Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.
Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct File and Directory Permissions Modification or Modify Registry in support of subverting these controls.[1] Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.[2][3]
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1038 | Execution Prevention |
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store (or other legitimate repositories) which can help mitigate some of these issues. Also enable application control solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious content. |
| M1028 | Operating System Configuration |
Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| M1024 | Restrict Registry Permissions |
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented. |
| M1054 | Software Configuration |
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential Adversary-in-the-Middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. [6] |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Command monitoring may reveal malicious attempts to modify trust settings, such as the installation of root certificates or modifications to trust attributes/policies applied to files. |
| DS0022 | File | File Metadata |
Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. |
| File Modification |
Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries.[1] Also analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure "Hide Microsoft Entries" and "Hide Windows Entries" are both deselected.[1] On macOS, the removal of the |
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| DS0011 | Module | Module Load |
Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging [7] to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). [1] |
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor processes and arguments for malicious attempts to modify trust settings, such as the installation of root certificates or modifications to trust attributes/policies applied to files. |
| DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Creation |
Monitoring the creation of (sub)keys within the Windows Registry may reveal malicious attempts to modify trust settings, such as the installation of root certificates. Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under |
| Windows Registry Key Modification |
Monitoring changes to the Windows Registry may reveal malicious attempts to modify trust settings, such as the installation of root certificates. Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under |