| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1553.001 | Gatekeeper Bypass |
| T1553.002 | Code Signing |
| T1553.003 | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking |
| T1553.004 | Install Root Certificate |
| T1553.005 | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass |
| T1553.006 | Code Signing Policy Modification |
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[1] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[2]
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide Adversary-in-the-Middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[3]
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.[4]
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.[5]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0160 | certutil |
certutil can be used to install browser root certificates as a precursor to performing Adversary-in-the-Middle between connections to banking websites. Example command: |
| S0281 | Dok |
Dok installs a root certificate to aid in Adversary-in-the-Middle actions using the command |
| S0009 | Hikit |
Hikit installs a self-generated certificate to the local trust store as a root CA and Trusted Publisher.[9] |
| S0148 | RTM |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1028 | Operating System Configuration |
Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the |
| M1054 | Software Configuration |
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential Adversary-in-the-Middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. [12] |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0056 | Detection Strategy for Subvert Trust Controls via Install Root Certificate. | AN0153 |
Detection of unauthorized modifications to Windows root certificate stores by monitoring registry keys, certificate installation processes, and creation of new certificate entries not in baseline trusted lists. |
| AN0154 |
Detection of unexpected additions or modifications to system-wide certificate stores or execution of commands adding certificates to trusted stores. |
||
| AN0155 |
Detection of malicious certificate installation via monitoring execution of the |