| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1090.001 | Internal Proxy |
| T1090.002 | External Proxy |
| T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
| T1090.004 | Domain Fronting |
Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. [1] Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0016 | APT29 |
APT29 has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.[2] |
| S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.[3] |
| S0175 | meek |
meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination. |
| S0699 | Mythic |
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.[4] |
| S0649 | SMOKEDHAM |
SMOKEDHAM has used a fronted domain to obfuscate its hard-coded C2 server domain.[5] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1020 | SSL/TLS Inspection |
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0196 | Domain Fronting Behavior via Mismatched TLS SNI and HTTP Host Headers | AN0564 |
Suspicious outbound HTTPS connections where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) does not match the HTTP Host header, indicating potential use of domain fronting to mask C2 traffic via CDNs. |
| AN0565 |
Applications such as |
||
| AN0566 |
Unsigned or user-space apps initiate TLS connections with one hostname and HTTP headers requesting a different domain, commonly abused in CDN-resident domain fronting techniques. |
||
| AN0567 |
Traffic originating from ESXi hosts or management interfaces displays SNI-to-Host mismatch behavior, particularly anomalous given typical infrastructure communication patterns. |