Privileged Account Management

Remove users from the local administrator group on systems.

By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed.

Remove unnecessary users from the local administrator group on systems.

Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. ^[1] Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.^[2]

Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.^[3]

Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. ^[1] Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.^[2]

Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.^[3]

Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. ^[1] Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.^[2]

Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.^[3]

Do not allow domain administrator or root accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Ensure that all accounts use the least privileges they require. In Azure AD environments, consider using Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to define roles that require two or more approvals before assignment to users.^[4]

When PowerShell is necessary, consider restricting PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.^[7]

PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Administration) may also be used to sandbox administration and limit what commands admins/users can execute through remote PowerShell sessions.^[8]

Use of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) systems will limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization^{[9] [10]}

Use of proper Identity and Access Management (IAM) with Role Based Access Control (RBAC) policies to limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of administrative actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse.

Limit the number of accounts permitted to create other accounts. Limit the usage of local administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries.

Limit the number of accounts with permissions to create other accounts. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Limit the number of accounts with permissions to create other accounts. Do not allow privileged accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

The creation and modification of systemd service unit files is generally reserved for administrators such as the Linux root user and other users with superuser privileges.

Limit the number of cloud accounts and services with permission to query the secrets manager to only those required. Ensure that accounts and services with permissions to query the secrets manager only have access to the secrets they require.

Use the principal of least privilege and protect administrative access to domain trusts and identity tenants.

Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.^[12]

Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality.

Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality.

Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.^[13]

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.^[15]

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security.^{[16] [17]}

Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. ^{[18] [19]} These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. ^[20]

Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.

Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.

Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.^[18][19] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.^[20]

Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Entra ID Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.^[21]

Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.

Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.

Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.^[22]

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing sensitive information.

Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive information.

Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique.

Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a bootkit.

Use of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) systems will limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization. ^{[9] [10]}

Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux, grsecurity, and AppArmor.

Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts.

Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP.

Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{{AppID_GUID}} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.^[15]

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do not set their own process-wide security.^{[16] [17]}

If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM accounts and permissions.

Limit the number of high-privileged domain and cloud accounts, and ensure that these are not used for day-to-day operations. Ensure that on-premises accounts do not have privileged cloud permissions and that isolated, cloud-only accounts are used for managing cloud environments.^[23]

Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. ^[24]

Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. ^[24]

Limit access to the root account and prevent users from creating and/or modifying systemd timer unit files.

Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.^[5]

Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add IIS components to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose these permissions to potential adversaries and/or other unprivileged systems.

Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.

Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.^[25]

Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.^[25]

Limit the usage of local administrator and domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries.

Restrict execution of Msiexec.exe to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage.

Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level.

If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.

Use the principle of least privilege for privileged accounts such as the service account in Kubernetes. For example, if a pod is not required to access the Kubernetes API, consider disabling the service account altogether.^[26]

Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems.

Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.^[27]

Audit domain account permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained.

Audit local accounts permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. ^{[18] [19]} Limit the usage of local administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries.

For example, audit the use of service accounts in Kubernetes, and avoid automatically granting them access to the Kubernetes API if this is not required.^[26] Implementing LAPS may also help prevent reuse of local administrator credentials across a domain.^[28]

Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.^[18][19][29] These reviews should also check if new privileged cloud accounts have been created that were not authorized. For example, in Azure AD environments configure alerts to notify when accounts have gone many days without using privileged roles, as these roles may be able to be removed.^[30] Consider using temporary, just-in-time (JIT) privileged access to Azure AD resources rather than permanently assigning privileged roles.^[29]