| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials |
| T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
| T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles |
| T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys |
| T1098.005 | Device Registration |
| T1098.006 | Additional Container Cluster Roles |
| T1098.007 | Additional Local or Domain Groups |
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.[1][2][3] These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.[1] With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.[4]
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.[5] This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.[6][7]
Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for Cloud Service Dashboard.[8][9] If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts).[10][11] For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.[12]
In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the sts:GetFederationToken API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.[13]
In Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.[14] As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.[15]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.[16] |
| S1091 | Pacu |
Pacu can generate SSH and API keys for AWS infrastructure and additional API keys for other IAM users.[17] |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise |
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added credentials to OAuth Applications and Service Principals.[18][19] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Remove unnecessary and potentially abusable authentication mechanisms where possible. For example, in Entra ID environments, disable the app password feature unless explicitly required. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Consider enforcing multi-factor authentication for the |
| M1030 | Network Segmentation |
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers. Most cloud environments support separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances that enable further segmentation of cloud systems. |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Do not allow domain administrator or root accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permission to add access keys to accounts. In AWS environments, prohibit users from calling the |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0026 | Active Directory | Active Directory Object Creation |
Monitor M365 Audit logs for Analytic 1 - Creation of applications with unusual permissions or from suspicious user agents/IPs. Note: To detect the creation of potentially malicious applications using hijacked admin credentials or from unusual IP addresses.
Analytic 2 - Creation of service principals with suspicious user agents or from unusual IP addresses. Note: To detect the creation of potentially malicious service principals using hijacked admin credentials or from unusual IP addresses.
|
| Active Directory Object Modification |
Monitor M365 Audit logs for Analytic 1 - Suspicious modifications to RequiredResourceAccess, unexpected user agents, unusual modification times. Note: To detect suspicious updates to applications which might indicate the granting of unauthorized permissions or impersonation access.
Analytic 2 - Suspicious key descriptions, unexpected user agents, unusual modification times. Note: To detect suspicious updates to application certificates and secrets, which might indicate unauthorized access or changes.
Analytic 3 - Suspicious service principal names, unexpected user agents, unusual modification times. Note: To detect suspicious updates to service principals, which might indicate unauthorized access or changes.
|
||
| DS0002 | User Account | User Account Modification |
Monitor for unexpected changes to cloud user accounts, such as Azure Activity Logs highlighting malicious Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the use of API and CLI commands that add passwords, access keys, or tokens to accounts, such as |