Compromise Infrastructure: Domains

Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.[1] Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).[2]

Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.[3]

Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.[4]

ID: T1584.001
Sub-technique of:  T1584
Platforms: PRE
Contributors: Jeremy Galloway
Version: 1.4
Created: 01 October 2020
Last Modified: 24 September 2024

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0006 APT1

APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.[5]

C0010 C0010

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.[6]

C0021 C0021

For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.[7]

S1138 Gootloader

Gootloader has used compromised legitimate domains to as a delivery network for malicious payloads.[8]

G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.[9][10]

G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims.[11][12][13][14]

G1020 Mustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.[15][16][17][18]

C0022 Operation Dream Job

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.[19][20]

G1008 SideCopy

SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.[21]

C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 compromised domains to use for C2.[22]

G0134 Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.[23]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0038 Domain Name Active DNS

Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.[4] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.

Domain Registration

Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.

Passive DNS

Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.[4] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.

References

  1. ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
  2. Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
  3. Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.
  4. Janos Szurdi, Rebekah Houser and Daiping Liu. (2022, September 21). Domain Shadowing: A Stealthy Use of DNS Compromise for Cybercrime. Retrieved March 7, 2023.
  5. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  6. Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
  7. Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
  8. Pirozzi, A. (2021, June 16). Gootloader: ‘Initial Access as a Service’ Platform Expands Its Search for High Value Targets. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
  9. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
  10. Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
  11. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021.
  12. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.