| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1078.001 | Default Accounts |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts |
| T1078.003 | Local Accounts |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.[1][2][3]
Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.
An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods. For example, in Azure environments, adversaries may target Azure Managed Identities, which allow associated Azure resources to request access tokens. By compromising a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, adversaries may be able to Steal Application Access Tokens to move laterally across the cloud environment.[4]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[5] |
| G0016 | APT29 |
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used |
| G0064 | APT33 |
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[8] |
| G1023 | APT5 |
APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials. [9] |
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants.[10] |
| G0125 | HAFNIUM |
HAFNIUM has abused service principals in compromised environments to enable data exfiltration.[11] |
| G0004 | Ke3chang |
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.[12] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.[13] |
| S1091 | Pacu |
Pacu leverages valid cloud accounts to perform most of its operations.[14] |
| S0683 | Peirates |
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[15] |
| S0684 | ROADTools |
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[16] |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider |
Scattered Spider has used compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to pivot in victim environments.[17] |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[18] |
| G1053 | Storm-0501 |
Storm-0501 has leveraged compromised accounts to access Microsoft Entra Connect, which was used to synchronize on-premises identities and Microsoft Entra identities, allowing users to sign into both environments with the same password.[19] Storm-0501 has also used the victim Global Administrator account that lacked any registered MFA method to access victim cloud environments.[20] Storm-0501 has leveraged Storage Account Access Keys within the victim environment.[20] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1036 | Account Use Policies |
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[21] |
| M1015 | Active Directory Configuration |
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Use multi-factor authentication for cloud accounts, especially privileged accounts. This can be implemented in a variety of forms (e.g. hardware, virtual, SMS), and can also be audited using administrative reporting features.[22] |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Ensure that cloud accounts, particularly privileged accounts, have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Passwords and access keys should be rotated regularly. This limits the amount of time credentials can be used to access resources if a credential is compromised without your knowledge. Cloud service providers may track access key age to help audit and identify keys that may need to be rotated.[22] |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.[23][24][25] These reviews should also check if new privileged cloud accounts have been created that were not authorized. For example, in Azure AD environments configure alerts to notify when accounts have gone many days without using privileged roles, as these roles may be able to be removed.[26] Consider using temporary, just-in-time (JIT) privileged access to Azure AD resources rather than permanently assigning privileged roles.[25] |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. |
| M1017 | User Training |
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0546 | Detection of Abused or Compromised Cloud Accounts for Access and Persistence | AN1503 |
Detects anomalous authentication activity such as sign-ins from impossible geolocations or legacy protocols from high-privileged accounts. |
| AN1504 |
Detects cloud account use for API calls that exceed normal scope, such as IAM changes or access to services never used before. |
||
| AN1505 |
Detects unexpected access or usage of cloud productivity tools (e.g., downloading large numbers of files, creating external shares) by internal users. |
||
| AN1506 |
Detects login and usage patterns deviating from typical Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace user profiles. |