Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
|ADVSTORESHELL||ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2. |
|APT3||APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel. |
|APT32||APT32's backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server. |
|Astaroth||Astaroth exfiltrates collected information from its r1.log file to the external C2 server. |
|BACKSPACE||Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server. |
|Bankshot||Bankshot exfiltrates data over its C2 channel. |
|CallMe||CallMe exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications. |
|Cannon||Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels. |
|Emotet||Emotet has been seen exfiltrating system information stored within cookies sent within an HTTP GET request back to its C2 servers. |
|Empire||Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel. |
|Gamaredon Group||A Gamaredon Group file stealer transfers collected files to a hardcoded C2 server. |
|HAWKBALL||HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel. |
|HOPLIGHT||HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data. |
|Ke3chang||Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations. |
|Kimsuky||Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its email C2 channel. |
|Lazarus Group||Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is uploaded to one of its 10 C2 servers. Another Lazarus Group malware sample also performs exfiltration over the C2 channel.   |
|LightNeuron||LightNeuron exfiltrates data over its email C2 channel. |
|Machete||Machete's collected data is exfiltrated over the same channel used for C2. |
|MobileOrder||MobileOrder exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications. |
|NETEAGLE||NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel. |
|OopsIE||OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server. |
|Proxysvc||Proxysvc performs data exfiltration over the control server channel using a custom protocol. |
|Psylo||Psylo exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications. |
|Pteranodon||Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server. |
|Pupy||Pupy can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server. |
|Remexi||Remexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel. |
|ROKRAT||ROKRAT sends collected files back over same C2 channel. |
|Soft Cell||Soft Cell used Web shells and HTRAN for C2 as well as to exfiltrate data. |
|Stealth Falcon||After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel. |
|Zebrocy||Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests. |
|Network Intrusion Prevention||Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. |
Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. 
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