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Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

ID Name
T1053.002 At
T1053.003 Cron
T1053.005 Scheduled Task
T1053.006 Systemd Timers
T1053.007 Container Orchestration Job

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.[1] In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet Invoke-CimMethod, which leverages WMI class PS_ScheduledTask to create a scheduled task via an XML path.[2]

An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.[3]

Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from schtasks /query and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).[4][5] Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., Index value) within associated registry keys.[6]

ID: T1053.005
Sub-technique of:  T1053
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
ⓘ
Permissions Required: Administrator
ⓘ
Supports Remote:  Yes
Contributors: Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas; Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell; Selena Larson, @selenalarson; Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak; Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
Version: 1.6
Created: 27 November 2019
Last Modified: 13 October 2024
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0034 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.[7]
S0331 Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla has achieved persistence via scheduled tasks.[8]

S0504 Anchor

Anchor can create a scheduled task for persistence.[9]
S1133 Apostle

Apostle achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task, such as MicrosoftCrashHandlerUAC.[10]
S0584 AppleJeus

AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[11]
G0099 APT-C-36

APT-C-36 has used a macro function to set scheduled tasks, disguised as those used by Google.[12]
G0016 APT29

APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[13]
G0022 APT3

An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System".[14]
G0050 APT32

APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.[15][16][17][18]
G0064 APT33

APT33 has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times a day.[19]
G0067 APT37

APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.[20]
G0082 APT38

APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[21]
G0087 APT39

APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence.[22][23][24]
G0096 APT41

APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system.[25][26]
S1087 AsyncRAT

AsyncRAT can create a scheduled task to maintain persistence on system start-up.[27]
S0438 Attor

Attor's installer plugin can schedule a new task that loads the dispatcher on boot/logon.[28]
S0414 BabyShark

BabyShark has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[26]
S0475 BackConfig

BackConfig has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[29]
S0606 Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.[30]
S1081 BADHATCH

BADHATCH can use schtasks.exe to gain persistence.[31]

S0128 BADNEWS

BADNEWS creates a scheduled task to establish by executing a malicious payload every subsequent minute.[32]
S0534 Bazar

Bazar can create a scheduled task for persistence.[33][34]
G1002 BITTER

BITTER has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[35]
G0108 Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.[36]
S0360 BONDUPDATER

BONDUPDATER persists using a scheduled task that executes every minute.[37]
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used schtasks to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[38]
S1039 Bumblebee

Bumblebee can achieve persistence by copying its DLL to a subdirectory of %APPDATA% and creating a Visual Basic Script that will load the DLL via a scheduled task.[39][40]
C0017 C0017

During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: \Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor, \Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults, and \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared.[41]

C0032 C0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used scheduled task XML triggers.[42]
S0335 Carbon

Carbon creates several tasks for later execution to continue persistence on the victim’s machine.[43]
S1043 ccf32

ccf32 can run on a daily basis using a scheduled task.[44]
G0114 Chimera

Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[45][46]
S1149 CHIMNEYSWEEP

CHIMNEYSWEEP can use the Windows SilentCleanup scheduled task to enable payload execution.[47]
G0080 Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[48]
S0126 ComRAT

ComRAT has used a scheduled task to launch its PowerShell loader.[49][50]
G0142 Confucius

Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host.[51]
S0050 CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named "Watchmon Service" for persistence.[52]
C0004 CostaRicto

During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.[53]

S0046 CozyCar

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task.[54]
S0538 Crutch

Crutch has the ability to persist using scheduled tasks.[55]
S0527 CSPY Downloader

CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.[56]
G1034 Daggerfly

Daggerfly has attempted to use scheduled tasks for persistence in victim environments.[57]
S1014 DanBot

DanBot can use a scheduled task for installation.[58]
S0673 DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman has created a scheduled task for persistence.[59]
S1088 Disco

Disco can create a scheduled task to run every minute for persistence.[60]
G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.[61]
S0384 Dridex

Dridex can maintain persistence via the creation of scheduled tasks within system directories such as windows\system32\, windows\syswow64, winnt\system32, and winnt\syswow64.[62]

S0038 Duqu

Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on remote machines that executes the malware.[63]
S0024 Dyre

Dyre has the ability to achieve persistence by adding a new task in the task scheduler to run every minute.[64]
G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear uses remotely scheduled tasks to facilitate remote command execution on victim machines.[65]
S0367 Emotet

Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task, e.g. though a .dll file in the Registry.[66][67]
S0363 Empire

Empire has modules to interact with the Windows task scheduler.[68]
S0396 EvilBunny

EvilBunny has executed commands via scheduled tasks.[69]
G0051 FIN10

FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[70][68]
G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has created scheduled tasks in the C:\Windows directory of the compromised network.[71]

G0037 FIN6

FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS.[72]
G0046 FIN7

FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[73][74][75][76]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.[77]
G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used Scheduled Tasks for persistence and to load and execute a reverse proxy binary.[78][79]
C0001 Frankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR, named "WinUpdate" [80]
G0093 GALLIUM

GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.[81]
G0047 Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.[82][83][84][85]

S0168 Gazer

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a scheduled task.[86][87]
S0588 GoldMax

GoldMax has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[88]
S0477 Goopy

Goopy has the ability to maintain persistence by creating scheduled tasks set to run every hour.[17]

S0237 GravityRAT

GravityRAT creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.[89]
S0417 GRIFFON

GRIFFON has used sctasks for persistence. [90]
S0632 GrimAgent

GrimAgent has the ability to set persistence using the Task Scheduler.[91]
S0170 Helminth

Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[92]
S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to use scheduled tasks for execution.[93]
G1001 HEXANE

HEXANE has used a scheduled task to establish persistence for a keylogger.[94]
G0126 Higaisa

Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.[95][96]
S0431 HotCroissant

HotCroissant has attempted to install a scheduled task named "Java Maintenance64" on startup to establish persistence.[97]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID has created a scheduled task to establish persistence.[98][99][100]
S1152 IMAPLoader

IMAPLoader creates scheduled tasks for persistence based on the operating system version of the victim machine.[101]
S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named MSST and \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled to establish persistence.[102]
S0581 IronNetInjector

IronNetInjector has used a task XML file named mssch.xml to run an IronPython script when a user logs in or when specific system events are created.[103]
S0189 ISMInjector

ISMInjector creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[104]
S0044 JHUHUGIT

JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.[105][106]
S0648 JSS Loader

JSS Loader has the ability to launch scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[107]
G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[108]
S0250 Koadic

Koadic has used scheduled tasks to add persistence.[109]

S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus can create scheduled tasks for persistence.[110][111][112]
G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.[113][114]
S0680 LitePower

LitePower can create a scheduled task to enable persistence mechanisms.[115]
S0447 Lokibot

Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.[116]

S0532 Lucifer

Lucifer has established persistence by creating the following scheduled task schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn QQMusic ^ /tr C:Users\%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\spread.exe /F.[117]
G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.[118]
S0409 Machete

The different components of Machete are executed by Windows Task Scheduler.[119][120]
G0095 Machete

Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain Machete's persistence.[121]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.[122][123]
S0167 Matryoshka

Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization".[124][125]
S0449 Maze

Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[126]
S0500 MCMD

MCMD can use scheduled tasks for persistence.[127]
G0045 menuPass

menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.[128]
S0688 Meteor

Meteor execution begins from a scheduled task named Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it creates a separate scheduled task called mstask to run the wiper only once at 23:55:00.[129]
S1015 Milan

Milan can establish persistence on a targeted host with scheduled tasks.[130][131]
G0021 Molerats

Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[132]
G1036 Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet used scheduled tasks for program execution during initial access to victim machines.[133]
G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[134]
S1135 MultiLayer Wiper

MultiLayer Wiper creates a malicious scheduled task that launches a batch file to remove Windows Event Logs.[135]
G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.[136][137][138]
G0019 Naikon

Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.[139]
S0198 NETWIRE

NETWIRE can create a scheduled task to establish persistence.[140]
S1147 Nightdoor

Nightdoor uses scheduled tasks for persistence to load the final malware payload into memory.[141]
S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.[142]
G0049 OilRig

OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.[143][144][145][146]
S0439 Okrum

Okrum's installer can attempt to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.[147]
S0264 OopsIE

OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.[143][148]
C0012 Operation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.[149]
C0022 Operation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.[150]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.[151]
G0040 Patchwork

A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.[152]
S0194 PowerSploit

PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.[153][154]
S0223 POWERSTATS

POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR "c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe".[155]
S0184 POWRUNER

POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.[156]
S1058 Prestige

Prestige has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by Sandworm Team using Impacket.[157]
S0147 Pteranodon

Pteranodon schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.[158][159]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot has the ability to create scheduled tasks for persistence.[160][161][162][163][164][165][166][167]
S0269 QUADAGENT

QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine.[144]
S0262 QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot.[168][169]
S0629 RainyDay

RainyDay can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.[139]
S0458 Ramsay

Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.[170]

G0075 Rancor

Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the schtasks /create /sc command.[171]
G1039 RedCurl

RedCurl has created scheduled tasks for persistence.[172][173][174]
S0375 Remexi

Remexi utilizes scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism.[175]
S0166 RemoteCMD

RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new schedule task on the remote system[176]
S0379 Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals.[177]
S0148 RTM

RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.[178][179]
S0446 Ryuk

Ryuk can remotely create a scheduled task to execute itself on a system.[180]
S1018 Saint Bot

Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named "Maintenance" to establish persistence.[181]
G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines.[182]
S0111 schtasks

schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[183]
S0382 ServHelper

ServHelper contains modules that will use schtasks to carry out malicious operations.[184]
S0140 Shamoon

Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.[185][186]
S1089 SharpDisco

SharpDisco can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.[60]
S0546 SharpStage

SharpStage has a persistence component to write a scheduled task for the payload.[187]

S0589 Sibot

Sibot has been executed via a scheduled task.[88]
G0091 Silence

Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.[188]
S0226 Smoke Loader

Smoke Loader launches a scheduled task.[189]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted.[190][191][192]
S0516 SoreFang

SoreFang can gain persistence through use of scheduled tasks.[193]
S1140 Spica

Spica has created a scheduled task named CalendarChecker to establish persistence.[194]
S0390 SQLRat

SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\.[76]
G0038 Stealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" to execute a malicious file hourly.[195]
S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet schedules a network job to execute two minutes after host infection.[196]
S1042 SUGARDUMP

SUGARDUMP has created scheduled tasks called MicrosoftInternetExplorerCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA and MicrosoftEdgeCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA, which were configured to execute CrashReporter.exe during user logon.[197]
S1064 SVCReady

SVCReady can create a scheduled task named RecoveryExTask to gain persistence.[198]
G1018 TA2541

TA2541 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for installed tools.[199]

S1011 Tarrask

Tarrask is able to create "hidden" scheduled tasks for persistence.[5]
G1022 ToddyCat

ToddyCat has used scheduled tasks to execute discovery commands and scripts for collection.[200]
S0671 Tomiris

Tomiris has used SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN StartDVL /TR "[path to self]" /ST 10:00 to establish persistence.[201]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.[202][203][204]
C0030 Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files.[205]
S0476 Valak

Valak has used scheduled tasks to execute additional payloads and to gain persistence on a compromised host.[206][207][208]
G1035 Winter Vivern

Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts that would subsequently attempt to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks objects to periodically retrieve and execute remotely-hosted payloads.[209]
G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[210][211][212][213][214]
S0248 yty

yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR " + path_file + "/ST 09:30".[215]
S0251 Zebrocy

Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[216]
S0350 zwShell

zwShell has used SchTasks for execution.[217]
S1013 ZxxZ

ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[35]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit

Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. [218]
M1028 Operating System Configuration

Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. [219]
M1026 Privileged Account Management

Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. [220]
M1018 User Account Management

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor for commands being executed via schtasks or other utilities related to task scheduling.

Analytic 1 - Look for schtasks.exe execution with arguments indicative of task creation/modification.

sourcetype=WinEventLog:Powershell (EventCode=4104 OR command="schtasks.exe")| stats count by user host process_name command_line| where Image="schtasks.exe" OR command_line="schtasks"
DS0022 File File Creation

Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary may use the Windows Task Scheduler to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. Task Scheduler stores tasks as files in two locations - C:\Windows\Tasks (legacy) or C:\Windows\System32\Tasks. Accordingly, this analytic looks for the creation of task files in these two locations.

Analytic 1 - Look for new task files in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks.

((source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="11") OR (sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4663)) (TargetFilename= "C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\" OR TargetFilename "C:\Windows\Tasks\*") AND Image!= "C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe"
File Modification

Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.

Analytic 1 - Look for task file modifications with unusual parameters.

sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security (EventCode=4663 OR file_path="C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\*")| stats count by user host file_path action| where action="Write" OR action="Create"
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Flow

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Look for RPC traffic after being mapped, which implies a destination port of at least 49152. If network inspection is available via packet captures or a NIDS, then traffic through the ITaskSchedulerService interface can be detected. Microsoft has a list of the possible methods that are implemented for the ITaskSchedulerService interface, which may be useful in differentiating read and query operations from creations and modifications.

When scheduled tasks are created remotely, Windows uses RPC (135/tcp) to communicate with the Task Scheduler on the remote machine. Once an RPC connection is established, the client communicates with the Scheduled Tasks endpoint, which runs within the service group netsvcs. With packet capture and the right packet decoders or byte-stream based signatures, remote invocations of these functions can be identified.Certain strings can be identifiers of the schtasks, by looking up the interface UUID of ITaskSchedulerService in different formats

  • UUID 86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c (decoded)
  • Hex 49 59 d3 86 c9 83 44 40 b4 24 db 36 32 31 fd 0c (raw)
  • ASCII IYD@$621 (printable bytes only)

This identifier is present three times during the RPC request phase. Any sensor that has access to the byte code as raw, decoded, or ASCII could implement an analytic.

Analytic 1 - Look for RPC traffic with ITaskSchedulerService interface usage.

sourcetype=Netflow OR sourcetype=PacketCapture OR sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=5156 | search (dest_port=135 OR dest_port=5985 OR dest_port=5986) AND (protocol="tcp" OR protocol="udp") AND (Image="taskeng.exe" OR Image="schtasks.exe")| stats count by src_ip dest_ip dest_port| where count > threshold

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. [221] If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Look for instances of schtasks.exe running as processes. The command_line field is necessary to disambiguate between types of schtasks commands. These include the flags /create , /run, /query, /delete, /change, and /end.

Detection of the creation or modification of Scheduled Tasks with a suspicious script, extension or user writable path. Attackers may create or modify Scheduled Tasks for the persistent execution of malicious code. This detection focuses at the same time on EventIDs 4688 and 1 with process creation (SCHTASKS) and EventID 4698, 4702 for Scheduled Task creation/modification event log.

Analytic 1 - New processes whose parent processes are svchost.exe or taskeng.exe

(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") AND (ParentImage="svchost.exe" OR ParentImage="taskeng.exe")

Analytic 2 - Scheduled Task Creation or Modification Containing Suspicious Scripts, Extensions or User Writable Paths

( (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") CommandLine="SCHTASKS" (CommandLine="/CREATE" OR CommandLine="/CHANGE") ) ( ( CommandLine=".cmd" OR CommandLine=".ps1" OR CommandLine=".vbs" OR CommandLine=".py" OR CommandLine=".js" OR CommandLine=".exe" OR CommandLine=".bat" ) OR ( CommandLine="javascript" OR CommandLine="powershell" OR CommandLine="wmic" OR CommandLine="rundll32" OR CommandLine="cmd" OR CommandLine="cscript" OR CommandLine="wscript" OR CommandLine="regsvr32" OR CommandLine="mshta" OR CommandLine="bitsadmin" OR CommandLine="certutil" OR CommandLine="msiexec" OR CommandLine="javaw" ) OR ( CommandLine="%APPDATA%" OR CommandLine="\AppData\Roaming" OR CommandLine="%PUBLIC%" OR CommandLine="C:\Users\Public" OR CommandLine="%ProgramData%" OR CommandLine="C:\ProgramData" OR CommandLine="%TEMP%" OR CommandLine="\AppData\Local\Temp" OR CommandLine="\Windows\PLA\System" OR CommandLine="\tasks" OR CommandLine="\Registration\CRMLog" OR CommandLine="\FxsTmp" OR CommandLine="\spool\drivers\color" OR CommandLine="\tracing" ) )
DS0003 Scheduled Job Scheduled Job Creation

Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. [222] Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including Event ID 106 on Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 for scheduled task registration. For Windows 10 and Server 2016, the relevant events are also logged in the Windows Security event channel after enabling the auditing of other object access events. These include:

  • Event ID 4698: A scheduled task was created.
  • Event ID 4699: A scheduled task was deleted.
  • Event ID 4700: A scheduled task was enabled.
  • Event ID 4701: A scheduled task was disabled.
  • Event ID 4702: A scheduled task was updated.

Note: Detection of the creation or modification of Scheduled Tasks with a suspicious script, extension or user writable path. Attackers may create or modify Scheduled Tasks for the persistent execution of malicious code. This detection focuses at the same time on EventIDs 4688 and 1 with process creation (SCHTASKS) and EventID 4698, 4702 for Scheduled Task creation/modification event log.

Analytic 1 - New schedule tasks whose content includes suspicious scripts, extensions or user writable path

(source="*WinEventLog:Security" EventCode IN (4698, 4702, 4699, 4700, 4701)) | where(JobContent LIKE '%.cmd%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.ps1%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.vbs%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.py%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.js%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.exe%' OR JobContent LIKE '%.bat%' OR JobContent LIKE '%javascript%' OR JobContent LIKE '%powershell%' OR JobContent LIKE '%wmic%' OR JobContent LIKE '%rundll32%' OR JobContent LIKE '%cmd%' OR JobContent LIKE '%cscript%' OR JobContent LIKE '%wscript%' OR JobContent LIKE '%regsvr32%' OR JobContent LIKE '%mshta%' OR JobContent LIKE '%bitsadmin%' OR JobContent LIKE '%certutil%' OR JobContent LIKE '%msiexec%' OR JobContent LIKE '%javaw%' OR JobContent LIKE '%[%]APPDATA[%]%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\AppData\Roaming%' OR JobContent LIKE '%[%]PUBLIC[%]%' OR JobContent LIKE '%C:\Users\Public%' OR JobContent LIKE '%[%]ProgramData[%]%' OR JobContent LIKE '%C:\ProgramData%' OR JobContent LIKE '%[%]TEMP[%]%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\AppData\Local\Temp%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\Windows\PLA\System%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\tasks%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\Registration\CRMLog%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\FxsTmp%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\spool\drivers\color%' OR JobContent LIKE '%\tracing%')
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Creation

Monitor for newly constructed registry keys upon creation of new task. Deletion of values/keys in the registry may further indicate malicious activity.

Analytic 1 - Suspicious Creations under Schedule Registry Key

((source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="12") OR (sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4657) | search (registry_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\" OR registry_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\*")

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