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Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

ID: S0002
ⓘ
Type: TOOL
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Version: 1.9
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 25 September 2024
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Enterprise Layer
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Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1134 .005 Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection

Mimikatz's MISC::AddSid module can append any SID or user/group account to a user's SID-History. Mimikatz also utilizes SID-History Injection to expand the scope of other components such as generated Kerberos Golden Tickets and DCSync beyond a single domain.[2][3]
Enterprise T1098 Account Manipulation

The Mimikatz credential dumper has been extended to include Skeleton Key domain controller authentication bypass functionality. The LSADUMP::ChangeNTLM and LSADUMP::SetNTLM modules can also manipulate the password hash of an account without knowing the clear text value.[2][4]
Enterprise T1547 .005 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider

The Mimikatz credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.[1]
Enterprise T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.[1][5][6][7][8]

.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from DPAPI.[1][5][6][7]

.004 Windows Credential Manager

Mimikatz contains functionality to acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.[9]
Enterprise T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSASS Memory.[1][5][6][7]
.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the SAM table.[1][5][6][7]
.004 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSA.[1][5][6][7]
.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from DCSync/NetSync.[1][5][6][7][8]
Enterprise T1207 Rogue Domain Controller

Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCShadow module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.[1][2]
Enterprise T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Mimikatz's CRYPTO module can create and export various types of authentication certificates.[2]
Enterprise T1558 .001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket

Mimikatz's kerberos module can create golden tickets.[10][8]
.002 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket

Mimikatz's kerberos module can create silver tickets.[10]
Enterprise T1552 .004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

Mimikatz's CRYPTO::Extract module can extract keys by interacting with Windows cryptographic application programming interface (API) functions.[2]
Enterprise T1550 .002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.[2][7][8]
.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCSync and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.[2][3][11][7]

Groups That Use This Software

ID Name References
G0050 APT32

[12][13][14]
G0016 APT29

[15][16][17][18][19][20]
G1006 Earth Lusca

[21]
G0046 FIN7

[22]
G0079 DarkHydrus

[23][24]
G0092 TA505

[25]
G1030 Agrius

Agrius used Mimikatz to dump credentials from LSASS memory.[26]
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

[27][28][29]
G0034 Sandworm Team

[30]
G0064 APT33

[31]
G1024 Akira

[32]
G0131 Tonto Team

[33]
G0087 APT39

[34][35][36][37]
G0108 Blue Mockingbird

[38]
G0080 Cobalt Group

[39][40][41]
G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz.[42][43][44][45][46]
G0004 Ke3chang

[47][48]
G0045 menuPass

[49]
G1023 APT5

[50]
G0088 TEMP.Veles

[51][52][53]
G0007 APT28

[54]
G0006 APT1

[55]
G1016 FIN13

[56]
G0059 Magic Hound

[57]
G1015 Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider has gathered credentials using Mimikatz.[58][59]
G0076 Thrip

[60]
G1004 LAPSUS$

[61]
G1017 Volt Typhoon

[62][63]
G0135 BackdoorDiplomacy

[64]
G0119 Indrik Spider

[65][66]
G0093 GALLIUM

[67][68]
G0069 MuddyWater

[69][70]
G0077 Leafminer

[71]
G0096 APT41

[72][73][74]
G0003 Cleaver

[75]
G0082 APT38

[76]
G0010 Turla

[77][78]
G0114 Chimera

[79][80]
G0102 Wizard Spider

[81][82]
G0008 Carbanak

[83]
G0011 PittyTiger

[84]
G1001 HEXANE

[85][86]
G0035 Dragonfly

[87]
G0049 OilRig

[88][89][57]
G0094 Kimsuky

[90][91][92]
G1040 Play

[93]
G0037 FIN6

[94]
G0107 Whitefly

[95]

Campaigns

ID Name Description
C0017 C0017

During C0017, APT41 used Mimikatz to execute the lsadump::sam command on dumped registry hives to obtain locally stored credentials and NTLM hashes.[74]
C0018 C0018

[96][97]
C0032 C0032

[51]
C0038 HomeLand Justice

[98][86]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz with the privilege::debug and lsadump::dcsync /all flags to dump account credentials.[99]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

[16][17]
C0030 Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack

[100]

References

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  4. Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.
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