APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. This group has been active since at least 2004.          
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.  In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations. Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
Associated Group Descriptions
|Enterprise||T1134||.001||Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft|
|Enterprise||T1583||.001||Acquire Infrastructure: Domains|
|Enterprise||T1071||.003||Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols|
|.001||Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols|
|Enterprise||T1560||Archive Collected Data|
|Enterprise||T1037||.001||Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)|
|Enterprise||T1110||.003||Brute Force: Password Spraying||
APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in password-spraying mode it conducted approximately four authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several days or weeks.
|.001||Brute Force: Password Guessing||
APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days.
|Enterprise||T1059||.001||Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell|
|.003||Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell|
|Enterprise||T1092||Communication Through Removable Media|
|Enterprise||T1213||.002||Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint|
|Enterprise||T1005||Data from Local System|
|Enterprise||T1025||Data from Removable Media|
|Enterprise||T1001||.001||Data Obfuscation: Junk Data||
APT28 added "junk data" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a "junk length" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of the command protocol on the wire.
|Enterprise||T1074||.001||Data Staged: Local Data Staging|
|Enterprise||T1140||Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
|Enterprise||T1114||.002||Email Collection: Remote Email Collection|
|Enterprise||T1573||.001||Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography|
|Enterprise||T1546||.015||Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking|
|Enterprise||T1190||Exploit Public-Facing Application|
|Enterprise||T1203||Exploitation for Client Execution|
|Enterprise||T1211||Exploitation for Defense Evasion|
|Enterprise||T1068||Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
|Enterprise||T1210||Exploitation of Remote Services|
|Enterprise||T1083||File and Directory Discovery|
|Enterprise||T1564||.001||Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories|
|.003||Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window|
|Enterprise||T1070||.006||Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp|
|.001||Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs|
|.004||Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion|
|Enterprise||T1105||Ingress Tool Transfer|
|Enterprise||T1056||.001||Input Capture: Keylogging|
|Enterprise||T1559||.002||Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange|
|Enterprise||T1498||Network Denial of Service|
APT28 deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials. APT28 close-access teams have used Wi-Fi pineapples to intercept Wi-Fi signals and user credentials.
|Enterprise||T1027||Obfuscated Files or Information|
|Enterprise||T1137||.002||Office Application Startup: Office Test|
|Enterprise||T1003||OS Credential Dumping|
|Enterprise||T1120||Peripheral Device Discovery|
|Enterprise||T1566||.002||Phishing: Spearphishing Link|
|.001||Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment|
|Enterprise||T1542||.003||Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit|
|Enterprise||T1090||.002||Proxy: External Proxy||
APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. APT28 has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and their server.
|Enterprise||T1091||Replication Through Removable Media|
|Enterprise||T1218||.011||Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32||
APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as
|Enterprise||T1528||Steal Application Access Token||
APT28 has used several malicious applications to steal user OAuth access tokens including applications masquerading as "Google Defender" "Google Email Protection," and "Google Scanner" for Gmail users. They also targeted Yahoo users with applications masquerading as "Delivery Service" and "McAfee Email Protection".
|Enterprise||T1550||.002||Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash|
|.001||Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token|
|Enterprise||T1204||.002||User Execution: Malicious File|
APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.
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- Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
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- Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.
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- Microsoft. (2017, March 14). Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 - Critical. Retrieved August 17, 2017.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Rea, M. (2017, November 7). Threat Group APT28 Slips Office Malware into Doc Citing NYC Terror Attack. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
- Paganini, P. (2017, November 9). Russia-Linked APT28 group observed using DDE attack to deliver malware. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
- Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
- ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- ESET. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved July 2, 2019.
- Robert Falcone. (2017, February 14). XAgentOSX: Sofacy's Xagent macOS Tool. Retrieved July 12, 2017.
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- Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: Sofacy’s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.
- Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
- CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team. (2016). Use of Fancy Bear Android Malware in Tracking of Ukrainian FIeld Artillery Units. Retrieved February 6, 2017.