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System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery

ID Name
T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery
T1016.002 Wi-Fi Discovery

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, tracert, and GET requests to websites.

Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

ID: T1016.001
Sub-technique of:  T1016
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Tactic: Discovery
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Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
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Permissions Required: User
Version: 1.0
Created: 17 March 2021
Last Modified: 25 March 2021
Version Permalink

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0016 APT29

APT29 has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.[1]
S1066 DarkTortilla

DarkTortilla can check for internet connectivity by issuing HTTP GET requests.[2]
G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has used Ping and tracert for network reconnaissance efforts.[3]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has used the Ping command to check connectivity to actor-controlled C2 servers.[4]

G0047 Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1.[5]
S0597 GoldFinder

GoldFinder performed HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request traveled through.[6]
G0125 HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using ping, including attempts to contact google[.]com.[7]
G1001 HEXANE

HEXANE has used tools including BITSAdmin to test internet connectivity from compromised hosts.[8]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.[9]

S0284 More_eggs

More_eggs has used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity.[10]
S0691 Neoichor

Neoichor can check for Internet connectivity by contacting bing[.]com with the request format bing[.]com?id=<GetTickCount>.[11]
S1107 NKAbuse

NKAbuse utilizes external services such as ifconfig.me to identify the victim machine's IP address.[12]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a Visual Basic script that checked for internet connectivity.[13]
S0650 QakBot

QakBot can measure the download speed on a targeted host.[14]
S0686 QuietSieve

QuietSieve can check C2 connectivity with a ping to 8.8.8.8 (Google public DNS).[15]
S0448 Rising Sun

Rising Sun can test a connection to a specified network IP address over a specified port number.[16]
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used GoldFinder to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.[6]
S1049 SUGARUSH

SUGARUSH has checked for internet connectivity from an infected host before attempting to establish a new TCP connection.[17]
S0663 SysUpdate

SysUpdate can contact the DNS server operated by Google as part of its C2 establishment process.[18]

G1018 TA2541

TA2541 has run scripts to check internet connectivity from compromised hosts. [19]
G0010 Turla

Turla has used tracert to check internet connectivity.[20]
G1017 Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has employed Ping to check network connectivity.[21]
S1065 Woody RAT

Woody RAT can make Ping GET HTTP requests to its C2 server at regular intervals for network connectivity checks.[22]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor for executed processes (such as tracert or ping) that may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.

References

  1. Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.
  2. Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, August 17). DarkTortilla Malware Analysis. Retrieved November 3, 2022.
  3. Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  4. Budaca, E., et al. (2021, August 25). FIN8 Threat Actor Goes Agile with New Sardonic Backdoor. Retrieved August 9, 2023.
  5. Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
  6. Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.
  7. Eoin Miller. (2021, March 23). Defending Against the Zero Day: Analyzing Attacker Behavior Post-Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 27, 2022.
  8. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
  9. DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023.
  10. Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019.
  11. MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022.
  1. KASPERSKY GERT. (2023, December 14). Unveiling NKAbuse: a new multiplatform threat abusing the NKN protocol. Retrieved February 8, 2024.
  2. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  3. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  4. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
  5. Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
  6. Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
  7. Daniel Lunghi. (2023, March 1). Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting. Retrieved March 20, 2023.
  8. Ventura, V. (2021, September 16). Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise. Retrieved September 15, 2023.
  9. Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
  10. CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
  11. MalwareBytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, August 3). Woody RAT: A new feature-rich malware spotted in the wild. Retrieved December 6, 2022.