KONNI is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. KONNI has significant code overlap with the NOKKI malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking KONNI to APT37.[1][2][3][4][5]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1548 | .002 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control |
KONNI has bypassed UAC by performing token impersonation as well as an RPC-based method, this included bypassing UAC set to "AlwaysNotify".[4][5] |
Enterprise | T1134 | .002 | Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token |
KONNI has duplicated the token of a high integrity process to spawn an instance of cmd.exe under an impersonated user.[4][5] |
.004 | Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing |
KONNI has used parent PID spoofing to spawn a new |
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Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | |
Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data |
KONNI has encrypted data and files prior to exfiltration.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
A version of KONNI has dropped a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.[1] |
.009 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification |
A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut on the victim’s machine to establish persistence.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | ||
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
KONNI used PowerShell to download and execute a specific 64-bit version of the malware.[1][5] |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
KONNI has used cmd.exe to execute arbitrary commands on the infected host across different stages of the infection chain.[1][4][5] |
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.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | |||
Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
KONNI has registered itself as a service using its export function.[5] |
Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers |
KONNI can steal profiles (containing credential information) from Firefox, Chrome, and Opera.[1] |
Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | Data Encoding: Standard Encoding |
KONNI has used a custom base64 key to encode stolen data before exfiltration.[4] |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
KONNI has stored collected information and discovered processes in a tmp file.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
KONNI has used certutil to download and decode base64 encoded strings and has also devoted a custom section to performing all the components of the deobfuscation process.[4][5] |
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Enterprise | T1573 | .001 | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography | |
Enterprise | T1546 | .015 | Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking |
KONNI has modified ComSysApp service to load the malicious DLL payload.[4] |
Enterprise | T1048 | .003 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
KONNI has used FTP to exfiltrate reconnaissance data out.[4] |
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | ||
Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
A version of KONNI searches for filenames created with a previous version of the malware, suggesting different versions targeted the same victims and the versions may work together.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | |
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
KONNI can download files and execute them on the victim’s machine.[1][5] |
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Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | |
Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
KONNI has pretended to be the xmlProv Network Provisioning service.[5] |
.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
KONNI has created a shortcut called "Anti virus service.lnk" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
KONNI has modified registry keys of ComSysApp, Svchost, and xmlProv on the machine to gain persistence.[4][5] |
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Enterprise | T1106 | Native API |
KONNI has hardcoded API calls within its functions to use on the victim's machine.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing | |
.013 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File |
KONNI is heavily obfuscated and includes encrypted configuration files.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment |
KONNI has been delivered via spearphishing campaigns through a malicious Word document.[5] |
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
KONNI has used the command |
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Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | ||
Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
KONNI has used Rundll32 to execute its loader for privilege escalation purposes.[4][5] |
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
KONNI can gather the OS version, architecture information, connected drives, hostname, RAM size, and disk space information from the victim’s machine and has used |
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Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
KONNI can collect the IP address from the victim’s machine.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | ||
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
KONNI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1204 | .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
KONNI has relied on a victim to enable malicious macros within an attachment delivered via email.[5] |