| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1584.001 | Domains |
| T1584.002 | DNS Server |
| T1584.003 | Virtual Private Server |
| T1584.004 | Server |
| T1584.005 | Botnet |
| T1584.006 | Web Services |
| T1584.007 | Serverless |
| T1584.008 | Network Devices |
Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.[1] Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.[2]
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.[3]
Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.[4]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0006 | APT1 |
APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.[5] |
| C0010 | C0010 |
During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.[6] |
| C0021 | C0021 |
For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.[7] |
| G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.[8] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims.[9][10][11][12] |
| G1020 | Mustard Tempest |
Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.[13][14][15][16] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.[17][18] |
| G1008 | SideCopy |
SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.[19] |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 compromised domains to use for C2.[20] |
| G0134 | Transparent Tribe |
Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.[21] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0038 | Domain Name | Active DNS |
Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.[4] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| Domain Registration |
Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. |
||
| Passive DNS |
Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.[4] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |