TRANSLATEXT is malware that is believed to be used by Kimsuky.[1] TRANSLATEXT masqueraded as a Google Translate extension for Google Chrome, but is actually a collection of four malicious Javascript files that perform defense evasion, information collection and exfiltration.[1]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
TRANSLATEXT has used HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.[1] |
Enterprise | T1185 | Browser Session Hijacking |
TRANSLATEXT has the ability to use form-grabbing and event-listening to extract data from web data forms.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
TRANSLATEXT has used PowerShell to collect system information and to upload the collected data to a Github repository.[1] |
Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers |
TRANSLATEXT has stolen credentials stored in Chrome.[1] |
Enterprise | T1114 | Email Collection |
TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected email addresses to the C2 server.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected credentials to the C2 server.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
TRANSLATEXT has been named |
Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
TRANSLATEXT has modified the following registry key to install itself as the value, granting permission to install specified extensions: |
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Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
TRANSLATEXT has queried the following registry key to check for installed Chrome extensions: |
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Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture |
TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture screenshots of new browser tabs, based on the presence of the |
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Enterprise | T1176 | .001 | Software Extensions: Browser Extensions |
TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture credentials, cookies, browser screenshots, etc. and to exfiltrate data.[1] |
Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie |
TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated updated cookies from Google, Naver, Kakao or Daum to the C2 server.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
TRANSLATEXT has redirected clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1102 | .001 | Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver |
TRANSLATEXT has used a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.[1] |
.002 | Web Service: Bidirectional Communication |
TRANSLATEXT has used a Github repository for C2.[1] |