The SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation campaign was conducted in July 2025 and encompassed the first waves of exploitation against incompetely patched spoofing (CVE-2025-49706) and remote code execution (CVE-2025-49704) vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. Later patched and updated as CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, the ToolShell vulnerabilities were widely exploited including by China-based ransomware actor Storm-2603 and espionage actors Threat Group-3390 and ZIRCONIUM. SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation targeted multiple regions and industries including finance, education, energy, and healthcare across Asia, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4][5]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, Threat Group-3390 attempted to exploit CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704 to gain initial access to target organizations.[1] |
| G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, Threat Group-1314 attempted to exploit CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704 to gain initial access to target organizations.[1] |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors registered C2 domains to spoof legitimate Microsoft domains.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1595 | .002 | Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors scanned for SharePoint servers vulnerable to CVE-2025-53770.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors issued HTTP |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used a command shell to automatically iterate through web.config files to expose and collect machineKey settings.[5][2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used PowerShell to execute attacker-controlled encoded commands.[1][3][6][2] |
| .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors utilized |
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| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors deployed ransomware including 4L4MD4R and Warlock.[1][2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors extracted information from the compromised systems.[1][4][6][2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors staged stolen data from web.config files to debug_dev.js.[2][5] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors decrypted scripts prior to execution.[2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1484 | .001 | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, modified group policy to enable ransomware distribution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1585 | .002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors created Proton mail accounts for communication with organizations infected with ransomware.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors exfiltrated stolen credentials and internal data over HTTPS to C2 infrastructure.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors exploited authentication bypass and remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704) against on-premises SharePoint servers. This activity was characterized by crafted |
|
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors leveraged commands to locate accessible file shares, backup paths, or SharePoint content.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1657 | Financial Theft |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors demanded ransom payments to unencrypt filesystems and to refrain from publishing sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.[2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors disabled Microsoft Defender through Registry settings and real-time monitoring via PowerShell.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used a loader to download and execute ransomware.[2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Impacket to remotely stage and execute payloads via WMI.[1] |
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| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications.[1] |
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| Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors UPX-packed malicous payloads including 4L4MD4R ransomware.[2] |
| .010 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors executed Base64-encoded PowerShell commands.[1][3][5][6][2] |
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| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors leveraged tools including Impacket, PsExec, and Mimikatz.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Mimikatz to dump LSASS memory.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors utilized ngrok tunnels to deliver PowerShell payloads.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Fast Reverse Proxy to communicate with C2.[1][4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors reflectively loaded payloads using |
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| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used scheduled tasks to help establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors followed exploitation of SharePoint servers with installation of a malicious .aspx web shell (spinstall0.aspx) that was written to the |
| .004 | Server Software Component: IIS Components |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors modified Internet Information Services (IIS) components to load suspicious .NET assemblies for persistence.[1] |
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| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors fingerprinted targeted SharePoint servers to identify OS version and running processes.[1] |
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| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors executed |
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| Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors leveraged PsExec for command execution and used |
| Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors accessed web.config and machine.config to extract MachineKey values, enabling them to forge legitimate VIEWSTATE tokens for future deserialization payloads.[1][3][5][6][2] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used WMI for execution.[1] |
|