| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1505.001 | SQL Stored Procedures |
| T1505.002 | Transport Agent |
| T1505.003 | Web Shell |
| T1505.004 | IIS Components |
| T1505.005 | Terminal Services DLL |
| T1505.006 | vSphere Installation Bundles |
Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.[1][2][3][4]
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.[2][1][5][6][4][7]
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.[8][4][9]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1022 | IceApple |
IceApple is an IIS post-exploitation framework, consisting of 18 modules that provide several functionalities.[10] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted Windows servers running Internet Information Systems (IIS) to install C2 components.[11] |
| S0072 | OwaAuth |
OwaAuth has been loaded onto Exchange servers and disguised as an ISAPI filter (owaauth.dll). The IIS w3wp.exe process then loads the malicious DLL.[6] |
| S0258 | RGDoor |
RGDoor establishes persistence on webservers as an IIS module.[12][9] |
| C0058 | SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors modified Internet Information Services (IIS) components to load suspicious .NET assemblies for persistence.[13] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1047 | Audit |
Regularly check installed IIS components to verify the integrity of the web server and identify if unexpected changes have been made. |
| M1045 | Code Signing |
Ensure IIS DLLs and binaries are signed by the correct application developers. |
| M1038 | Execution Prevention |
Restrict unallowed ISAPI extensions and filters from running by specifying a list of ISAPI extensions and filters that can run on IIS.[14] |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add IIS components to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose these permissions to potential adversaries and/or other unprivileged systems. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0068 | Detection Strategy for T1505.004 - Malicious IIS Components | AN0184 |
Adversary installs or modifies IIS components (ISAPI filters, extensions, or modules) using DLL files registered via configuration changes or administrative tools like AppCmd.exe. These components intercept or manipulate HTTP requests/responses for persistence or C2. |