Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.[1]
Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.[2]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0331 | Agent Tesla |
Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.[3] |
| S0534 | Bazar |
Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to |
| S0268 | Bisonal |
Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware.[5] |
| S1070 | Black Basta |
Black Basta can make a random number of calls to the |
| S1039 | Bumblebee |
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.[7] |
| S0484 | Carberp |
Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.[8] |
| S0023 | CHOPSTICK |
CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.[9] |
| S0046 | CozyCar |
Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.[10] |
| G0012 | Darkhotel |
Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.[11] |
| S0554 | Egregor |
Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes.[12][13] |
| S0666 | Gelsemium |
Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior.[14] |
| S0499 | Hancitor |
Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[15] |
| S0483 | IcedID |
IcedID has manipulated Keitaro Traffic Direction System to filter researcher and sandbox traffic.[16] |
| S1020 | Kevin |
Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.[17] |
| S0455 | Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.[18] |
| C0005 | Operation Spalax |
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.[19] |
| S0147 | Pteranodon |
Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.[20] |
| S1130 | Raspberry Robin |
Raspberry Robin contains real and fake second-stage payloads following initial execution, with the real payload only delivered if the malware determines it is not running in a virtualized environment.[21] |
| S0148 | RTM |
RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.[22] |
| G1031 | Saint Bear |
Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.[23] |
| S1030 | Squirrelwaffle |
Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.[24][25] |
| S0380 | StoneDrill |
StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.[26] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. |
| DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
Monitor for API calls that may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. |
| Process Creation |
Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |