Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have overlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collaboration or limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6] Because of overlapping operations, some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the broader Lazarus Group umbrella rather than tracking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions.
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9]
In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Black Banshee | |
| Velvet Chollima | |
| Emerald Sleet | |
| THALLIUM | |
| APT43 | |
| TA427 | |
| Springtail |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1098 | .007 | Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups |
Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with |
| Enterprise | T1583 | Acquire Infrastructure |
Kimsuky has used funds from stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to acquire operational infrastructure.[5] |
|
| .001 | Domains |
Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties including search engines, web platforms, and cryptocurrency exchanges.[12][16][4][2][3][15][5][17] |
||
| .004 | Server |
Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.[15] |
||
| .006 | Web Services |
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.[18] Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for hosting payloads and uploading victim system information. [19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | |
| .002 | Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols |
Kimsuky has used FTP to download additional malware to the target machine.[20] |
||
| .003 | Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols |
Kimsuky has used e-mail to send exfiltrated data to C2 servers.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Kimsuky has used QuickZip to archive stolen files before exfiltration.[18] |
| .003 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method | |||
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the |
| Enterprise | T1185 | Browser Session Hijacking |
Kimsuky has the ability to use form-grabbing to extract emails and passwords from web data forms.[23] |
|
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts including Invoke-Mimikatz.[1][4][18][15][5] Kimsuky has also utilized PowerShell scripts for execution, persistence, and defense evasion.[19] |
| .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Kimsuky has executed Windows commands by using |
||
| .005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
Kimsuky has used Visual Basic to download malicious payloads.[12][20][22][18] Kimsuky has also used malicious VBA macros within maldocs disguised as forms that trigger when a victim types any content into the lure.[18] |
||
| .006 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python |
Kimsuky has used a macOS Python implant to gather data as well as MailFetcher.py code to automatically collect email data.[4][15] |
||
| .007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript |
Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools.[20][4] Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT, which contained four Javascript files for bypassing defenses, collecting sensitive information and screenshots, and exfiltrating data.[23] |
||
| Enterprise | T1586 | .002 | Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts |
Kimsuky has compromised email accounts to send spearphishing e-mails.[20][3] |
| Enterprise | T1584 | .001 | Compromise Infrastructure: Domains |
Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.[15][5][17] |
| Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | Create Account: Local Account | |
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service | |
| Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers |
Kimsuky has used browser extensions including Google Chrome to steal passwords and cookies from browsers. Kimsuky has also used Nirsoft's WebBrowserPassView tool to dump the passwords obtained from victims.[11][4][7][18] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Kimsuky has collected Office, PDF, and HWP documents from its victims.[21][18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
Kimsuky has decoded malicious VBScripts using Base64.[18] Kimsuky has also decoded malicious PowerShell scripts using Base64.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1587 | Develop Capabilities |
Kimsuky created and used a mailing toolkit to use in spearphishing attacks.[20] |
|
| .001 | Malware |
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.[15][18][5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1114 | .002 | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection |
Kimsuky has used tools such as the MailFetch mail crawler to collect victim emails (excluding spam) from online services via IMAP.[15] |
| .003 | Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule |
Kimsuky has set auto-forward rules on victim's e-mail accounts.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1585 | Establish Accounts | ||
| .001 | Social Media Accounts |
Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.[15] |
||
| .002 | Email Accounts |
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.[15][5][6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1546 | .001 | Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association |
Kimsuky has a HWP document stealer module which changes the default program association in the registry to open HWP documents.[21] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | ||
| Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.[18] Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for uploading victim system information.[19] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Kimsuky has exploited various vulnerabilities for initial access, including Microsoft Exchange vulnerability CVE-2020-0688.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | ||
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system.[21][18][15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft |
Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure.[5][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1589 | .002 | Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses |
Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses including personal accounts that were subsequently used for spearphishing and other forms of social engineering.[3][6][17] |
| .003 | Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names | |||
| Enterprise | T1591 | Gather Victim Org Information |
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.[15] Kimsuky has also used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about potential targets of interest.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1564 | .002 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users |
Kimsuky has run |
| .003 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window |
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim.[18] Kimsuky has also been known to use |
||
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.[21][18] |
| .004 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.[21] |
||
| Enterprise | T1656 | Impersonation |
Kimsuky has impersonated academic institutions and NGOs in order to gain information related to North Korea.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Kimsuky has deleted the exfiltrated data on disk after transmission. Kimsuky has also used an instrumentor script to terminate browser processes running on an infected system and then delete the cookie files on disk.[21][18][15] Kimsuky has deleted files using the |
| .006 | Indicator Removal: Timestomp |
Kimsuky has manipulated timestamps for creation or compilation dates to defeat anti-forensics.[2] |
||
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Kimsuky has downloaded additional scripts, tools, and malware onto victim systems.[18][22][19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
Kimsuky has used a PowerShell-based keylogger as well as a tool called MECHANICAL to log keystrokes.[1][21][4][7][18][15] |
| Enterprise | T1534 | Internal Spearphishing |
Kimsuky has sent internal spearphishing emails for lateral movement after stealing victim information.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | ||
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
Kimsuky has disguised services to appear as benign software or related to operating system functions.[4][19] |
| .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as |
||
| .007 | Masquerading: Double File Extension |
Kimsuky has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type. Kimsuky has also masqueraded malicious LNK files as PDF objects using the double extension .pdf.lnk.[19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.[4][22][18][15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1111 | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing |
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.[4][7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information |
Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding.[12][20] Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format.[18] |
|
| .001 | Binary Padding |
Kimsuky has performed padding of PowerShell command line code with over 100 spaces.[19] |
||
| .002 | Software Packing | |||
| .010 | Command Obfuscation |
Kimsuky has encoded malicious PowerShell scripts using Base64.[19] |
||
| .012 | LNK Icon Smuggling |
Kimsuky has used the LNK icon location to execute malicious scripts. Kimsuky has also padded the LNK target field properties with extra spaces to obscure the script.[19] |
||
| .016 | Junk Code Insertion |
Kimsuky has obfuscated code by filling scripts with junk code and concatenating strings to hamper analysis and detection.[19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
Kimsuky has obtained and used tools such as Nirsoft WebBrowserPassVIew, Mimikatz, and PsExec.[7][18][5] |
| .003 | Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates |
Kimsuky has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.[25] |
||
| .005 | Obtain Capabilities: Exploits | |||
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Kimsuky has gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[4][7][15] |
| Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing |
Kimsuky has used spearphishing to gain initial access and intelligence.[10][17] |
|
| .001 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.[11][21][12][20][2][3][18][15] Kimsuky has also distributed emails with attached compressed zip files that contained malicious .LNK files masquerading as legitimate files.[19] |
||
| .002 | Spearphishing Link |
Kimsuky has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a document that contained malicious macros or took the victim to an actor-controlled domain.[1][7][15] |
||
| Enterprise | T1598 | Phishing for Information |
Kimsuky has used tailored spearphishing emails to gather victim information including contat lists to identify additional targets.[5] |
|
| .003 | Spearphishing Link |
Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information including web beacons for target profiling.[20][3][15][6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
Kimsuky can gather a list of all processes running on a victim's machine.[18] Kimsuky has also obtained running processes on the victim device utilizing PowerShell cmdlet |
|
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection |
Kimsuky has used Win7Elevate to inject malicious code into explorer.exe.[21] |
|
| .012 | Process Hollowing |
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.[18] |
||
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Kimsuky has obtained specific Registry keys and values on a compromised host.[18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading |
Kimsuky has used the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script to reflectively load a Mimikatz credential stealing DLL into memory.[5] Kimsuky has also used reflective loading through .NET assembly using |
|
| Enterprise | T1219 | .002 | Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software |
Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.[21][22] |
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[15] Kimsuky has established persistence by creating a scheduled task named "ChromeUpdateTaskMachine" through the PowerShell cmdlet |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture |
Kimsuky has captured browser screenshots using TRANSLATEXT.[23] |
|
| Enterprise | T1596 | Search Open Technical Databases |
Kimsuky has used LLMs to better understand publicly reported vulnerabilities.[10][26] |
|
| Enterprise | T1593 | Search Open Websites/Domains |
Kimsuky has used LLMs to identify think tanks, government organizations, etc. that have information.[10] |
|
| .001 | Social Media |
Kimsuky has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails.[3] |
||
| .002 | Search Engines |
Kimsuky has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google to target victims.[15] |
||
| Enterprise | T1594 | Search Victim-Owned Websites |
Kimsuky has searched for information on the target company's website.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding "Dinosaur" references within the code.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
Kimsuky has checked for the presence of antivirus software with |
| Enterprise | T1176 | .001 | Software Extensions: Browser Extensions |
Kimsuky has used Google Chrome browser extensions to infect victims and to steal passwords and cookies.[11][7] |
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
Kimsuky has used compromised and acquired infrastructure to host and deliver malware including Blogspot to host beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants.[18][5][17] Kimsuky has also hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[19] |
| Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie |
Kimsuky has used malware, such as TRANSLATEXT, to steal and exfiltrate browser cookies.[23][25] |
|
| Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing |
Kimsuky has signed files with the name EGIS CO,. Ltd. and has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.[12][25] |
| Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta |
Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[1][4][22][15] |
| .010 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 | |||
| .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
Kimsuky has used |
||
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
Kimsuky has enumerated OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the "systeminfo" command.[21][18] Kimsuky has also obtained system information such as OS type, OS version, and system type through querying various Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) classes including |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
Kimsuky has used |
|
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery |
Kimsuky has used an instrumentor script to gather the names of all services running on a victim's system.[18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT to redirect clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.[23] |
|
| Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files |
Kimsuky has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from saved mail.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1550 | .002 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash |
Kimsuky has used pass the hash for authentication to remote access software used in C2.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
Kimsuky has lured victims into clicking malicious links.[15] |
| .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
Kimsuky has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious e-mail attachments.[12][20][4][2][3][18] Kimsuky has also lured victims with tailored filenames and fake extensions that entice victims to open LNK files.[19] |
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| Enterprise | T1078 | .003 | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts |
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | .001 | Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver |
Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT and a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.[23] |
| .002 | Web Service: Bidirectional Communication |
Kimsuky has used Blogspot pages and a Github repository for C2.[18][23] Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for downloading payloads and uploading victim system information.[19] |
||