Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts

ID Name
T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
T1585.002 Email Accounts

Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.[1][2]

For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.

Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.[1][2] These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).

ID: T1585.001
Sub-technique of:  T1585
Tactic: Resource Development
Platforms: PRE
Version: 1.0
Created: 01 October 2020
Last Modified: 15 April 2021

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0050 APT32

APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.[3]

G0003 Cleaver

Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.[4]

G0117 Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.[5]

G0034 Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.[6]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise

This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

Detection

Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.

Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).

References