Windows Management Instrumentation

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) [1] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) [2] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. [3]

An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. [4] [5]

ID: T1047
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Execution
Platforms: Windows
System Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running; Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination; SMB authentication.
Permissions Required: Administrator, User
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Supports Remote:  Yes
Version: 1.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 13 May 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0331 Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla has used wmi queries to gather information from the system.[6]

G0016 APT29

APT29 used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.[7] They have also used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement.[8][9]

G0050 APT32

APT32 used WMI to deploy their tools on remote machines and to gather information about the Outlook process.[10]

G0096 APT41

APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit.[11]

S0373 Astaroth

Astaroth uses WMIC to execute payloads. [12]

S0534 Bazar

Bazar can execute a WMI query to gather information about the installed antivirus engine.[13][14]

S0089 BlackEnergy

A BlackEnergy 2 plug-in uses WMI to gather victim host details.[15]

G0108 Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe to set environment variables.[16]

G0114 Chimera

Chimera has used WMIC to execute remote commands.[17][18]

S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.[19]

S0488 CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can execute remote commands using Windows Management Instrumentation.[20]

G0009 Deep Panda

The Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement.[21]

S0062 DustySky

The DustySky dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an anti-virus is active.[22]

S0367 Emotet

Emotet has used WMI to execute powershell.exe.[23]

S0363 Empire

Empire can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.[24]

S0396 EvilBunny

EvilBunny has used WMI to gather information about the system.[25]


EVILNUM has used the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) tool to enumerate infected machines.[26]


FELIXROOT uses WMI to query the Windows Registry.[27]

G0037 FIN6

FIN6 has used WMI to automate the remote execution of PowerShell scripts.[28]

G0061 FIN8

FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn cmd.exe execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC during and post compromise cleanup activities.[29][30]

S0381 FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy leverages WMI to enumerate anti-virus on the victim.[31]

G0101 Frankenstein

Frankenstein has used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running, as well as the operating system version.[32]


GALLIUM used WMI for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for installing tools across multiple assets.[33]

S0237 GravityRAT

GravityRAT collects various information via WMI requests, including CPU information in the Win32_Processor entry (Processor ID, Name, Manufacturer and the clock speed).[34]


HALFBAKED can use WMI queries to gather system information.[35]


HOPLIGHT has used WMI to recompile the Managed Object Format (MOF) files in the WMI repository.[36]

S0483 IcedID

IcedID has used WMI to execute binaries.[37]

S0357 Impacket

Impacket's wmiexec module can be used to execute commands through WMI.[38]

S0283 jRAT

jRAT uses WMIC to identify anti-virus products installed on the victim’s machine and to obtain firewall details.[39]

S0265 Kazuar

Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying.[40]

S0250 Koadic

Koadic can use WMI to execute commands.[41]


KOMPROGO is capable of running WMI queries.[42]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line application wmic to start itself on a target system during lateral movement.[43][44]

G0065 Leviathan

Leviathan has used WMI for execution.[45]

S0532 Lucifer

Lucifer can use WMI to log into remote machines for propagation.[46]

S0449 Maze

Maze has used WMI to attempt to delete the shadow volumes on a machine, and to connect a virtual machine to the network domain of the victim organization's network.[47][48]

G0045 menuPass

menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs, which logs into a remote machine using WMI.[49][50][51]

S0339 Micropsia

Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.[52][53]

S0553 MoleNet

MoleNet can perform WMI commands on the system.[54]

S0256 Mosquito

Mosquito's installer uses WMI to search for antivirus display names.[55]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.[56][57][58]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has executed PowerShell scripts via WMI.[59][60]

S0457 Netwalker

Netwalker can use WMI to delete Shadow Volumes.[61]

S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.[62][63]

S0340 Octopus

Octopus uses wmic.exe for local discovery information.[64]

G0049 OilRig

OilRig has used WMI for execution.[65]

S0365 Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer uses WMI to help propagate itself across a network.[66]

S0264 OopsIE

OopsIE uses WMI to perform discovery techniques.[67]

G0116 Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used WMI to execute commands.[68]

S0378 PoshC2

PoshC2 has a number of modules that use WMI to execute tasks.[69]

S0194 PowerSploit

PowerSploit's Invoke-WmiCommand CodeExecution module uses WMI to execute and retrieve the output from a PowerShell payload.[70][71]


POWERSTATS can use WMI queries to retrieve data from compromised hosts.[72][57]


POWRUNER may use WMI when collecting information about a victim.[73]


RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.[74][75]

S0375 Remexi

Remexi executes received commands with wmic.exe (for WMI commands). [76]

S0496 REvil

REvil can use WMI to monitor for and kill specific processes listed in its configuration file.[77][78]

S0270 RogueRobin

RogueRobin uses various WMI queries to check if the sample is running in a sandbox.[79][80]

S0546 SharpStage

SharpStage can use WMI for execution.[54][81]

S0589 Sibot

Sibot has used WMI to discover network connections and configurations. Sibot has also used the Win32_Process class to execute a malicious DLL.[82]

G0038 Stealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).[83]

S0380 StoneDrill

StoneDrill has used the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to run tasks.[84]


SUNBURST used the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.[85]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.[86]

S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif droppers have used WMI classes to execute PowerShell commands.[87]

S0476 Valak

Valak can use wmic process call create in a scheduled task to launch plugins and for execution.[88]

S0366 WannaCry

WannaCry utilizes wmic to delete shadow copies.[89][90][91]

G0112 Windshift

Windshift has used WMI to collect information about target machines.[92]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and to move laterally.[93][94][95][96]

S0251 Zebrocy

One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.[97]


ID Mitigation Description
M1026 Privileged Account Management

Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. [5]

M1018 User Account Management

By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI.


Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. [5]


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