |