Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.[1]
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
G1030 | Agrius |
Agrius used the Plink tool for tunneling and connections to remote machines, renaming it |
S0622 | AppleSeed | |
G0007 | APT28 | |
G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.[5] |
S0268 | Bisonal |
Bisonal dropped a decoy payload with a .jpg extension that contained a malicious Visual Basic script.[6] |
S0635 | BoomBox |
BoomBox has the ability to mask malicious data strings as PDF files.[7] |
G0060 | BRONZE BUTLER |
BRONZE BUTLER has masked executables with document file icons including Word and Adobe PDF.[8] |
C0015 | C0015 |
During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file |
C0018 | C0018 |
During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.[10] |
S0497 | Dacls |
The Dacls Mach-O binary has been disguised as a .nib file.[11] |
S1111 | DarkGate |
DarkGate can masquerade as pirated media content for initial delivery to victims.[12] |
S1066 | DarkTortilla |
DarkTortilla's payload has been renamed |
S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman has used an icon mimicking a text file to mask a malicious executable.[14] |
G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as |
S0634 | EnvyScout |
EnvyScout has used folder icons for malicious files to lure victims into opening them.[7] |
S0512 | FatDuke |
FatDuke has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.[16] |
G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has masqueraded staged data by using the Windows certutil utility to generate fake Base64 encoded certificates with the input file.[17][18] |
S0696 | Flagpro |
Flagpro can download malicious files with a .tmp extension and append them with .exe prior to execution.[19] |
S0661 | FoggyWeb |
FoggyWeb can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.[20] |
C0035 | KV Botnet Activity |
KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to |
G0140 | LazyScripter |
LazyScripter has used several different security software icons to disguise executables.[22] |
G0045 | menuPass |
menuPass has used esentutl to change file extensions to their true type that were masquerading as .txt files.[23] |
S1015 | Milan |
Milan has used an executable named |
S0637 | NativeZone |
NativeZone has, upon execution, displayed a message box that appears to be related to a Ukrainian electronic document management system.[25] |
G0133 | Nomadic Octopus |
Nomadic Octopus attempted to make Octopus appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.[26] |
S0368 | NotPetya | |
G0049 | OilRig |
OilRig has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.[28] |
C0016 | Operation Dust Storm |
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.[29] |
C0006 | Operation Honeybee |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.[30] |
G0068 | PLATINUM | |
S1046 | PowGoop |
PowGoop has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat).[32] |
S0565 | Raindrop |
Raindrop was built to include a modified version of 7-Zip source code (including associated export names) and Far Manager source code.[33][34] |
S0458 | Ramsay | |
S0662 | RCSession |
RCSession has used a file named English.rtf to appear benign on victim hosts.[36][37] |
S0148 | RTM |
RTM has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.[38] |
S0446 | Ryuk |
Ryuk can create .dll files that actually contain a Rich Text File format document.[39] |
S1018 | Saint Bot |
Saint Bot has renamed malicious binaries as |
G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team masqueraded malicious installers as Windows update packages to evade defense and entice users to execute binaries.[42] |
S0615 | SombRAT |
SombRAT can use a legitimate process name to hide itself.[43] |
G0127 | TA551 | |
G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.[45] |
S0682 | TrailBlazer |
TrailBlazer has used filenames that match the name of the compromised system in attempt to avoid detection.[46] |
S0266 | TrickBot |
The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.[47] |
S0689 | WhisperGate |
WhisperGate has been disguised as a JPG extension to avoid detection as a malicious PE file.[48] |
G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables.[49] Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers.[50] |
S0466 | WindTail |
WindTail has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask payloads.[49] |
G1035 | Winter Vivern |
Winter Vivern created specially-crafted documents mimicking legitimate government or similar documents during phishing campaigns.[51] |
S0658 | XCSSET |
XCSSET builds a malicious application bundle to resemble Safari through using the Safari icon and |
G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has spoofed legitimate applications in phishing lures and changed file extensions to conceal installation of malware.[53][54] |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1049 | Antivirus/Antimalware |
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. |
M1047 | Audit |
Audit user accounts to ensure that each one has a defined purpose. |
M1040 | Behavior Prevention on Endpoint |
Implement security controls on the endpoint, such as a Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS), to identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious files (such as those with mismatching file signatures). |
M1045 | Code Signing |
Require signed binaries. |
M1038 | Execution Prevention |
Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common operating system utilities that are needed. |
M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. |
M1018 | User Account Management |
Consider defining and enforcing a naming convention for user accounts to more easily spot generic account names that do not fit the typical schema. |
M1017 | User Training |
Train users not to open email attachments or click unknown links (URLs). Such training fosters more secure habits within your organization and will limit many of the risks. |
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. [55] Note: For Windows, Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on potential Masquerading. |
DS0022 | File | File Metadata |
Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE". Check and ensure that file headers/signature and extensions match using magic bytes detection and/or file signature validation.[56] In Linux, the |
File Modification |
Monitor for changes made to files outside of an update or patch that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Windows Event ID 4663 (An Attempt Was Made to Access An Object) can be used to alert on attempted file accesses that may be associate with Masquerading. |
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DS0007 | Image | Image Metadata |
Collecting disk and resource filenames for binaries, comparing that the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected, could provide useful leads but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. [58] |
DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
Monitor for API calls such as |
Process Creation |
Monitor for newly executed processes that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. The RECYCLER and SystemVolumeInformation directories will be present on every drive. Replace %systemroot% and %windir% with the actual paths as configured by the endpoints. Analytic 1 - Suspicious Run Locations
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Process Metadata |
Monitor for file names that are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. |
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DS0003 | Scheduled Job | Scheduled Job Metadata |
Monitor for contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc. On Windows, Event ID 4698 (Security Log - A scheduled task was created) can be used to alert on the creation of scheduled tasks and provides metadata including the task name and task content (as XML). On Linux, auditing frameworks such as the Linux Auditing System (auditd) can be used to alert on invocations of cron, and provides the metadata included when executing the command. |
Scheduled Job Modification |
Monitor for changes made to scheduled jobs that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. |
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DS0019 | Service | Service Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed services/daemons that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. |
Service Metadata |
Monitor for contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc. |
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DS0002 | User Account | User Account Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed accounts with names that are unusually generic or identical to recently-deleted accounts. |