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Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe

ID Name
T1561.001 Disk Content Wipe
T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe

Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.[1][2][3][4][5] The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.

On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using Network Device CLI commands such as format.[6]

To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.[1][2][3][4]

ID: T1561.002
Sub-technique of:  T1561
ⓘ
Tactic: Impact
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Platforms: Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
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Impact Type: Availability
Contributors: Austin Clark, @c2defense
Version: 1.1
Created: 20 February 2020
Last Modified: 15 October 2024
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0067 APT37

APT37 has access to destructive malware that is capable of overwriting a machine's Master Boot Record (MBR).[7][8]
G0082 APT38

APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable.[9]
S1136 BFG Agonizer

BFG Agonizer retrieves a device handle to \\.\PhysicalDrive0 to wipe the boot sector of a given disk.[10]
S0693 CaddyWiper

CaddyWiper has the ability to destroy information about a physical drive's partitions including the MBR, GPT, and partition entries.[11][12]
S1134 DEADWOOD

DEADWOOD opens and writes zeroes to the first 512 bytes of each drive, deleting the MBR. DEADWOOD then sends the control code IOCTL_DISK_DELETE_DRIVE_LAYOUT to ensure the MBR is removed from the drive.[13]
G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear conducted destructive operations against victims, including disk structure wiping, via the WhisperGate malware in Ukraine.[14]
S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to corrupt disk partitions, damage the Master Boot Record (MBR), and overwrite the Master File Table (MFT) of all available physical drives.[15][16][17][18]
C0038 HomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a version of ZeroCleare to wipe disk drives on targeted hosts.[19][20]
S0607 KillDisk

KillDisk overwrites the first sector of the Master Boot Record with "0x00".[21]
G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.[22][23]
S1135 MultiLayer Wiper

MultiLayer Wiper opens a handle to \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0 and wipes the first 512 bytes of data from this location, removing the boot sector.[10]
S0364 RawDisk

RawDisk was used in Shamoon to help overwrite components of disk structure like the MBR and disk partitions.[3][5]
G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to corrupt the infected system's master boot record.[24][25]
S0140 Shamoon

Shamoon has been seen overwriting features of disk structure such as the MBR.[1][2][3][5]
S0380 StoneDrill

StoneDrill can wipe the master boot record of an infected computer.[26]
S0689 WhisperGate

WhisperGate can overwrite the Master Book Record (MBR) on victim systems with a malicious 16-bit bootloader.[27][28][29][30][31][32]
S1151 ZeroCleare

ZeroCleare can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.[33][19][34]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1053 Data Backup

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[35] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
DS0016 Drive Drive Access

Monitor for newly constructed drive letters or mount points to a data storage device for attempts to write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock.
Drive Modification

Monitor for changes made to drive letters or mount points of data storage devices for attempts to read to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock.
DS0027 Driver Driver Load

Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor newly executed processes that may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

References

  1. Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  2. FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  3. Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  4. Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  5. Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  6. Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.
  7. FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.
  8. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
  9. FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
  10. Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  11. ESET. (2022, March 15). CaddyWiper: New wiper malware discovered in Ukraine. Retrieved March 23, 2022.
  12. Malhotra, A. (2022, March 15). Threat Advisory: CaddyWiper. Retrieved March 23, 2022.
  13. Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  14. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
  15. Guerrero-Saade, J. (2022, February 23). HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  16. Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, February 24). Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  17. Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  18. Dani, M. (2022, March 1). Ukrainian Targets Hit by HermeticWiper, New Datawiper Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  1. CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  2. MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  3. Fernando Merces, Byron Gelera, Martin Co. (2018, June 7). KillDisk Variant Hits Latin American Finance Industry. Retrieved January 12, 2021.
  4. US-CERT. (2018, March 09). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536.11.WHITE. Retrieved June 13, 2018.
  5. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
  6. US-CERT. (2016, February 25). ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  7. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
  8. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  9. MSTIC. (2022, January 15). Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved March 10, 2022.
  10. Crowdstrike. (2022, January 19). Technical Analysis of the WhisperGate Malicious Bootloader. Retrieved March 10, 2022.
  11. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, February 15). Cybereason vs. WhisperGate and HermeticWiper. Retrieved March 10, 2022.
  12. Falcone, R. et al.. (2022, January 20). Threat Brief: Ongoing Russia and Ukraine Cyber Conflict. Retrieved March 10, 2022.
  13. Biasini, N. et al.. (2022, January 21). Ukraine Campaign Delivers Defacement and Wipers, in Continued Escalation. Retrieved March 14, 2022.
  14. S2W. (2022, January 18). Analysis of Destructive Malware (WhisperGate) targeting Ukraine. Retrieved March 14, 2022.
  15. Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  16. Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.
  17. Ready.gov. (n.d.). IT Disaster Recovery Plan. Retrieved March 15, 2019.