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System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec

ID Name
T1218.001 Compiled HTML File
T1218.002 Control Panel
T1218.003 CMSTP
T1218.004 InstallUtil
T1218.005 Mshta
T1218.007 Msiexec
T1218.008 Odbcconf
T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm
T1218.010 Regsvr32
T1218.011 Rundll32
T1218.012 Verclsid
T1218.013 Mavinject
T1218.014 MMC
T1218.015 Electron Applications

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).[1] The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.[2][3] Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.[4]

ID: T1218.007
Sub-technique of:  T1218
ⓘ
Tactic: Defense Evasion
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
ⓘ
Defense Bypassed: Application control, Digital Certificate Validation
Contributors: Alexandros Pappas; Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom
Version: 2.0
Created: 24 January 2020
Last Modified: 19 April 2022
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0584 AppleJeus

AppleJeus has been installed via MSI installer.[5]
S0631 Chaes

Chaes has used .MSI files as an initial way to start the infection chain.[6]
S0611 Clop

Clop can use msiexec.exe to disable security tools on the system.[7]

S1052 DEADEYE

DEADEYE can use msiexec.exe for execution of malicious DLL.[8]
S0038 Duqu

Duqu has used msiexec to execute malicious Windows Installer packages. Additionally, a PROPERTY=VALUE pair containing a 56-bit encryption key has been used to decrypt the main payload from the installer packages.[9]
S0381 FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy has been installed via msiexec.exe.[10]

S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can use MSI files to execute DLLs.[11]
S0483 IcedID

IcedID can inject itself into a suspended msiexec.exe process to send beacons to C2 while appearing as a normal msi application. [12] IcedID has also used msiexec.exe to deploy the IcedID loader.[13]
S0528 Javali

Javali has used the MSI installer to download and execute malicious payloads.[11]
S1160 Latrodectus

Latrodectus has called msiexec to install remotely-hosted MSI files.[14][15]
S0451 LoudMiner

LoudMiner used an MSI installer to install the virtualization software.[16]

G0095 Machete

Machete has used msiexec to install the Machete malware.[17]
S0449 Maze

Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using msiexec.[18]
S0530 Melcoz

Melcoz can use MSI files with embedded VBScript for execution.[11]
S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.[19][20]

S1122 Mispadu

Mispadu has been installed via MSI installer.[21][22]
G0021 Molerats

Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.[23]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can use MSIExec to spawn multiple cmd.exe processes.[24]
S0481 Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with msiexec.exe.[25]
G0075 Rancor

Rancor has used msiexec to download and execute malicious installer files over HTTP.[26]
S1130 Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe for post-installation communication to command and control infrastructure.[27] Msiexec.exe is executed referencing a remote resource for second-stage payload retrieval and execution.[28]
S0662 RCSession

RCSession has the ability to execute inside the msiexec.exe process.[29]
S0592 RemoteUtilities

RemoteUtilities can use Msiexec to install a service.[30]
G0092 TA505

TA505 has used msiexec to download and execute malicious Windows Installer files.[31][32][33]
G0128 ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used the msiexec.exe command-line utility to download and execute malicious MSI files.[34]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Consider disabling the AlwaysInstallElevated policy to prevent elevated execution of Windows Installer packages.[4]
M1026 Privileged Account Management

Restrict execution of Msiexec.exe to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.
DS0011 Module Module Load

Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts.

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files.

References

  1. Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.
  2. LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
  3. Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
  4. Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  5. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  6. Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.
  7. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, December 23). Cybereason vs. Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 11, 2021.
  8. Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
  9. Kaspersky Lab. (2015, June 11). The Duqu 2.0. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
  10. Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  11. GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.
  12. Kimayong, P. (2020, June 18). COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
  13. Kenefick , I. (2022, December 23). IcedID Botnet Distributors Abuse Google PPC to Distribute Malware. Retrieved July 24, 2024.
  14. Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.
  15. Abrams, L. (2024, April 30). New Latrodectus malware attacks use Microsoft, Cloudflare themes. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  16. Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
  17. kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
  1. Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  2. Zhang, X. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.
  3. ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
  4. SCILabs. (2021, December 23). Cyber Threat Profile Malteiro. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  5. ESET Security. (2019, November 19). Mispadu: Advertisement for a discounted Unhappy Meal. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  6. Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  7. CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  8. SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
  9. Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
  10. Lauren Podber and Stef Rand. (2022, May 5). Raspberry Robin gets the worm early. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  11. Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  12. Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
  13. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  14. Salem, E. (2019, April 25). Threat Actor TA505 Targets Financial Enterprises Using LOLBins and a New Backdoor Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  15. Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved September 16, 2024..
  16. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  17. Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.