| Name | Description | 
|---|---|
| Chanitor | 
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[2] | 
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Hancitor has decoded Base64 encoded URLs to insert a recipient’s name into the filename of the Word document. Hancitor has also extracted executables from ZIP files.[1][2] | |
| Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Hancitor has the ability to download additional files from C2.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Hancitor has used  | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | ||
| .015 | Compression | Hancitor has delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims.[2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.[2] | 
| .002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link | Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.[1] | ||
| Enterprise | T1218 | .012 | System Binary Proxy Execution: Verclsid | Hancitor has used verclsid.exe to download and execute a malicious script.[3] | 
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | User Execution: Malicious Link | Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[1] | 
| .002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.[2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[2] | |