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Domain Trust Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.[1] Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting.[2][3] Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.[3] The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.[4]

ID: T1482
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
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Tactic: Discovery
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Platforms: Windows
Contributors: Dave Westgard; Elia Florio, Microsoft; ExtraHop; Mnemonic; RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
Version: 1.2
Created: 14 February 2019
Last Modified: 16 June 2022
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0552 AdFind

AdFind can gather information about organizational units (OUs) and domain trusts from Active Directory.[5][6][7][8]
G1024 Akira

Akira uses the built-in Nltest utility or tools such as AdFind to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.[9]

S1081 BADHATCH

BADHATCH can use nltest.exe /domain_trusts to discover domain trust relationships on a compromised machine.[10]
S0534 Bazar

Bazar can use Nltest tools to obtain information about the domain.[11][12]
S0521 BloodHound

BloodHound has the ability to map domain trusts and identify misconfigurations for potential abuse.[13]
S1063 Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries and nltest /domain_trusts for domain trust discovery.[14][15]
C0015 C0015

During C0015, the threat actors used the command nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts to enumerate domain trusts.[16]
G0114 Chimera

Chimera has nltest /domain_trusts to identify domain trust relationships.[17]
S0105 dsquery

dsquery can be used to gather information on domain trusts with dsquery * -filter "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" -attr *.[3]
S1159 DUSTTRAP

DUSTTRAP can identify Active Directory information and related items.[18]
G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has used Nltest to obtain information about domain controllers.[19]
S0363 Empire

Empire has modules for enumerating domain trusts.[20]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has retrieved a list of trusted domains by using nltest.exe /domain_trusts.[21]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID used Nltest during initial discovery.[22][23]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus can run C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts to discover domain trusts.[24][25]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used a web shell to execute nltest /trusted_domains to identify trust relationships.[26]
S1146 MgBot

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on local domain users and permissions.[27]
S0359 Nltest

Nltest may be used to enumerate trusted domains by using commands such as nltest /domain_trusts.[28][29]
S1145 Pikabot

Pikabot will gather information concerning the Windows Domain the victim machine is a member of during execution.[30]
S0378 PoshC2

PoshC2 has modules for enumerating domain trusts.[31]
S0194 PowerSploit

PowerSploit has modules such as Get-NetDomainTrust and Get-NetForestTrust to enumerate domain and forest trusts.[32][33]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery.[34]
S1071 Rubeus

Rubeus can gather information about domain trusts.[35][36]
S1124 SocGholish

SocGholish can profile compromised systems to identify domain trust relationships.[37][38]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the Get-AcceptedDomain PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell.[39] They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.[40][41]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot can gather information about domain trusts by utilizing Nltest.[29][42]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit

Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum.
M1030 Network Segmentation

Employ network segmentation for sensitive domains.[3].

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as nltest /domain_trusts. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information.
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to LDAP and MSRPC that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure).
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

Monitor for API calls associated with gathering information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement like DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call to spot activity associated with Domain Trust Discovery.[3] Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as PowerShell. The .NET method GetAllTrustRelationships() can be an indicator of Domain Trust Discovery.[43]
Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes that may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.
DS0012 Script Script Execution

Monitor for any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.

References

  1. Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  2. Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  3. Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  4. Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  5. Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
  6. McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  7. Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
  8. Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.
  9. Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
  10. Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
  11. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020.
  12. Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
  13. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  14. Harbison, M. and Renals, P. (2022, July 5). When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. Retrieved February 1, 2023.
  15. Kenefick, I. et al. (2022, October 12). Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
  16. DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
  17. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  18. Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
  19. Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
  20. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  21. Martin Zugec. (2021, July 27). Deep Dive Into a FIN8 Attack - A Forensic Investigation. Retrieved September 1, 2021.
  22. DFIR. (2021, March 29). Sodinokibi (aka REvil) Ransomware. Retrieved July 22, 2024.
  1. DFIR. (2022, April 25). Quantum Ransomware. Retrieved July 26, 2024.
  2. Stepanic, D. and Bousseaden, S. (2024, May 15). Spring Cleaning with LATRODECTUS: A Potential Replacement for ICEDID. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  3. Batista, J. (2024, June 17). Latrodectus, are you coming back?. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  4. DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023.
  5. Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.
  6. ss64. (n.d.). NLTEST.exe - Network Location Test. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  7. Bacurio Jr., F. and Salvio, J. (2018, April 9). Trickbot’s New Reconnaissance Plugin. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  8. Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
  9. Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  10. PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  11. PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  12. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  13. The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  14. The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.
  15. Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
  16. Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
  17. Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
  18. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
  19. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  20. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
  21. Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.