Operation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign "Honeybee" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.[1]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1548 | .002 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used the malicious NTWDBLIB.DLL and |
Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors registered domains for C2.[1] |
.004 | Acquire Infrastructure: Server |
For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1071 | .002 | Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors had the ability to use FTP for C2.[1] |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uses zip to pack collected files before exfiltration.[1] |
Enterprise | T1059 | .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
During Operation Honeybee, various implants used batch scripting and |
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
For Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script embedded within a Word document to download an implant.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors installed DLLs and backdoors as Windows services.[1] |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected data from compromised hosts.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format |
Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
During Operation Honeybee, malicious files were decoded prior to execution.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1585 | .002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts |
During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.[1] |
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a malicious DLL to search for files with specific keywords.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1574 | .011 | Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the |
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that reduced their fingerprint on a compromised system by deleting malware-related files.[1] |
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors downloaded additional malware and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.[1] |
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.005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a legitimate Windows executable and secure directory for their payloads to bypass UAC.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that modified registry keys.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1106 | Native API |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed malware that used API calls, including |
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Enterprise | T1027 | .013 | Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used Base64 to encode files with a custom key.[1] |
Enterprise | T1588 | .004 | Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates |
For Operation Honeybee, the threat actors stole a digital signature from Adobe Systems to use with their MaoCheng dropper.[1] |
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors obtained a list of running processes on a victim machine using |
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Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed the MaoCheng dropper with a stolen Adobe Systems digital signature.[1] |
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected the computer name, OS, and other system information using |
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Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors ran |
Enterprise | T1204 | .002 | User Execution: Malicious File |
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Word document.[1] |
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0106 | cmd | |
S0075 | Reg | |
S0464 | SYSCON |
Operation Honeybee included the use of an upgraded version of SYSCON.[1] |
S0096 | Systeminfo | |
S0057 | Tasklist |