Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
Name | Description |
---|---|
IRON HUNTER | |
Group 88 | |
Waterbug |
Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.[8] |
WhiteBear |
WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.[9][10] |
Snake | |
Krypton | |
Venomous Bear | |
Secret Blizzard | |
BELUGASTURGEON |
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1134 | .002 | Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token |
Turla RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands.[11] |
Enterprise | T1087 | .001 | Account Discovery: Local Account |
Turla has used |
.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Turla has used |
||
Enterprise | T1583 | .006 | Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services |
Turla has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration.[15] |
Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | |
.003 | Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols |
Turla has used multiple backdoors which communicate with a C2 server via email attachments.[17] |
||
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Turla has encrypted files stolen from connected USB drives into a RAR file before exfiltration.[18] |
Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key |
.004 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL |
Turla established persistence by adding a Shell value under the Registry key |
||
Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force |
Turla may attempt to connect to systems within a victim's network using |
|
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Turla has used PowerShell to execute commands/scripts, in some cases via a custom executable or code from Empire's PSInject.[16][11][18] Turla has also used PowerShell scripts to load and execute malware in memory. |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Turla RPC backdoors have used cmd.exe to execute commands.[11][18] |
||
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic | |||
.006 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python |
Turla has used IronPython scripts as part of the IronNetInjector toolchain to drop payloads.[20] |
||
.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | |||
Enterprise | T1584 | .003 | Compromise Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server |
Turla has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors.[21] |
.004 | Compromise Infrastructure: Server |
Turla has used compromised servers as infrastructure.[22][13][10] |
||
.006 | Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services |
Turla has frequently used compromised WordPress sites for C2 infrastructure.[22] |
||
Enterprise | T1555 | .004 | Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager |
Turla has gathered credentials from the Windows Credential Manager tool.[18] |
Enterprise | T1213 | Data from Information Repositories |
Turla has used a custom .NET tool to collect documents from an organization's internal central database.[14] |
|
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Turla RPC backdoors can upload files from victim machines.[11] |
|
Enterprise | T1025 | Data from Removable Media |
Turla RPC backdoors can collect files from USB thumb drives.[11][18] |
|
Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
Turla has used a custom decryption routine, which pulls key and salt values from other artifacts such as a WMI filter or PowerShell Profile, to decode encrypted PowerShell payloads.[11] |
|
Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware |
Turla has developed its own unique malware for use in operations.[22] |
Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | ||
Enterprise | T1546 | .003 | Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription |
Turla has used WMI event filters and consumers to establish persistence.[11] |
.013 | Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile |
Turla has used PowerShell profiles to maintain persistence on an infected machine.[11] |
||
Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Turla has used WebDAV to upload stolen USB files to a cloud drive.[18] Turla has also exfiltrated stolen files to OneDrive and 4shared.[14] |
Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
Turla has exploited vulnerabilities in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to obtain kernel mode privileges.[23] |
|
Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover files in specific locations on the hard disk %TEMP% directory, the current user's desktop, the Program Files directory, and Recent.[1][14] Turla RPC backdoors have also searched for files matching the |
|
Enterprise | T1615 | Group Policy Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover Group Policy details using the |
|
Enterprise | T1564 | .012 | Hide Artifacts: File/Path Exclusions |
Turla has placed LunarWeb install files into directories that are excluded from scanning.[19] |
Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll, in PowerShell scripts to bypass Windows antimalware products.[11] |
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Turla has used shellcode to download Meterpreter after compromising a victim.[16] |
|
Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Turla RPC backdoors can be used to transfer files to/from victim machines on the local network.[11][18] |
|
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Turla has named components of LunarWeb to mimic Zabbix agent logs.[19] |
Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
Turla has modified Registry values to store payloads.[11][18] |
|
Enterprise | T1106 | Native API |
Turla and its RPC backdoors have used APIs calls for various tasks related to subverting AMSI and accessing then executing commands through RPC and/or named pipes.[11] |
|
Enterprise | T1027 | .005 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools |
Based on comparison of Gazer versions, Turla made an effort to obfuscate strings in the malware that could be used as IoCs, including the mutex name and named pipe.[2] |
.010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
Turla has used encryption (including salted 3DES via PowerSploit's |
||
.011 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage |
Turla has used the Registry to store encrypted and encoded payloads.[11][18] |
||
Enterprise | T1588 | .001 | Obtain Capabilities: Malware |
Turla has used malware obtained after compromising other threat actors, such as OilRig.[21][22] |
.002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
Turla has obtained and customized publicly-available tools like Mimikatz.[18] |
||
Enterprise | T1201 | Password Policy Discovery |
Turla has used |
|
Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery |
Turla has used |
|
Enterprise | T1069 | .001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups |
Turla has used |
.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
Turla has used |
||
Enterprise | T1566 | .002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
Turla attempted to trick targets into clicking on a link featuring a seemingly legitimate domain from Adobe.com to download their malware and gain initial access.[4] |
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running processes using the |
|
Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection |
Turla has also used PowerSploit's |
|
.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |
Turla has used Metasploit to perform reflective DLL injection in order to escalate privileges.[16][24] |
||
Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Turla RPC backdoors have included local UPnP RPC proxies.[11] |
|
.001 | Internal Proxy |
Turla has compromised internal network systems to act as a proxy to forward traffic to C2.[10] |
||
Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover information in the Windows Registry with the |
|
Enterprise | T1021 | .002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Turla used |
Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the |
|
Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
Turla has obtained information on security software, including security logging information that may indicate whether their malware has been detected.[14] |
Enterprise | T1553 | .006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
Turla has modified variables in kernel memory to turn off Driver Signature Enforcement after exploiting vulnerabilities that obtained kernel mode privileges.[23][25] |
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover operating system configuration details using the |
|
Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover network configuration details using the |
|
.001 | Internet Connection Discovery | |||
Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover active local network connections using the |
|
Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the |
|
Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery |
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover the system time by using the |
|
Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link |
Turla has used spearphishing via a link to get users to download and run their malware.[4] |
Enterprise | T1078 | .003 | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts |
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.[15] |
Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Turla has used legitimate web services including Pastebin, Dropbox, and GitHub for C2 communications.[13][15] |
|
.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
A Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server.[4][16] |