Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores

Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.

Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.

If an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged Cloud Accounts or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as get-secret-value in AWS, gcloud secrets describe in GCP, and az key vault secret show in Azure.[1][2][3][4][5]

Note: this technique is distinct from Cloud Instance Metadata API in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.

ID: T1555.006
Sub-technique of:  T1555
Platforms: IaaS
Contributors: Martin McCloskey, Datadog
Version: 1.0
Created: 25 September 2023
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S9042 CanisterWorm

CanisterWorm has gathered credentials from Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Microsoft Azure.[6]

G0125 HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has moved laterally from on-premises environments to steal passwords from Azure key vaults.[7]

S9043 Mini Shai-Hulud

Mini Shai-Hulud has captured credentials stored in cloud secret stores.[8][9][10][11][12]

S1091 Pacu

Pacu can retrieve secrets from the AWS Secrets Manager via the enum_secrets module.[13]

S9008 Shai-Hulud

Shai-Hulud has gathered secrets from AWS Secrets and GCP Secret Manager.[14][15][16] Shai-Hulud has also gathered data from Azure Key Vault.[15][16]

G1053 Storm-0501

Storm-0501 has utilized Azure Key Vault to store the encryption key using the operation Microsoft.KeyVault/Vaults/write.[17]

G1056 TeamPCP

TeamPCP has used malware to exfiltrate cloud secrets from targeted environments including AWS, GCP, and Azure.[18][19][20][6]

S9041 TeamPCP Cloud Stealer

TeamPCP Cloud Stealer can enumerate multiple filesystem paths to extract credentials for AWS, GCP, and Azure including Identity Access Management (IAM) credentials.[21][22][23][18][24][24][20][6][25]

S9009 TruffleHog

TruffleHog can obtain secrets from AWS Secrets and GCP Secret Manager.[26][27] TruffleHog has also gathered passwords, secrets and API keys from source repositories, .env files, and git history.[15]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1026 Privileged Account Management

Limit the number of cloud accounts and services with permission to query the secrets manager to only those required. Ensure that accounts and services with permissions to query the secrets manager only have access to the secrets they require.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0130 Detect Unauthorized Access to Cloud Secrets Management Stores AN0366

Detection of suspicious access to cloud-native secret management systems (AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault). Focuses on abnormal secret retrieval activity, such as secrets being accessed by unusual identities, from unexpected regions, outside business hours, or at high volume. Correlates API calls to secret retrieval with surrounding authentication events, role assumptions, and anomalous execution patterns.

References

  1. Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
  2. Alessandro Brucato. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
  3. AWS. (n.d.). Retrieve secrets from AWS Secrets Manager. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
  4. Google Cloud. (n.d.). List secrets and view secret details. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
  5. Microsoft. (2023, January 13). Quickstart: Set and retrieve a secret from Azure Key Vault using Azure CLI. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
  6. FBI. (2026, July 2). Cyber Criminal Group TeamPCP. Retrieved July 7, 2026.
  7. Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
  8. McCarthy, R., Cohen, A., and Read, B. (2026, May 12). Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: TanStack + more npm Packages Compromised. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  9. Santos, J. and Navato, J.R. (2026, May 13). Analyzing TeamPCP’s Supply Chain Attacks: Checkmarx KICS and elementary-data in CI/CD Credential Theft. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  10. Hunt.io. (2026, May 14). How TeamPCP's Python Toolkit Survives a C2 Takedown: FIRESCALE, GitHub, and the Victim's Own Account. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  11. Webb, M. (2026, May 20). TeamPCP Wave Four: GitHub Breach via Poisoned VS Code Extension, durabletask PyPI Worm, and ~4,000 Internal Repositories Exfiltrated. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  12. Flashpoint. (2026, May 28). The Mini Shai-Hulud Worm and the New Era of CI/CD Exploitation. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  13. Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.
  14. Charlie Eriksen. (2025, September 16). S1ngularity/nx attackers strike again. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
  1. Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.
  2. Socket Research Team. (2025, November 24). Shai Hulud Strikes Again (v2). Retrieved April 9, 2026.
  3. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, August 27). Storm-0501’s evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomware. Retrieved October 19, 2025.
  4. Sysdig Threat Research Team. (2026, March 23). TeamPCP expands: Supply chain compromise spreads from Trivy to Checkmarx GitHub Actions. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  5. Eriksen, C. (2026, March 27). Popular telnyx package compromised on PyPI by TeamPCP. Retrieved July 16, 2026.
  6. Unit 42. (2026, March 31). Weaponizing the Protectors: TeamPCP’s Multi-Stage Supply Chain Attack on Security Infrastructure. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  7. McCarthy, R. (2026, March 20). Trivy Compromised: Everything You Need to Know about the Latest Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  8. Aqua Security . (2026, March 21). Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  9. Aqua Team. (2026, April 1). Update: Ongoing Investigation and Continued Remediation. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  10. McCarthy, R., Haughom, J., Read, B. (2026, March 23). KICS GitHub Action Compromised: TeamPCP Strikes Again in Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved July 1, 2026.
  11. Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2026, May 11). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Adversaries Leverage AI for Vulnerability Exploitation, Augmented Operations, and Initial Access. Retrieved July 7, 2026.
  12. Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.
  13. Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.