| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1584.001 | Domains |
| T1584.002 | DNS Server |
| T1584.003 | Virtual Private Server |
| T1584.004 | Server |
| T1584.005 | Botnet |
| T1584.006 | Web Services |
| T1584.007 | Serverless |
| T1584.008 | Network Devices |
Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.
Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices.
Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.[1][2]
Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.[3]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.[4] |
| C0029 | Cutting Edge |
During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.[5][6] |
| C0035 | KV Botnet Activity |
KV Botnet Activity focuses on compromise of small office-home office (SOHO) network devices to build the subsequent botnet.[7] |
| C0039 | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation |
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used compromised small office/home office (SOHO) devices to interact with vulnerable Versa Director servers.[8] |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.[9][10] |
| G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks.[11][12] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0035 | Internet Scan | Response Content |
Once adversaries leverage compromised network devices as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.[13] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle. |