Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log)
Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log)
Domain | ID | Name | Detects | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Mobile | T1638 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Mobile security products can potentially detect rogue Wi-Fi access points if the adversary is attempting to decrypt traffic using an untrusted SSL certificate. |
|
Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with processes performing collection activity, especially those involving abnormal/untrusted hosts. |
|
.001 | Traffic Duplication |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by abnormal or untrusted hosts. |
||
Enterprise | T1197 | BITS Jobs |
Monitor for newly constructed network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). |
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Enterprise | T1176 | Browser Extensions |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Enterprise | T1612 | Build Image on Host |
Monitor for established network communications with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that may indicate the download of malicious code. |
|
Enterprise | T1602 | Data from Configuration Repository |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access configuration content) |
|
.001 | SNMP (MIB Dump) |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows(e.g. snmp traffic originating from unauthorized or untrusted hosts, signature detection for strings mapped to device configuration(s), and anomolies in snmp request(s)) |
||
.002 | Network Device Configuration Dump |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access network configuration content) |
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Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network protocols such as SMB that revolve around network shares. |
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Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications or suspicious communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals as well as unusually long connection patterns). Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, protocol port mismatch, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated |
|
Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data. |
|
ICS | T0817 | Drive-by Compromise |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data. |
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Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.001 | Fast Flux DNS |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. |
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Enterprise | T1114 | Email Collection |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
.002 | Remote Email Collection |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
||
.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
||
.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
||
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on TCP network connection creation. |
|
Enterprise | T1011 | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on TCP network connection creation. The below analytic is using an event ID from OSQuery. |
|
.001 | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections to web and cloud services associated with abnormal or non-browser processes. |
|
.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections to cloud services associated with abnormal or non-browser processes. |
||
Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Valid Accounts to access and/or persist within a network using External Remote Services. Use of External Remote Services may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using External Remote Services. |
|
Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before may be suspicious. Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on TCP network connection creation. The below analytic is using an event ID from OSQuery. |
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Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. |
|
Enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
Enterprise | T1542 | Pre-OS Boot |
Monitor for newly constructed network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. |
|
.005 | TFTP Boot |
Monitor for newly constructed network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. [1] [2] The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. |
||
Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
.001 | Internal Proxy |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
||
.002 | External Proxy |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
||
.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
Enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor network connections involving common remote management protocols, such as ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900, as well as ports tcp: 3389 and tcp:22 for remote login. |
|
.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections (typically over port 3389) that may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Analytic 1 - Abnormal RDP Network Connections
|
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.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections (typically over ports 139 or 445), especially those that are sent or received by abnormal or untrusted hosts. Correlate these network connections with remote login events and associated SMB-related activity such as file transfers and remote process execution. Note: Event ID is for Zeek but can also be implemented in other Network Analysis Frameworks by parsing & decoding captured SMB2 network traffic. Preference would be to detect smb2_write_response event (instead of smb2_write_request), because it would confirm the file was actually written to the remote destination. Unfortunately, Bro/Zeek does not have an event for that SMB message-type yet. From a network traffic capture standpoint, it’s important to capture the right traffic for this type of detection to function (e.g., all endpoint to endpoint if possible or workstation to server and workstation to workstation). As such, it is helpful to have a centralized server area where it is possible to monitor communications between servers and endpoints. Analytic 1 and 2 are very similar, with the key difference being that Implementation 2 is intended to capture multiple attempts at lateral movement originating from the same host within a short time period (5 minutes).
From a network traffic capture standpoint, it’s important to capture the right traffic for this type of detection to function (e.g., all endpoint to endpoint if possible or workstation to server and workstation to workstation). As such, it is helpful to have a centralized server area where it is possible to monitor communications between servers and endpoints.The Service Control Manager (SCM) can be used to copy a file to the ADMIN$ share and execute it as a service. This can be detected by looking for incoming RPC network connections to the Service Control Manager, followed by services.exe spawning a child process. Analytic 1 - Basic
|
||
.003 | Distributed Component Object Model |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines using Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135). Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on RPC network flows. Traffic to the RPC Endpoint Mapper will always have the destination port of 135. Assuming success, RPC traffic will continue to the endpoint. The endpoint and the client both bind to dynamically assigned ports (on Windows, this is typically greater than 49152). The traffic between the client and endpoint can be detected by looking at traffic to 135 followed by traffic where the source and destination ports are at least 49152. |
||
.004 | SSH |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections (typically port 22) that may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Network Analysis Frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network traffic. Accordingly, they can be used to look for the creation of SSH network connections. |
||
.005 | VNC |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC. |
||
.006 | Windows Remote Management |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections using Windows Remote Management (WinRM), such as remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS). |
||
ICS | T0886 | Remote Services |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor network connections involving common remote management protocols, such as ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900, as well as ports tcp:3389 and tcp:22 for remote logins. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to enable remote logins. |
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Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. |
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Enterprise | T1496 | Resource Hijacking |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, look for connections to/from strange ports, as well as reputation of IPs and URLs related cryptocurrency hosts. |
|
.001 | Compute Hijacking |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Look for connections to/from strange ports, as well as reputation of IPs and URLs related to cryptocurrency hosts. In AWS environments, configure GuardDuty to alert when EC2 instances query IP addresses associated with known cryptocurrency activity.[3] |
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.002 | Bandwidth Hijacking |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Look for connections to/from strange ports. |
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Enterprise | T1029 | Scheduled Transfer |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
Enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.003 | CMSTP |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, such as Sysmon Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. Note: Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created). The Analytic looks for the creation of a new CMSTP.exe process which initiates a network connection to a non-local IP address. This is a specific implementation where CMSTP.exe can be leveraged to setup listeners that will receive and install malware from remote sources in a trusted fashion. Analytic 1 - CMSTP
|
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.005 | Mshta |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.007 | Msiexec |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.010 | Regsvr32 |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
|
Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.001 | Port Knocking |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.002 | Socket Filters |
Monitor recently started applications creating raw socket connections.[4] |
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Enterprise | T1204 | User Execution |
Monitor network traffic patterns associated with web-based user actions, such as clicking on phishing links or executing malware that tries to establish C2 communication. Analytic 1 - Web-based network connections to suspicious destinations.
|
|
.001 | Malicious Link |
Monitor for network connections to suspicious or external sites shortly after a user clicks on a link, especially if the URL is linked to phishing or malicious activities. Analytic 1 - Web-based network connections to suspicious destinations.
|
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ICS | T0863 | User Execution |
Monitor for newly constructed web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious destinations (e.g., destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). |
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Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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.003 | One-Way Communication |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
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Mobile | T1481 | Web Service |
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic. |
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.001 | Dead Drop Resolver |
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic. |
||
.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block bidirectional command and control traffic. |
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.003 | One-Way Communication |
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block one-way command and control traffic. |
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Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
Monitor network traffic for WMI connections for potential use to remotely edit configuration, start services, or query files. When remote WMI requests are over RPC it connects to a DCOM interface within the RPC group Look for instances of the WMI querying in network traffic, and find the cases where a process is launched immediately after a connection is seen. This essentially merges the request to start a remote process via WMI with the process execution. If other processes are spawned from wmiprvse.exe in this time frame, it is possible for race conditions to occur, and the wrong process may be merged. If this is the case, it may be useful to look deeper into the network traffic to see if the desired command can be extracted. After the WMI connection has been initialized, a process can be remotely launched using the command: This leaves artifacts at both a network (RPC) and process (command line) level. When After RPC authenticates, the RPC endpoint mapper opens a high port connection, through which the schtasks Remote Procedure Call is actually implemented. With the right packet decoders, or by looking for certain byte streams in raw data, these functions can be identified. When the command line is executed, it has the parent process of Certain strings can be identifiers of the WMI by looking up the interface UUID for This identifier is present three times during the RPC request phase. Any sensor that has access to the byte code as raw, decoded, or ASCII could implement this analytic. The transfer syntax is- UUID Thus, a great ASCII based signature is- Note: To detect WMI over RPC (using DCOM), a sensor needs to exist that has the insight into individual connections and can actually decode and make sense of RPC traffic. Specifically, WMI can be detected by looking at RPC traffic where the target interface matches that of WMI, which is IRemUnknown2. Look for instances of the WMI querying in network traffic, and find the cases where a process is launched immediately after a connection is seen. This essentially merges the request to start a remote process via WMI with the process execution. If other processes are spawned from wmiprvse.exe in this time frame, it is possible for race conditions to occur, and the wrong process may be merged. If this is the case, it may be useful to look deeper into the network traffic to see if the desired command can be extracted. Analytic 1 - Monitor for WMI over RPC (DCOM) connections. Look for the string RPCSS within the initial RPC connection on port 135/tcp.
|
Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Domain | ID | Name | Detects | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to LDAP and MSRPC that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). |
ICS | T0800 | Activate Firmware Update Mode |
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for information that an asset has been placed into Firmware Update Mode. |
|
Enterprise | T1595 | Active Scanning |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Scanning IP Blocks |
Monitoring the content of network traffic can help detect patterns associated with active scanning activities. This can include identifying repeated connection attempts, unusual scanning behaviors, or probing activity targeting multiple IP addresses across a network. |
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.002 | Vulnerability Scanning |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.003 | Wordlist Scanning |
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). |
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Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. |
|
.001 | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy. |
||
.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned. |
||
.003 | DHCP Spoofing |
Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally, monitor network traffic for rogue DHCPv6 activity. |
||
.004 | Evil Twin |
Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior involving evil twin attacks. Intrusion prevention systems (WIDS) can identify traffic patterns indicative of activity associated with evil twins, rogue access points, and adversary-in-the-middle activity. |
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ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. For Collection activity where transmitted data is not manipulated, anomalies may be present in network management protocols (e.g., ARP, DHCP). |
|
Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Web Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.002 | File Transfer Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | Mail Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.004 | DNS |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH), that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.005 | Publish/Subscribe Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0802 | Automated Collection |
Monitor for information collection on assets that may indicate deviations from standard operational tools. Examples include unexpected industrial automation protocol functions, new high volume communication sessions, or broad collection across many hosts within the network. |
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Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration |
Monitor network traffic content for evidence of data exfiltration, such as gratuitous or anomalous outbound traffic containing collected data. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command lines associated with collection and exfiltration. |
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ICS | T0806 | Brute Force I/O |
Monitor network traffic for ICS functions related to write commands for an excessive number of I/O points or manipulating a single value an excessive number of times. |
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Enterprise | T1612 | Build Image on Host |
Monitor for network traffic associated with requests and/or downloads of container images, especially those that may be anomalous or known malicious. |
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ICS | T0892 | Change Credential |
Monitor for device credential changes observable in automation or management network protocols. |
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ICS | T0858 | Change Operating Mode |
Monitor ICS management protocols for functions that change an asset’s operating mode. |
|
ICS | T0885 | Commonly Used Port |
Monitor for mismatches between protocols and their expected ports (e.g., non-HTTP traffic on tcp:80). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1586 | Compromise Accounts |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Social Media Accounts |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0884 | Connection Proxy |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
Enterprise | T1659 | Content Injection |
Monitor for other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional malicious content transferred to the system. Use network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, to look for known malicious payloads, content obfuscation, and exploit code. |
|
Enterprise | T1132 | Data Encoding |
Monitor for network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network protocols and packet contents. |
|
.001 | Standard Encoding |
Monitor for network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. |
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.002 | Non-Standard Encoding |
Monitor for network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. |
||
Enterprise | T1602 | Data from Configuration Repository |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access configuration content) |
|
.001 | SNMP (MIB Dump) |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flow (e.g. snmp traffic originating from unauthorized or untrusted hosts, signature detection for strings mapped to device configuration(s), and anomolies in snmp request(s)) |
||
.002 | Network Device Configuration Dump |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access network configuration content) |
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Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1565 | Data Manipulation |
Monitor for networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device. |
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.002 | Transmitted Data Manipulation |
Monitor for networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device. |
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Enterprise | T1001 | Data Obfuscation |
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. [5] |
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.001 | Junk Data |
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[5] |
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.002 | Steganography |
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[5] |
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.003 | Protocol or Service Impersonation |
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1491 | Defacement |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access internal and external websites and services). Consider correlating with application monitoring for indication of unplanned service interruptions or unauthorized content changes. |
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.001 | Internal Defacement |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | External Defacement |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0812 | Default Credentials |
Monitor network traffic for default credential use in protocols that allow unencrypted authentication. |
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ICS | T0814 | Denial of Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0868 | Detect Operating Mode |
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for functions related to reading an asset’s operating mode. In some cases, there may be multiple ways to detect a device’s operating mode, one of which is typically used in the operational environment. Monitor for the operating mode being checked in unexpected ways. |
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ICS | T0816 | Device Restart/Shutdown |
Monitor ICS automation protocols for functions that restart or shutdown a device. Commands to restart or shutdown devices may also be observable in traditional IT management protocols. |
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Enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to LDAP and MSRPC that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). |
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Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime |
Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious. |
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Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise |
Monitor for other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. Use network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. |
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ICS | T0817 | Drive-by Compromise |
Monitor for unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. Use network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. |
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Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | DNS Calculation |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | Symmetric Cryptography |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | Asymmetric Cryptography |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1499 | Endpoint Denial of Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | OS Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | Service Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | Application Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.004 | Application or System Exploitation |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1585 | Establish Accounts |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | Social Media Accounts |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1011 | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.001 | Exfiltration to Code Repository |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites |
Monitor and analyze network traffic for exfiltration attempts using text storage sites, i.e. POST requests to text storage sites. |
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.004 | Exfiltration Over Webhook |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection strings or known payloads. For example, monitor for successively chained functions that adversaries commonly abuse (i.e. gadget chaining) through unsafe deserialization to exploit publicly facing applications for initial access.[6] In AWS environments, monitor VPC flow logs and/or Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) logs going to and from instances hosting externally accessible applications. |
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ICS | T0819 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. |
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Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. |
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Mobile | T1428 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
Network traffic analysis could reveal patterns of compromise if devices attempt to access unusual targets or resources. |
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ICS | T0866 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. |
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Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1187 | Forced Authentication |
For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. Analytic 1 - Detection of NTLM hash traffic or other suspicious authentication traffic.
|
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Enterprise | T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information |
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. |
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.002 | Email Addresses |
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. |
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Enterprise | T1615 | Group Policy Discovery |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0891 | Hardcoded Credentials |
Monitor network traffic for hardcoded credential use in protocols that allow unencrypted authentication. |
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Enterprise | T1665 | Hide Infrastructure |
Network detection systems may be able to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure. Correlate network traffic with data and patterns from Internet-facing resources gathered from scans to gain further insight into potential adversary C2 networks. |
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Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.005 | Network Share Connection Removal |
Monitoring for SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. |
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Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Monitor network traffic content for files and other potentially malicious content, especially data coming in from abnormal/unknown domain and IPs. |
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Enterprise | T1534 | Internal Spearphishing |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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ICS | T0883 | Internet Accessible Device |
Monitor for unusual logins to Internet connected devices or unexpected protocols to/from the Internet. Network traffic content will provide valuable context and details about the content of network flows. |
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Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Monitor for unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious Note: Analytic Event Type is for Zeek but can also be implemented in other Network Analysis Frameworks by parsing & decoding captured SMB2 network traffic. From a network traffic capture standpoint, it’s important to capture the right traffic for this type of detection to function (e.g., all endpoint to endpoint if possible or workstation to server and workstation to workstation). As such, it is helpful to have a centralized server area where it is possible to monitor communications between servers and endpoints. |
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ICS | T0867 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Monitor for unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system which may be suspicious. |
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ICS | T0838 | Modify Alarm Settings |
Monitor for alarm setting changes observable in automation or management network protocols. |
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ICS | T0836 | Modify Parameter |
Monitor ICS management protocols for parameter changes, including for unexpected values, changes far exceeding standard values, or for parameters being changed in an unexpected way (e.g., via a new function, at an unusual time). |
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ICS | T0889 | Modify Program |
Monitor device management protocols for functions that modify programs such as online edit and program append events. |
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ICS | T0839 | Module Firmware |
Monitor ICS management protocols / file transfer protocols for protocol functions related to firmware changes. |
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ICS | T0801 | Monitor Process State |
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for functions related to reading an operational process state (e.g., "Read" function codes in protocols like DNP3 or Modbus). In some cases, there may be multiple ways to monitor an operational process’ state, one of which is typically used in the operational environment. Monitor for the operating mode being checked in unexpected ways. |
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Enterprise | T1599 | Network Boundary Bridging |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Network Address Translation Traversal |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port |
Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. |
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Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping |
Monitor for network protocols [7] [8] and other replication requests [9] from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. [10] Analytic 1 - Anomalous network traffic content related to credential managers
|
|
.006 | DCSync |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing |
Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.[11][12] |
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.001 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.[11][12] |
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.002 | Spearphishing Link |
Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Furthermore, monitor network traffic for cloned sites as well as homographs via the use of internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites). |
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.003 | Spearphishing via Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Mobile | T1660 | Phishing |
Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious. |
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Enterprise | T1598 | Phishing for Information |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Spearphishing Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.002 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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.003 | Spearphishing Link |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Furthermore, monitor network traffic for homographs via the use of internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites). Also monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection for indicators of cloned websites. For example, if adversaries use HTTrack to clone websites, |
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ICS | T0861 | Point & Tag Identification |
Monitor ICS automation protocols for anomalies related to reading point or tag data, such as new assets using these functions, changes in volume or timing, or unusual information being queried. Many protocols provide multiple ways to achieve the same result (e.g., functions with/without an acknowledgment or functions that operate on a single point vs. multiple points). Monitor for changes in the functions used. |
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ICS | T0843 | Program Download |
Monitor for protocol functions related to program download or modification. Program downloads may be observable in ICS automation protocols and remote management protocols. |
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ICS | T0845 | Program Upload |
Program uploads may be observable in ICS management protocols or file transfer protocols. Note when protocol functions related to program uploads occur. In cases where the ICS protocols is not well understood, one option is to examine network traffic for the program files themselves using signature-based tools. |
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Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Internal Proxy |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.002 | External Proxy |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.004 | Domain Fronting |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
Enterprise | T1563 | Remote Service Session Hijacking |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | SSH Hijacking |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.002 | RDP Hijacking |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network protocols including RDP. |
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ICS | T0846 | Remote System Discovery |
Monitor for anomalies related to discovery related ICS functions, including devices that have not previously used these functions or for functions being sent to many outstations. Note that some ICS protocols use broadcast or multicast functionality, which may produce false positives. Also monitor for hosts enumerating network connected resources using non-ICS enterprise protocols. |
|
ICS | T0888 | Remote System Information Discovery |
Monitor for anomalies related to discovery related ICS functions, including devices that have not previously used these functions or for functions being sent to many outstations. Note that some ICS protocols use broadcast or multicast functionality, which may produce false positives. Also monitor for hosts enumerating network connected resources using non-ICS enterprise protocols. |
|
Enterprise | T1496 | Resource Hijacking |
Monitor network traffic content for resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. Note: Destination Host Name is not a comprehensive list of potential cryptocurrency URLs. This analytic has a hardcoded domain name which may change. |
|
.001 | Compute Hijacking |
Monitor network traffic content for resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. |
||
.002 | Bandwidth Hijacking |
Monitor network traffic content for strange or unusual patterns. |
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Enterprise | T1207 | Rogue Domain Controller |
Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. [13][14] DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). |
|
ICS | T0848 | Rogue Master |
Monitor for unexpected ICS protocol functions from new and existing devices. Monitoring known devices requires ICS function level insight to determine if an unauthorized device is issuing commands (e.g., a historian). |
|
Enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). [15] |
|
.003 | Web Shell |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
ICS | T0865 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Monitor network traffic for suspicious email attachments. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Use web proxies to review content of emails including sender information, headers, and attachments for potentially malicious content. |
|
ICS | T0856 | Spoof Reporting Message |
Spoofed reporting messages may be detected by reviewing the content of automation protocols, either through detecting based on expected values or comparing to other out of band process data sources. Spoofed messages may not precisely match legitimate messages which may lead to malformed traffic, although traffic may be malformed for many benign reasons. Monitor reporting messages for changes in how they are constructed. Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity. |
|
ICS | T0869 | Standard Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
ICS | T0857 | System Firmware |
Monitor ICS management protocols / file transfer protocols for protocol functions related to firmware changes. |
|
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network protocols. |
|
Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
Monitor and analyze network packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, protocol port mismatch, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider packet inspection for Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of |
|
Enterprise | T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Monitor network traffic content for evidence of data exfiltration, such as gratuitous or anomalous internal traffic containing collected data. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command lines associated with collection and exfiltration. |
|
Enterprise | T1199 | Trusted Relationship |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) from a trusted entity. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
ICS | T0855 | Unauthorized Command Message |
Monitor for unexpected ICS protocol command functions to controllers from existing master devices (including from new processes) or from new devices. The latter is like detection for Rogue Master but requires ICS function level insight to determine if an unauthorized device is issuing commands (e.g., a historian). Monitoring for unexpected or problematic values below the function level will provide better insights into potentially malicious activity but at the cost of additional false positives depending on the underlying operational process. |
|
Enterprise | T1204 | User Execution |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated with web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious detinations (e.g. destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, .SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). |
|
.001 | Malicious Link |
Inspect the content of the network traffic to look for signs of suspicious web traffic, such as phishing links or abnormal HTTP GET/POST requests. Analytic 1 - Suspicious network traffic content
|
||
ICS | T0863 | User Execution |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated with web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious destinations (e.g., destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). |
|
Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Dead Drop Resolver |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.003 | One-Way Communication |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Domain | ID | Name | Detects | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1595 | Active Scanning |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
.001 | Scanning IP Blocks |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.002 | Vulnerability Scanning |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
|
.001 | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
||
.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
||
.003 | DHCP Spoofing |
Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. |
||
.004 | Evil Twin |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing), as well as usage of network management protocols such as enabling DHCP snooping, may be helpful in identifying rogue hardware.[17] Additionally, wireless pentesting hardware is often limited to older |
||
ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hosts. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Adversary-in-the-Middle and applicable sub-techniques. |
|
ICS | T0878 | Alarm Suppression |
Monitor for loss of network traffic which could indicate alarms are being suppressed. A loss of expected communications associated with network protocols used to communicate alarm events or process data could indicate this technique is being used. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. |
|
Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
.001 | Web Protocols |
Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.002 | File Transfer Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.003 | Mail Protocols |
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.004 | DNS |
Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
.005 | Publish/Subscribe Protocols |
Monitor for traffic leveraging common publish/subscribe protocols to/from known-bad or suspicious domains and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration |
Monitor and analyze network flows associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider analyzing newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, unexpected hardware devices, or other uncommon data flows. |
|
.001 | Traffic Duplication |
Monitor and analyze network flows associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider analyzing newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, unexpcted hardware devices, or other uncommon data flows. |
||
ICS | T0803 | Block Command Message |
Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used. |
|
ICS | T0804 | Block Reporting Message |
Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used. |
|
ICS | T0805 | Block Serial COM |
Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used. |
|
Enterprise | T1612 | Build Image on Host |
Monitor for established network communications with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that may indicate the download of malicious code. |
|
ICS | T0885 | Commonly Used Port |
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., new protocols in use between hosts, unexpected ports in use). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
ICS | T0884 | Connection Proxy |
Monitor for known proxy protocols (e.g., SOCKS, Tor, peer-to-peer protocols) and tool usage (e.g., Squid, peer-to-peer software) on the network that are not part of normal operations. Also monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Monitor for several ways that code can execute on a remote host. One of the most common methods is via the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM), which allows authorized users to remotely create and modify services. Several tools, such as PsExec, use this functionality. When a client remotely communicates with the Service Control Manager, there are two observable behaviors. First, the client connects to the RPC Endpoint Mapper over 135/tcp. This handles authentication, and tells the client what port the endpoint—in this case the SCM—is listening on. Then, the client connects directly to the listening port on services.exe. If the request is to start an existing service with a known command line, the the SCM process will run the corresponding command. This compound behavior can be detected by looking for services.exe receiving a network connection and immediately spawning a child process. |
Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network protocols such as SMB that revolve around network shares. Although there may be more native ways to detect detailed SMB events on the host, they can be extracted out of network traffic. With the right protocol decoders, port 445 traffic can be filtered and even the file path (relative to the share) can be retrieved. Looking at this activity more closely to obtain an adequate sense of situational awareness may make it possible to detect adversaries moving between hosts in a way that deviates from normal activity. Because SMB traffic is heavy in many environments, this analytic may be difficult to turn into something that can be used to quickly detect an APT. In some cases, it may make more sense to run this analytic in a forensic fashion. Looking through and filtering its output after an intrusion has been discovered may be helpful in identifying the scope of compromise. |
|
Enterprise | T1565 | Data Manipulation |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. |
|
.002 | Transmitted Data Manipulation |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. |
||
Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits |
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
|
ICS | T0814 | Denial of Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
ICS | T0816 | Device Restart/Shutdown |
Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate a device has been shutdown or restarted. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. |
|
Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
.001 | Fast Flux DNS |
In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection. |
||
.002 | Domain Generation Algorithms |
Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more. [19] CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA. [20] Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated[21]] |
||
Enterprise | T1499 | Endpoint Denial of Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
.001 | OS Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.002 | Service Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.003 | Application Exhaustion Flood |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.004 | Application or System Exploitation |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
.001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
Enterprise | T1011 | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows., such as the usage of abnormal/unexpected protocols. |
|
.001 | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows., such as the usage of abnormal/unexpected protocols. |
||
Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
.001 | Exfiltration to Code Repository |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Monitor for use of code repositories for data exfiltration. |
||
.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Monitor for cloud storages for data exfiltration. |
||
.003 | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows, specifically to text storage sites such as |
||
.004 | Exfiltration Over Webhook |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
||
Enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution |
Look for unusual outbound connections following abnormal process execution, as this could indicate an adversary has established a foothold and is initiating communication with C2 infrastructure. Analytic 1 - monitors for network traffic generated by exploited processes
|
|
Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
|
ICS | T0822 | External Remote Services |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected systems. |
|
Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows, such as unexpected surges or other abnormal inbound/outbound patterns. |
|
Enterprise | T1187 | Forced Authentication |
Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems.If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. Analytic 1 - Unusual network traffic patterns indicative of forced authentication attempts.
|
|
Enterprise | T1200 | Hardware Additions |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
|
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
Enterprise | T1534 | Internal Spearphishing |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
ICS | T0883 | Internet Accessible Device |
Monitor for unexpected protocols to/from the Internet. While network traffic content and logon session metadata may directly identify a login event, new Internet-based network flows may also be a reliable indicator of this technique. |
|
Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
|
ICS | T0867 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hosts. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
|
Mobile | T1430 | .002 | Location Tracking: Impersonate SS7 Nodes |
Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.[22] The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members. |
Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
Remote access to the registry can be achieved via
All of these behaviors call into the Windows API, which uses the NamedPipe WINREG over SMB to handle the protocol information. This network can be decoded with wireshark or a similar sensor, and can also be detected by hooking the API function. Analytic 1 - Remote Registry
|
|
Enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
|
Enterprise | T1599 | Network Boundary Bridging |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Network Address Translation Traversal |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1498 | Network Denial of Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Direct Network Flood |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | Reflection Amplification |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. It should be noted that when a host/ port/ service scan is performed from a compromised machine, a single machine makes multiple calls to other hosts in the network to identify live hosts and services. After compromising an initial machine, adversaries commonly attempt to laterally move across the network. The first step to attempt the Lateral Movement often involves conducting host identification, port and service scans on the internal network via the compromised machine using tools such as Nmap, Cobalt Strike, etc. Note: It should be noted that when a host/ port/ service scan is performed from a compromised machine, a single machine makes multiple calls to other hosts in the network to identify live hosts and services. This can be detected using the following query Analytic 1 - Identifying Port Scanning Activity
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Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port |
Monitor network data flows for unexpected patterns and metadata that may be indicative of a mismatch between protocol and utilized port. |
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Mobile | T1509 | Non-Standard Port |
Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports. |
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Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analytic 1 - Unusual network communication patterns.
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.006 | DCSync |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | Spearphishing Link |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.003 | Spearphishing via Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Mobile | T1660 | Phishing |
Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise. |
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Enterprise | T1598 | Phishing for Information |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Spearphishing Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.003 | Spearphishing Link |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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ICS | T0845 | Program Upload |
Monitor device communication patterns to identify irregular bulk transfers of data between the embedded ICS asset and other nodes within the network. Note these indicators are dependent on the profile of normal operations and the capabilities of the industrial automation protocols involved (e.g., partial program uploads). |
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Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Internal Proxy |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | External Proxy |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Mobile | T1604 | Proxy Through Victim |
Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise. |
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Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1563 | Remote Service Session Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | SSH Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | RDP Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. RDP sessions may be split up into multiple flows and would therefore need to be aggregated. Anomaly detection using machine learning or other methods based on baselined RDP network flows may be a viable approach to alerting on potential RDP session hijacking. |
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Enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows that may be related to abuse of Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC. Note: Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on network service protocols such as SSH and RDP. Analytic 1 - Suspicious Protocols
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.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol |
Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows that may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), built in to Microsoft operating systems, allows a user to remotely log in to the desktop of another host. It allows for interactive access of the running windows, and forwards key presses, mouse clicks, etc. Network administrators, power users, and end-users may use RDP for day-to-day operations. From an adversary’s perspective, RDP provides a means to laterally move to a new host. Determining which RDP connections correspond to adversary activity can be a difficult problem in highly dynamic environments, but will be useful in identifying the scope of a compromise.Remote Desktop can be detected in several ways
Analytic 1 - Suspicious RDP
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.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Monitor network data for uncommon SMB data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on SMB network flows. Notes:
Analytic 1 - SMB Write
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.006 | Windows Remote Management |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network Analysis frameworks such as Zeek can be used to capture, decode, and alert on RPC network flows. When a Windows Remote Management connection is opened, the client sends HTTP requests to port 5985 for HTTP or 5986 for HTTPS on the target host. Each HTTP(S) request to the URI "/wsman" is called, and other information is set in the headers. Depending on the operation, the HTTP method may vary (i.e., GET, POST, etc.). This analytic would detect Remote PowerShell, as well as other communications that rely on WinRM. Additionally, it outputs the executable on the client host, the connection information, and the hostname of the target host. Look for network connections to port 5985 and 5986. To really decipher what is going on, these outputs should be fed into something that can do packet analysis. Note: Traffic to the RPC Endpoint Mapper will always have the destination port of 135. Assuming success, RPC traffic will continue to the endpoint. The endpoint and the client both bind to dynamically assigned ports (on Windows, this is typically greater than 49152). The traffic between the client and endpoint can be detected by looking at traffic to 135 followed by traffic where the source and destination ports are at least 49152. |
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ICS | T0886 | Remote Services |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., time of day, unusual source/destination address) that may be related to abuse of Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. |
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ICS | T0846 | Remote System Discovery |
Monitor for new ICS protocol connections to existing assets or for device scanning (i.e., a host connecting to many devices) over ICS and enterprise protocols (e.g., ICMP, DCOM, WinRM). For added context on adversary enterprise procedures and background see Remote System Discovery. |
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ICS | T0888 | Remote System Information Discovery |
Monitor for new ICS protocol connections to existing assets or for device scanning (i.e., a host connecting to many devices) over ICS and enterprise protocols (e.g., ICMP, DCOM, WinRM). |
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Enterprise | T1496 | Resource Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Compute Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | Bandwidth Hijacking |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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ICS | T0848 | Rogue Master |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected devices or addresses. Local network traffic metadata could be used to identify unexpected connections, including unknown/unexpected source MAC addresses connecting to ports associated with operational protocols. Also, network management protocols such as DHCP and ARP may be helpful in identifying unexpected devices. |
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Enterprise | T1053 | .002 | Scheduled Task/Job: At |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. When AT.exe is used to remotely schedule tasks, Windows uses named pipes over SMB to communicate with the API on the remote machine. After authentication over SMB, the Named Pipe This pipe activity could be discovered with a network decoder, such as that in wireshark, that can inspect SMB traffic to identify the use of pipes. It could also be detected by looking for raw packet capture streams or from a custom sensor on the host that hooks the appropriate API functions. If no network or API level of visibility is possible, this traffic may inferred by looking at SMB connections over 445/tcp followed by the creation of files matching the pattern To detect AT via network traffic, a sensor is needed that has the ability to extract and decode PCAP information. Specifically, it needs to properly decode SMB and the functions that are implemented over it via NamedPipes. If a sensor meets these criteria, then the PCAP data needs to search for instances of the command Analytic 1 - Remotely Scheduled Tasks via AT
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.005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Look for RPC traffic after being mapped, which implies a destination port of at least 49152. If network inspection is available via packet captures or a NIDS, then traffic through the When scheduled tasks are created remotely, Windows uses RPC (135/tcp) to communicate with the Task Scheduler on the remote machine. Once an RPC connection is established, the client communicates with the Scheduled Tasks endpoint, which runs within the service group netsvcs. With packet capture and the right packet decoders or byte-stream based signatures, remote invocations of these functions can be identified.Certain strings can be identifiers of the schtasks, by looking up the interface UUID of ITaskSchedulerService in different formats
This identifier is present three times during the RPC request phase. Any sensor that has access to the byte code as raw, decoded, or ASCII could implement an analytic. Analytic 1 - Look for RPC traffic with ITaskSchedulerService interface usage.
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Enterprise | T1029 | Scheduled Transfer |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. |
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Enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.003 | Web Shell |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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ICS | T0856 | Spoof Reporting Message |
Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity which may precede this technique. |
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ICS | T0869 | Standard Application Layer Protocol |
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows , or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
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Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling |
Monitor and analyze network flows associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider analyzing newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, unexpcted hardware devices, or other uncommon data flows. |
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.001 | Port Knocking |
Monitor and analyze network flows associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider analyzing newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts, unexpcted hardware devices, or other uncommon data flows. |
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ICS | T0864 | Transient Cyber Asset |
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) may be helpful in identifying transient assets. |
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ICS | T0855 | Unauthorized Command Message |
Monitor for new or unexpected connections to controllers, which could indicate an Unauthorized Command Message being sent via Rogue Master. |
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Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.001 | Dead Drop Resolver |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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.003 | One-Way Communication |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
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ICS | T0860 | Wireless Compromise |
New or irregular network traffic flows may indicate potentially unwanted devices or sessions on wireless networks. In Wi-Fi networks monitor for changes such as rogue access points or low signal strength, indicating a device is further away from the access point then expected and changes in the physical layer signal.[23] [24] Network traffic content will provide important context, such as hardware (e.g., MAC) addresses, user accounts, and types of messages sent. |
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ICS | T0887 | Wireless Sniffing |
Purely passive network sniffing cannot be detected effectively. In cases where the adversary interacts with the wireless network (e.g., joining a Wi-Fi network) detection may be possible. Monitor for new or irregular network traffic flows which may indicate potentially unwanted devices or sessions on wireless networks. In Wi-Fi networks monitor for changes such as rogue access points or low signal strength, indicating a device is further away from the access point then expected and changes in the physical layer signal.[23] [24] Network traffic content will provide important context, such as hardware (e.g., MAC) addresses, user accounts, and types of messages sent. |