Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.[1][2][3] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example:
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\commandHKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\commandHKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\commandThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.[4]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has a HWP document stealer module which changes the default program association in the registry to open HWP documents.[5] |
| S0692 | SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can conduct an image hijack of an |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0061 | Detect Default File Association Hijack via Registry & Execution Correlation on Windows | AN0170 |
Detects modification of registry keys used for default file handlers, followed by anomalous process execution from user-initiated file opens. This includes tracking changes under HKCU and HKCR for file extension mappings, and correlating them with new or suspicious handler paths launching unusual child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript). |