FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| GOLD NIAGARA | |
| ITG14 | |
| Carbon Spider | |
| ELBRUS | |
| Sangria Tempest |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 and the executable WsTaskLoad to enumerate domain administrations by executing |
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns.[13] Additionally, FIN7 has registered a malicious domain as |
| .006 | Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services |
FIN7 has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products.[6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1071 | .004 | Application Layer Protocol: DNS |
FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[2][4] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
FIN7 used SQL scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14][4] |
|
| .001 | PowerShell |
FIN7 used a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieved an additional payload.[2][15][16][6][17] Additionally, FIN7 has executed a custom obfuscation of the shellcode invoker in PowerSploit called POWERTRASH.[12] |
||
| .003 | Windows Command Shell |
FIN7 used the command prompt to launch commands on the victim’s machine.[4][14][6] Additionally, FIN7 has used cmd.exe to open the Run dialog by sending the "Windows + R" keys through malicious USBs acting as virtual keyboards.[17] |
||
| .005 | Visual Basic |
FIN7 used VBS scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14][5] |
||
| .007 | JavaScript |
FIN7 used JavaScript scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
FIN7 created new Windows services and added them to the startup directories for persistence.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact |
FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.[5][6] Additionally, FIN7 has deployed ransomware as the end payload during big game hunting.[12] |
|
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
FIN7 has collected files and other sensitive information from a compromised network.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
FIN7 has decoded a malicious PowerShell script using |
|
| Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware |
FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media.[16][18] |
| Enterprise | T1546 | .011 | Event Triggered Execution: Application Shimming |
FIN7 has used application shim databases for persistence.[19] |
| Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.[5] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
FIN7 has compromised targeted organizations through exploitation of CVE-2021-31207 in Exchange.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels |
FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.[20] |
|
| Enterprise | T1591 | Gather Victim Org Information |
FIN7 has compiled a list of victims by filtering companies by revenue using Zoominfo, which is a service that provides business information.[7] |
|
| .004 | Identify Roles |
FIN7 has identified IT staff and employees who had higher levels of administrative rights.[12] |
||
| Enterprise | T1564 | .001 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories |
FIN7 has used |
| .003 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window |
FIN7 has used .txt files to conceal PowerShell commands.[17] |
||
| Enterprise | T1562 | .004 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
FIN7 has added a firewall rule to allow TCP port 59999 inbound and a rule to allow sshd.exe on TCP port 9898.[12] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
FIN7 has downloaded additional malware to execute on the victim's machine, including by using a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieves an additional payload.[2][21][6][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1674 | Input Injection |
FIN7 has used malicious USBs to emulate keystrokes to launch PowerShell to download and execute malware from the adversary's server.[16][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1559 | .002 | Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange |
FIN7 spear phishing campaigns have included malicious Word documents with DDE execution.[22] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
FIN7 has created a scheduled task named "AdobeFlashSync" to establish persistence.[15] |
| .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
FIN7 has attempted to run Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe.[5] Additionally, FIN7 has mimicked WsTaskLoad.exe, which is associated with the Wondershare software suite, by using a malicious executable under the same name.[12] |
||
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port |
FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2.[4] FIN7 has used TCP ports 59999 and 9898 for firewall rules.[12] |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | .010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
FIN7 has used fragmented strings, environment variables, standard input (stdin), and native character-replacement functionalities to obfuscate commands.[23][4][5] |
| .016 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Junk Code Insertion |
FIN7 has used random junk code to obfuscate malware code.[6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
FIN7 has utilized a variety of tools such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, and the remote management tool, Atera for targeting efforts.[6] |
| Enterprise | T1069 | .002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
FIN7 has used the command |
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.[2][21][14][13][5] |
| .002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links.[5] Additionally, FIN7 has sent spearphishing emails containing a typosquatted link to "ip-sccanner[.]com."[12] |
||
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 to perform process discovery by executing |
|
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | ||
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading |
FIN7 has loaded a .NET assembly into the currect execution context via |
|
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools |
FIN7 has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.[6] |
|
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.[5] |
| .004 | Remote Services: SSH |
FIN7 has used SSH to move laterally through victim environments.[5] |
||
| .005 | Remote Services: VNC | |||
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media |
FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations.[16] Additionally, FIN7 has used malicious USBs that acted as virtual keyboards to install malware and txt files that decode to PowerShell commands.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[2][15][4][14] Specifically, FIN7 has used OpenSSH to establish persistence.[12] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | ||
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3.[6] FIN7 has also used an open directory web server as a staging server for payloads and other tools, such as OpenSSH and 7zip.[24] |
| .004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target |
FIN7 has compromised a digital product website and modified multiple download links to point to trojanized versions of offered digital products.[6] |
||
| .005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
FIN7 has created a fake link that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox that downloaded the malicious executable.[12] |
||
| Enterprise | T1558 | .003 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting |
FIN7 has used Kerberoasting PowerShell commands such as, |
| Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing |
FIN7 has signed Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1195 | .002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain |
FIN7 has gained initial access by compromising a victim's software supply chain.[6] |
| Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta |
FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.[2] |
| .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
FIN7 has used |
||
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
FIN7 has used csvde.exe, which is a built-in Windows command line tool, to export system information. Additionally, WsTaskLoad has gathered system information, such as operating system and hostname.[12] |
|
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
FIN7 has used the command |
|
| Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
FIN7 has started the SSH service by executing |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery |
FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 to execute |
|
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.[5] |
| .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file.[2][13][5] Additionally, FIN7 has used malicious Microsoft Word and Excel files and Leo VBS to distribute an updated version of JSS Loader and to distribute the Harpy backdoor.[25] |
||
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[5] |
|
| .003 | Local Accounts |
FIN7 has used compromised credentials for access as SYSTEM on Exchange servers.[10] |
||
| Enterprise | T1125 | Video Capture |
FIN7 created a custom video recording capability that could be used to monitor operations in the victim's environment.[4][21] |
|
| Enterprise | T1497 | .002 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: User Activity Based Checks |
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | Web Service: Bidirectional Communication |
FIN7 used legitimate services like Google Docs, Google Scripts, and Pastebin for C2.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
FIN7 has used WMI to install malware on targeted systems.[13] |
|