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Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

ID Name
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.002 Authentication Package
T1547.003 Time Providers
T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL
T1547.005 Security Support Provider
T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions
T1547.007 Re-opened Applications
T1547.008 LSASS Driver
T1547.009 Shortcut Modification
T1547.010 Port Monitors
T1547.012 Print Processors
T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries
T1547.014 Active Setup
T1547.015 Login Items

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.[1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:

  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

Run keys may exist under multiple hives.[2][3] The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.[1] For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" [4]

Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.

The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:

  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders

The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:

  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices

Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:

  • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run

Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run automatically for the currently logged-on user.

By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.

Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.

ID: T1547.001
Sub-technique of:  T1547
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
ⓘ
Permissions Required: Administrator, User
Contributors: Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs; Harun Küßner; Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
Version: 2.0
Created: 23 January 2020
Last Modified: 12 September 2024
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[5][6][7]
S0331 Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.[8][9]

S1025 Amadey

Amadey has changed the Startup folder to the one containing its executable by overwriting the registry keys.[10][11]
S1074 ANDROMEDA

ANDROMEDA can establish persistence by dropping a sample of itself to C:\ProgramData\Local Settings\Temp\mskmde.com and adding a Registry run key to execute every time a user logs on.[12]
S0622 AppleSeed

AppleSeed has the ability to create the Registry key name EstsoftAutoUpdate at HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce to establish persistence.[13]
G0026 APT18

APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key.[14][15]
G0073 APT19

An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[16]
G0007 APT28

APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.[17]
G0016 APT29

APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[18]
G0022 APT3

APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[19]
G0050 APT32

APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.[20][21][22]
G0064 APT33

APT33 has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.[23][24]
G0067 APT37

APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[25][26]
G0087 APT39

APT39 has maintained persistence using the startup folder.[27]
G0096 APT41

APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence.[28][29] APT41 added a registry key in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.[30]
S0456 Aria-body

Aria-body has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.[31]
S0373 Astaroth

Astaroth creates a startup item for persistence. [32]
S1029 AuTo Stealer

AuTo Stealer can place malicious executables in a victim's AutoRun registry key or StartUp directory, depending on the AV product installed, to maintain persistence.[33]
S0640 Avaddon

Avaddon uses registry run keys for persistence.[34]
S1053 AvosLocker

AvosLocker has been executed via the RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.[35]
S0414 BabyShark

BabyShark has added a Registry key to ensure all future macros are enabled for Microsoft Word and Excel as well as for additional persistence.[36][37]
S0093 Backdoor.Oldrea

Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[38][39]
S0031 BACKSPACE

BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[40]
S0128 BADNEWS

BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[41]
S0337 BadPatch

BadPatch establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.[42]
S0534 Bazar

Bazar can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.[43][44]
S0127 BBSRAT

BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe.
S0268 Bisonal

Bisonal has added itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.[45][46]

S0570 BitPaymer

BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[47]
S0089 BlackEnergy

The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[48]
S0635 BoomBox

BoomBox can establish persistence by writing the Registry value MicroNativeCacheSvc to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[49]
S0204 Briba

Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[50]
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[51]
S0471 build_downer

build_downer has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.[52]
S0030 Carbanak

Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.[53]
S0484 Carberp

Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.[54]
S0348 Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT establishes Persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load Registry key to point to its executable.[55]
S0631 Chaes

Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.[56]
S0144 ChChes

ChChes establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.[57]
S1041 Chinoxy

Chinoxy has established persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by loading a dropper to (%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\eoffice.exe).[58]
S0660 Clambling

Clambling can establish persistence by adding a Registry run key.[59][60]
G0080 Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[61]
S0338 Cobian RAT

Cobian RAT creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.[62]
S0244 Comnie

Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[63]
S0608 Conficker

Conficker adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[64]
G0142 Confucius

Confucius has dropped malicious files into the startup folder %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on a compromised host in order to maintain persistence.[65]
S0137 CORESHELL

CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[66]
S0046 CozyCar

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run[67]
S0115 Crimson

Crimson can add Registry run keys for persistence.[68][69]
S0235 CrossRAT

CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows.[70]
G0070 Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[70]
S0334 DarkComet

DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.[71][72]
S1111 DarkGate

DarkGate installation includes AutoIt script execution creating a shortcut to itself as an LNK object, such as bill.lnk, in the victim startup folder.[73] DarkGate installation finishes with the creation of a registry Run key.[73]
G0012 Darkhotel

Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[74]
S1066 DarkTortilla

DarkTortilla has established persistence via the Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[75]
S1021 DnsSystem

DnsSystem can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[76]
S0186 DownPaper

DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[77]
G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[78]
S0062 DustySky

DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[79]
S0081 Elise

If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self] and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAStorD.[80][81]
S0082 Emissary

Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[82]
S0367 Emotet

Emotet has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to maintain persistence.[83][84][85]
S0363 Empire

Empire can modify the registry run keys HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[86]
S0396 EvilBunny

EvilBunny has created Registry keys for persistence in [HKLM|HKCU]\…\CurrentVersion\Run.[87]

S0152 EvilGrab

EvilGrab adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.[57]
S0568 EVILNUM

EVILNUM can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.[88][89]
S0512 FatDuke

FatDuke has used HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[90]
S0267 FELIXROOT

FELIXROOT adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.[91]
G0051 FIN10

FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[92][86]
G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has used Windows Registry run keys such as, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\hosts to maintain persistence.[93]
G0037 FIN6

FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[94]
G0046 FIN7

FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[95][96]
S0355 Final1stspy

Final1stspy creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[97]
S0182 FinFisher

FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run.[98][99]
S0696 Flagpro

Flagpro has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.[100]

S0036 FLASHFLOOD

FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[40]
S0381 FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy has established persistence via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run registry key.[10]
S1044 FunnyDream

FunnyDream can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[58]
G0047 Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.[101][102][103][104]
S0168 Gazer

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[105][106]
S0666 Gelsemium

Gelsemium can set persistence with a Registry run key.[107]
S0032 gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[108][109]
S0249 Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[110]
S1138 Gootloader

Gootloader can create an autorun entry for a PowerShell script to run at reboot.[111]
G0078 Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[112]
S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.[113][114]
S0417 GRIFFON

GRIFFON has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.[115]
S0632 GrimAgent

GrimAgent can set persistence with a Registry run key.[116]
S0561 GuLoader

GuLoader can establish persistence via the Registry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[117]
S0499 Hancitor

Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[118]
S0170 Helminth

Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.[119]
S1027 Heyoka Backdoor

Heyoka Backdoor can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value EverNoteTrayUService.[120]
S0087 Hi-Zor

Hi-Zor creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[121]
G0126 Higaisa

Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.[122][123]
S0070 HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe" to establish persistence.[124][125]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.[126]
G0100 Inception

Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[127]
S0259 InnaputRAT

Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.[128]
S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.[129]
S0015 Ixeshe

Ixeshe can achieve persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[130]
S0389 JCry

JCry has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. [131]
S0044 JHUHUGIT

JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[132]
S0088 Kasidet

Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[133][134]
S0265 Kazuar

Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[135]
G0004 Ke3chang

Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[136]
G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce Registry key.[137][37][138][139][140]
S0250 Koadic

Koadic has added persistence to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[141]
S0669 KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS can set the AutoRun Registry key with a PowerShell command.[141]
S0356 KONNI

A version of KONNI has dropped a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.[142]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus can set an AutoRun key to establish persistence.[143]
G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[144][145][146][147]
G0140 LazyScripter

LazyScripter has achieved persistence via writing a PowerShell script to the autorun registry key.[141]
G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[148][149]
S0513 LiteDuke

LiteDuke can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[90]
S0397 LoJax

LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’ in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.[150]
S0582 LookBack

LookBack sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.[151]
S0532 Lucifer

Lucifer can persist by setting Registry key values HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic.[152]
G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run.[153][154]
S0409 Machete

Machete used the startup folder for persistence.[155][156]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[157][158][159]
S0652 MarkiRAT

MarkiRAT can drop its payload into the Startup directory to ensure it automatically runs when the compromised system is started.[160]
S0167 Matryoshka

Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[161][162]
S0449 Maze

Maze has created a file named "startup_vrun.bat" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.[163]
S0500 MCMD

MCMD can use Registry Run Keys for persistence.[164]
S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.[165][166][167][168]
S1122 Mispadu

Mispadu creates a link in the startup folder for persistence.[169] Mispadu adds persistence via the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[170]
S0080 Mivast

Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.[171]
S0553 MoleNet

MoleNet can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.[172]

G0021 Molerats

Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.[173]
S1026 Mongall

Mongall can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value EverNoteTrayUService.[120]
G1036 Moonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet used registry run keys for process execution during initial victim infection.[174]
S0256 Mosquito

Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.[175]
G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.[176][177][178][179][180][181]
G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has created the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU to maintain persistence.[182]
G0019 Naikon

Naikon has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.[183]
S0228 NanHaiShu

NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[184]
S0336 NanoCore

NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[185]
S0247 NavRAT

NavRAT creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.[186]
S0630 Nebulae

Nebulae can achieve persistence through a Registry Run key.[183]
S0034 NETEAGLE

The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[40]
S0198 NETWIRE

NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[187][188][117][189]
S0385 njRAT

njRAT has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ and dropped a shortcut in %STARTUP%.[190][191]
S0353 NOKKI

NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[192]
S0644 ObliqueRAT

ObliqueRAT can gain persistence by a creating a shortcut in the infected user's Startup directory.[193]
S0340 Octopus

Octopus achieved persistence by placing a malicious executable in the startup directory and has added the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to the Registry.[194]
S0439 Okrum

Okrum establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[195]

C0022 Operation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.[196]

C0013 Operation Sharpshooter

During Operation Sharpshooter, a first-stage downloader installed Rising Sun to %Startup%\mssync.exe on a compromised host.[197]

G0040 Patchwork

Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[198][199]
S1145 Pikabot

Pikabot maintains persistence following system checks through the Run key in the registry.[200]
S0124 Pisloader

Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.[201]
S0254 PLAINTEE

PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[202]
S0013 PlugX

PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.[203][57][204]
S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT has added a registry key in the hive for persistence.[205]
S0012 PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[206]
S0139 PowerDuke

PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[207]
S0441 PowerShower

PowerShower sets up persistence with a Registry run key.[208]
S0145 POWERSOURCE

POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[209]
S0194 PowerSploit

PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[210][211]
S0371 POWERTON

POWERTON can install a Registry Run key for persistence.[212]
S0113 Prikormka

Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[213]
G0056 PROMETHIUM

PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.[214]
S0147 Pteranodon

Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[215]
S0196 PUNCHBUGGY

PUNCHBUGGY has been observed using a Registry Run key.[216][217]
S0192 Pupy

Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[218]
G0024 Putter Panda

A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.[219]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key.[220][221][222][223]
S0262 QuasarRAT

If the QuasarRAT client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[224][225]

S0458 Ramsay

Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[226]
S1130 Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin will use a Registry key to achieve persistence through reboot, setting a RunOnce key such as: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce{random value name} = "rundll32 shell32 ShellExec_RunDLLA REGSVR /u /s "{dropped copy path and file name}"".[227]
S0662 RCSession

RCSession has the ability to modify a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[59][228]
S0172 Reaver

Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[229]
G1039 RedCurl

RedCurl has established persistence by creating entries in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[230][231]

S0153 RedLeaves

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[57][232]
S0332 Remcos

Remcos can add itself to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[233]
S0375 Remexi

Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[234]
S0433 Rifdoor

Rifdoor has created a new registry entry at HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Graphics with a value of C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe /run.[235]
S1150 ROADSWEEP

ROADSWEEP has been placed in the start up folder to trigger execution upon user login.[236]
G0106 Rocke

Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.[237]

S0270 RogueRobin

RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.[238]
S0090 Rover

Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[239]
S0148 RTM

RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[240]
G0048 RTM

RTM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the RTM Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.[240][241]
S0253 RunningRAT

RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.[110]
S0446 Ryuk

Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[242]
S0085 S-Type

S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[243]
S1018 Saint Bot

Saint Bot has established persistence by being copied to the Startup directory or through the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key.[244][245]
S0074 Sakula

Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[246]
S0461 SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [247][248]
S0053 SeaDuke

SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[249]
S0345 Seasalt

Seasalt creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\Run.[250]
S0382 ServHelper

ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.[251]
S0546 SharpStage

SharpStage has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.[172]

S0444 ShimRat

ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run to maintain persistence should other methods fail.[252]
S0028 SHIPSHAPE

SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[40]
G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.[253][254][255]
G0091 Silence

Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[256]

S0692 SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can establish a LNK file in the startup folder for persistence.[257]
S1035 Small Sieve

Small Sieve has the ability to add itself to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift for persistence.[258]
S0226 Smoke Loader

Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[259]
S0649 SMOKEDHAM

SMOKEDHAM has used reg.exe to create a Registry Run key.[260]
S1086 Snip3

Snip3 can create a VBS file in startup to persist after system restarts.[261]
S0159 SNUGRIDE

SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[262]
S0035 SPACESHIP

SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[40]
S0058 SslMM

To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[263]
S1037 STARWHALE

STARWHALE can establish persistence by installing itself in the startup folder, whereas the GO variant has created a HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookM registry key.[264][265]
S0491 StrongPity

StrongPity can use the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key for persistence.[214]
S0018 Sykipot

Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[266]
S0663 SysUpdate

SysUpdate can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[267]
G1018 TA2541

TA2541 has placed VBS files in the Startup folder and used Registry run keys to establish persistence for malicious payloads.[268]
S0011 Taidoor

Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.[269]
S0586 TAINTEDSCRIBE

TAINTEDSCRIBE can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as "Narrator.exe" for persistence.[270]
G0139 TeamTNT

TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.[271]
G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[272][273]
S0665 ThreatNeedle

ThreatNeedle can be loaded into the Startup folder (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk) as a Shortcut file for persistence.[274]
S0131 TINYTYPHON

TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[41]
S0004 TinyZBot

TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[275]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[276]
S0094 Trojan.Karagany

Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[38][277]
G0081 Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[278][279]
S0178 Truvasys

Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[280]
S0647 Turian

Turian can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[281]
G0010 Turla

A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence. Additionally, a Turla custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[175][282][283]
S0199 TURNEDUP

TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[284]
S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.[285][286]
S0136 USBStealer

USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[287]
S0207 Vasport

Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[288]
S0442 VBShower

VBShower used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[a-f0-9A-F]{8} to maintain persistence.[289]
S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can add itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UIF2IS20VK Registry keys.[290]
G0112 Windshift

Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[291]
S0141 Winnti for Windows

Winnti for Windows can add a service named wind0ws to the Registry to achieve persistence after reboot.[292]
G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and a shortcut within the startup folder.[293][294]
S0341 Xbash

Xbash can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.[295]
S0251 Zebrocy

Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.[296][297][298]
S0330 Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.[299][300]
G0128 ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named Dropbox Update Setup to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.[301]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key.
DS0022 File File Modification

Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including the startup folders. [302]
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes executed from the Run/RunOnce registry keys through Windows EID 9707 or "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" and "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce" registry keys with the full command line.

Registry modifications are often essential in establishing persistence via known Windows mechanisms. Many legitimate modifications are done graphically via regedit.exe or by using the corresponding channels, or even calling the Registry APIs directly. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe. When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exe will likely be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be learned so they can be tuned out accordingly.

Output DescriptionThe sequence of processes that resulted in reg.exe being started from a shell. That is, a hierarchy that looks like• great-grand_parent.exe• grand_parent.exe• parent.exe• reg.exe

Analytic 1 - Reg.exe called from Command Shell

(source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") Image="reg.exe" AND ParentImage="cmd.exe"| join left=L right=R where L.ParentProcessGuid = R.ProcessGuid [search EventCode IN (1, 4688) Image="cmd.exe" ParentImage!="explorer.exe"]
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Creation

Monitor for newly created windows registry keys that may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key.
Windows Registry Key Modification

Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations. [302]

Detection of the modification of the registry key Common Startup located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\ and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders. When a user logs on, any files located in the Startup Folder are launched. Attackers may modify these folders with other files in order to evade detection set on these default folders. This detection focuses on EventIDs 4688 and 1 for process creation and EventID 4657 for the modification of the Registry Keys.

Analytic 1 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key ‘Common Startup’

(source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4657" ObjectValueName="Common Startup") OR (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="13" TargetObject="*Common Startup")

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